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The Rise and Fall of Fear of Abuse in Consumer
Bankruptcy: Most Recent Comparative Evidence
from Europe and Beyond
Jason J. Kilborn*
Abstract: Prepared for a symposium celebrating the groundbreaking
career of Jay Westbrook, this Article examines recent evidence of fear of
abuse of the benefits of consumer bankruptcy and the gradual abatement of
that fear in modern consumer insolvency law reform. It marshals evidence
of a recent and accelerating retreat in both the judicial discretion that
Westbrook attributed to lawmakers' fear of abuse and other more direct
techniques to avoid abusive recourse to consumer discharge. Fear of abuse
appears to be diminishing with accumulated experience as indicated by
recent liberalizing reforms in Denmark, Slovakia, Poland, Austria, Russia,
and Romania. At the same time, evidence from countries that have only begun
to develop policies on personal insolvency and discharge-Croatia,
Bulgaria, China, and Saudi Arabia-indicate that fear, or at least resistance
to discharge relief clearly persists.
Law is fundamentally a social science. Its theories usually can and
should be tested based not just on the behavior of appellate courts but also on
anthropological evidence of the actual frontline form and effect of law's
regulation of human behavior. Jay Westbrook has led the charge in an
enormously fruitful campaign of discovery of such evidence in the United
States.' Our federalist legal system offers a natural laboratory for comparison
of different approaches and outcomes in a checkerboard of state and federal
districts and their various actors' often widely divergent approaches to key
issues. This is surprisingly true even in the supposedly unified federal
* Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School (Chicago) and Van der Grinten Professor of
International & Comparative Insolvency Law, Business & Law Research Centre, Radboud
University (Nijmegen, The Netherlands), jkilbom@jmls.edu.
1. See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS
WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 17-20 (1989)
(describing the methodology behind the authors' Consumer Bankruptcy Project, a study of debtors
in ten federal judicial districts across the United States); TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH
WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 7-
11 (2000) (discussing Phase II of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project, which focused on debtors in
sixteen federal districts); Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook,
Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial Comparison of Consumer Bankrupts 1981-1991,
68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121, 122-24 (1994) (same).
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consumer bankruptcy system. Opportunities for comparative analysis are
supercharged, however, when one moves outside the United States and
beyond the Anglo-American context on which most consumer bankruptcy
scholarship has focused.
Almost exactly twenty years ago, Jay extrapolated his research on U.S.
consumer bankruptcy to the new frontier of emerging consumer insolvency
systems in Europe. In so doing, he launched a field of scholarship that would
yield rich rewards. Before the turn of the twenty-first century, there was all
but nothing in Europe to compare with Anglo-American consumer
bankruptcy practice. 2 By the late 1990s, however, the first consumer
discharge procedures were emerging in Northern Europe and had produced a
foundation of operational results for comparison. Jay was among the first
Americans to seize this new opportunity.
In a short commentary on one of the earliest comparative consumer
bankruptcy conferences in Europe, Jay noted the potential of comparative
perspectives on the topic.3 At that time, he was studying judicial discretion
and a resulting pernicious phenomenon that he referred to as "local legal
culture," marked by persistent disparate treatment of similarly situated
consumer debtors across the United States. 4 The comparative conference
offered Jay a chance to extrapolate his U.S. findings to the few emerging
consumer discharge regimes in Europe and to develop hypotheses as to the
causes of the phenomenon of local legal culture. He noted that even the sparse
European data revealed the emergence of local legal culture as a consequence
of judicial discretion, particularly in determining (1) whether certain debtors
should have access to a discharge and (2) the duration of the payment plan
imposed on debtors as a quid pro quo for earning discharge relief.5
In light of his U.S. research, augmented by this limited set of
comparative observations, Jay tentatively suggested a cause for the discretion
producing these local legal culture disparities on both sides of the Atlantic:
he attributed this syndrome to a powerful fear of abuse by debtors of the
benefit of consumer discharge relief, a benefit that was radical and
revolutionary in Europe and still somewhat controversial in the United
2. When U.S. reformers were looking for comparative ideas for revision of the U.S. bankruptcy
law in the 1970s, they concluded "the bankruptcy experience of other countries is not a useful
resource." COMM'N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 66 (1973).
3. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Local Legal Culture and the Fear ofAbuse, 6 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REv. 25, 33-34 (1998).
4. See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of
Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidencefrom the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARv. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 801, 803-07 (1994) (applying the concept of local legal culture to bankruptcy law);
Westbrook, supra note 3, at 26-27 (elaborating upon the concept of local legal culture).
5. Westbrook, supra note 3, at 25, 32-33.
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States.6 He optimistically predicted "[fJurther research over the next several
years in the various countries that have adopted these new laws could yield a
rich harvest of new evidence and perhaps unexpected variations."7
This commentary was published just as I was beginning my academic
career, and it inspired everything I have done since then. It is extremely
gratifying to be able to celebrate Jay's career in this symposium issue by
adducing recent comparative evidence in support of his thesis in that early
commentary and by providing a small taste of the "rich harvest of new
evidence" 8 from the most recent developments in consumer bankruptcy in
Europe and beyond. As Jay predicted, European authorities have been
extremely concerned about debtors abusing the new discharge regimes, and
common impediments to relief have been far more obvious and imposing
than the nuanced effects of discretion and the resulting local legal culture.
Twenty years after Jay identified this fear of abuse, however, a thaw is
manifest in the icy European attitude, as evidenced in particular by
developments over just the past few months. Fear of abuse-and
discretionary or statutory mechanisms for making the path to discharge
narrower and more onerous-appears to be diminishing with time and
experience. This message needs to be broadcast more effectively, as several
projects for new consumer discharge laws reveal a resurgence of fear of abuse
or at least reticence to embrace the notion of discharge relief. Thus, the
vicious cycle repeats itself.
This Article presents the most recent evidence of these propositions in
three segments. Part I discusses three regimes that exemplify the trends
discussed above-that is, extremely fearful, highly discretionary procedures
that abruptly reversed course on fear of abuse after a decade or two of
operation but retained significant court discretion (Denmark, Slovakia,
Poland). Part II announces some of the most recent developments, including
notable harbingers of both a softening of fear of abuse and a reining-in of
discretion across Europe (Austria, Russia, Croatia, Romania). Part III looks
to the future of several nascent personal insolvency regimes-in-waiting,
which evidence a return to square one and a high degree of fear or resistance
to discharge (Bulgaria, China, Saudi Arabia). Like Jay's commentary, mine
here is designed primarily to stimulate interest in and discussions of
developments of which many followers of English-language legal
scholarship will be unaware9 but which hold great potential for revealing
6. Id. at 28.
7. Id. at 33-34.
8. Id. at 34.
9. See id. at 25-26 (noting that the value of the paper "will lie in stimulating discussion by




important cross-cultural trends about this important area of legal and social
policy.
I. From Fear and Discretion to Acceptance and Greater Standardization
A. Denmark 1984-2005
The first story is a bit dated, but it is both closely connected to Jay's
early foray into comparative consumer bankruptcy and perfectly revealing of
the trend away from the discretion and fear he described. Denmark was the
bellwether, adopting the very first consumer "debt adjustment" 10 law in
Europe in 1984." The Danish law was structured very much like the
Norwegian law that caught Jay's interest,12 as a persistent problem of local
legal culture plagued Danish practice for two decades and led to the only
major reform of this law in 2005. This syndrome of local legal culture
resulting from judicial discretion was fairly clearly born of a powerful fear
of abuse of this radical departure from the traditional pacta sunt servanda
notion that debts must be paid. Trailblazing Danish lawmakers were
expressly hesitant to undermine individual-payment morality, so they
imposed strict, discretionary access controls at both the entry and exit points
to discharge relief.
Simply to gain access to the relief process, debtors had to clear two
hurdles. First, they had to exhibit "qualified insolvency," which implied a
clear and doubt-free inability to regain financial footing in the foreseeable
future, by reducing profligate living standards and redoubling efforts to
service debts in full.' 3 Second, as in Norway,' 4 each court had to be convinced
that offering relief in any particular case was subjectively appropriate in light
of a series of enumerated factors, such as the debtor's efforts to manage debt
problems and the makeup of the debt load (preferably relatively few fines,
penalties, and "irresponsible" debts, such as debts for luxury consumption)."
Predictably, the highly subjective and probing inquiries prompted by these
two tests produced widely and persistently divergent results among debtors
10. This is the usual language used to name these laws in continental Europe, eschewing both
the stigma and the suggestion of an easy way out implicit in the word "bankruptcy."
11. Lov nr. 187 af 09.05.1984 om gldssaneringslov [Law No. 187 of 9 May 1984 on consumer
debt adjustment], af konkurslov afsnit IV, kapitel 25-29 [at Bankruptcy Act Section IV, Chapters
25-29] (Den.) [hereinafter Konkurslov].
12. See Westbrook, supra note 3, at 32-33 (discussing the discretionary elements of Norwegian
bankruptcy law, which produced local variations similar to those observed in the United States).
13. Konkurslov, supra note 11, 197.
14. See Westbrook, supra note 3, at 32 (discussing the Norwegian law's requirement that the
debtor's bankruptcy be "permanent in nature").
15. Jason J. Kilborn, Twenty-Five Years of Consumer Bankruptcy in Continental Europe: In-
ternalizing Negative Externalities and Humanizing Justice in Denmark, 18 INT'L INSOLVENCY REV.
155, 168 (2009).
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based on little more than the location of the governing court. In 2002, for
example, while the court in Odense admitted approximately 66% of its 161
debt adjustment applications, "the court in Roskilde admitted only 39% of its
139 applicants, and the court in Copenhagen admitted a mere 25% of [its]
828 applications." 16 For debtors who navigated past this Scylla, the
Charybdis of court confirmation of debtors' five-year debt adjustment plans
presented an equally daunting and equally divergent challenge. While the
court in Arhus closed 41% of its 244 cases with a confirmed plan, "the courts
in Alborg and Randers confirmed plans in only 19% and 15%, respectively,
of the 136 cases closed" by each of these courts, and "[a]s in most years, the
Copenhagen court had a miserly success rate of only 13% of its 8,689 closed
cases."'17
For the few lucky debtors who cleared these two procedural hurdles,
more local legal cultural variation plagued their pursuit of earned relief. Like
the Norwegian law that Jay learned about,' 8 the Danish law also left
completely to court discretion the terms of debtors' payment plans to earn
their discharge-both the length in years and the budget allocated to debtors
for family support.19 Unlike in Norway, the Danish courts quickly coalesced
around a standard five-year term, but courts differed widely in their
assessment of proper budgets to support, as the statute directed, a "modest"
lifestyle. Some courts allowed supplementary budget items beyond a basic
allowance (for things like eye and dental care and household appliance
rental), while others did not.20 Even the amount of the basic budget allowance
varied widely and was not based on variances in local cost of living, as this
allocation varied by 40%-50% among otherwise similar districts. 21 These
varying perspectives on appropriate sacrifice and thrift led some debt
counselors to suggest that their pre-bankruptcy clients engage in in-country
bankruptcy tourism, moving what we would now call their "center of main
16. Id. at 174-75.
17. Id. at 175.
18. See Westbrook, supra note 3, at 33 (discussing the Norwegian courts' discretion regarding
payment plans).
19. See Kilborn, supra note 15, at 172, 177 (stating that Danish law originally left questions of
disposable income and plan length "open to individual case-by-case and court-by-court discretion"
and that budgetary practices "varied widely" among local courts).
20. Kilborn, supra note 15, at 177.
21. See Betenkning nr. 1449 af august 2004 om gldssanering [Report No. 1449 of August
2004 on Debt Settlement] 144 (Den.) (reporting that in 1997-1998, budget allowances for singles
varied from 2,500 kr. to 3,500 kr. and for couples from 4,000 kr. to 6,000 kr.);
Dommerfuldmxgtigforeningen & Advokatridet, Redegorelse Vedrarende Endringer i
Konkurslovens Bestemmelser om Gldssanering [Statement Regarding Changes to the Bankruptcy
Act's Debt Settlement Provisions] 34 (1999) (Den.) (same).
13312018]
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interest" (i.e., their home residence) from a miserly region to a more generous
(reasonable?) region.22
After nearly twenty years of frustration with these overly restrictive and
divergent court demands, the Danish government stepped back from fear of
abuse and launched a reform process that culminated in 2005. While the
reform did not deal directly with the regional variations in admission and plan
confirmation rates, it relaxed access criteria and standardized plan terms.
In a technical but crucial about-face, the initial presumption of restricted
access was reversed. That is, while debtors were originally presumed not
admissible unless the court was convinced that the totality of the
circumstances militated in favor of relief, after 2005 the presumption is in
favor of admission unless consideration of a slightly reformulated list of
factors "suggests decisively against" relief.23 Also, at least for former small-
business entrepreneurs, the "qualified insolvency" test was modified
expressly to provide admission for debtors whose economic situation is
"unclear," 24 and the payment term for a discharge plan for these former small-
business entrepreneurs was set by Justice Ministry regulation at three years,
rather than the standard five years for consumers. 25
For all debtors, the reform dealt head-on with the local legal cultural
problem of vast differences in court parsimony in discharge plans. The
Justice Ministry was tasked with establishing uniform, nationwide basic
budgetary allowances, and the Ministry took a much more humane approach
to debtor support. The new budget guidelines exceeded the upper range then
applied by the courts in most debt adjustment cases by nearly 20%, and
additional types of income were exempted entirely from distribution to
creditors, such as state transfer payments for children. 26
As Jay predicted, however, local legal culture is quite sticky. The Danish
courts have continued their rigorous watch at the gates into and out of the
discharge procedure. In the decade following the reform, fewer than half of
all petitions for admission to the personal discharge procedure were granted
(fewer than 40% in 2009 and 2010).27 While the reasons for these rejections
are not reported, anecdotes from other jurisdictions suggest that most of the
22. Kilborn, supra note 15, at 174.
23. Konkurslov, supra note 11, 197(4), 231a(4).
24. Id. 231b, 236a(2).
25. Bekendtgorelse nr. 894 af 22.9.2005 om gldssanering [Executive Order No. 894 of
22 September 2005 on Debt Settlement] 2 (Den.).
26. Kilborn, supra note 15 at 1, 176-78.
27. See DANMARKS DOMSTOLE, STATISTIK FOR SKIFTESAGER M.V.: MODTAGNE SAGER OM
INSOLVENSSKIFTE M.V., http://www.domstol.dk/om/talogfakta/statistik/Documents/Skiftesager/
[https://perma.cc/F6HX-JUNN] (reporting the number of debt adjustment applications received and
the number of debt adjustment applications declined). Calculations were based on ten years of data
from 2006 to 2016 (on file with author).
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rejected applications involve paperwork errors rather than merit-based
judgments. Of an average of just over 5,000 cases closed per year during this
period, only about 30% (an average of about 1,680) concluded with an
approved plan. Though again looking on the bright side, excluding the cases
rejected at the entryway, this represents a 70% confirmation rate for admitted
cases. 28
B. Slovakia 2006-2017
When Jay attended the comparative conference in 1997, Denmark's
personal discharge regime and similar ones in neighboring Scandinavia were
effectively the only games in town. 29 Since then, the dam has broken and new
consumer discharge laws and experience have flooded into virtually every
country in Europe, 30 often through multiple iterations and amendments of
new laws. 31 Much of the intervening experience has been analyzed
elsewhere, 32 so this paper will focus on the very latest developments.
The most exciting and bold departure from a system historically both
quite discretionary and quite fearful of abuse occurred in Slovakia, whose
consumer discharge system was entirely overhauled effective March 1,
2017.33 This amendment was preceded by a long period of disappointment
with the original quite restrictive law. The Slovak consumer discharge
provisions were added to the Law on Bankruptcy and Restructuring 2005
with a delayed effective date of January 1, 2006.34
28. Kilborn, supra note 15, at 173.
29. See Westbrook, supra note 3, at 31. Though Jay notes emerging systems in France and
Germany as well, in 1997 the French law offered no discharge to consumers and the German
consumer bankruptcy reforms would not become effective until 1999. See JASON J. KILBORN,
EXPERT RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN BEST PRACTICES FOR THE
TREATMENT OF OVERINDEBTEDNESS, 1984-2010, at 13 n.69, 14 (2011).
30. But see discussion infra subpart III(A) (addressing Bulgaria's hesitance to adopt consumer
debt discharge procedures).
31. See, e.g., GERARD MCCORMACK ET AL., STUDY ON A NEW APPROACH TO BUSINESS
FAILURE AND INSOLVENCY: COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE MEMBER STATES'
RELEVANT PROVISIONS AND PRACTICES 333-48 (2016) (reviewing the variations among consumer
discharge laws in EU member states).
32. See generally, e.g., KILBORN, supra note 29 (tracing the evolution of consumer bankruptcy
systems throughout Europe); WORLD BANK, REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF THE INSOLVENCY OF
NATURAL PERSONS (2013) (discussing laws of insolvency of natural persons throughout the world).
33. See Radovan Pala & Michal Michalek, Long-Awaited Changes to Restructuring Rules in
Slovakia, TAYLOR WESSING LLP (Feb. 1, 2017), https://united-kingdom.taylorwessing.com/en
/insights/rcr-update/long-awaited-changes-to-restructuring-rules-in-slovakia [https://perma
.cc/FH6E-G8DF] (discussing the enactment of an amendment to Slovakia's bankruptcy law).
34. Zikon, c. 7/2005 Z.z. o konkurze a restrukturalizAcii a o zmene a doplneni niektorych
zikonov z 9. decembra 2004 [Law on Bankruptcy and Restructuring and on Amendment and





A surprisingly imposing barrier to relief prevented all but a few cases
from making their way past the admissions stage for the first decade of this
new law. To access relief, debtors had to pay the equivalent of about $800
(¬663.88) in filing and trustee fees and demonstrate that they had assets to
liquidate that would produce the equivalent of about $2,000 (1,659.70) in
distributions for creditors. 35 Debtors who cleared this hurdle faced yet
another: like most European consumer insolvency laws, the Slovak regime
required debtors to earn their fresh start by complying with a three-year
payment plan imposed by the court.3 6 The amount of payment demanded of
debtors was subject to the all-but-unfettered discretion of the court, guided
only by a frightening suggestion that the payment obligation could be "up to
70% of the debtor's net income." 37
Few debtors managed to clear the entry barrier to this new system,
though those who did so seem largely to have succeeded in obtaining relief.
It took seven years of operation for this new procedure to produce 100 cases
admitted to the three-year payment plan phase, though 484 debtors had
applied for such relief and only about 200 cases were fully administered
(leaving a significant and persistent backlog). 38 By the end of 2016, the total
number of discharge applications over the ten-year life of the regime had
risen to 1,855, with administered cases still lagging far behind at 685, of
which 478 had been admitted to the payment plan phase.3 9 This methodical
approach to case evaluation was apparently fairly successful, as only a
handful of cases over the eleven-year life of this original procedure ended in
default or withdrawal, and most admitted cases seem to have concluded with
a granted discharge about three years later, suggesting that courts had
exercised their discretion in imposing relatively judicious payment
obligations.40
Digging a bit deeper reveals a stark local legal culture issue at the
admissions stage. The admissions figures just mentioned produce an
admissions rate of 70% of all administered cases from 2006 through 2016.
35. Id. 171(1) (repealed Mar. 1, 2017); Vladimir Kordos & Filip Takie, Resurrection of
Personal Insolvencies in Slovakia?, EUROFENIX, Spring 2017, at 34.
36. Kordos & Takie, supra note 35, at 34.
37. Id.
38. These figures derive from annual bankruptcy case statistics published by the Slovak
Ministry of Justice. See Konkurzne konania na okresnych szdoch SR, MINISTERSTVO
SPRAVODLIVOSTI SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY (Slovk.), http://www.justice.gov.sk/Stranky
/Informacie/Statistika-konkurznych-konani-OS.aspx [https://perma.cc/5J5Q-772X] [hereinafter
Slovak Bankruptcy Statistics] (reporting discharge application and administration statistics in
Slovakia from 2006 through 2012).
39. See id. (reporting discharge application and administration statistics in Slovakia from 2006
through 2016).
40. See id. (compiling bankruptcy proceeding outcome statistics in Slovakia from 2006 through
2016).
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But in examining district-level rates among the eight districts adjudicating
these cases, stark differences emerge. In the last six years of the original
regime, the court in the capital region of Bratislava admitted 100% of
administered cases, with the high-volume courts in Banski Bystrica and
Zilina not far behind. The district court in Trenin, in contrast, admitted only
33% of administered cases during this period (fewer than 20% before
2015).41 The small number of cases makes these figures less compelling, but
the differing admissions practices of these decision makers seem to fairly
clearly reflect very different attitudes toward, most likely, quite similar
debtors. Payment-plan practices likely also differed dramatically. Over the
entire eleven-year period under the original law, only two debtors emerged
with a discharge from the process in Trenin, compared with five in
Bratislava and thirty-eight in Banska Bystrica (percentages are difficult to
determine here, but judging by any perspective, the ratios of success vary
wildly across districts).4 2
The Slovak government set out in 2016 to rectify this sad situation and
align Slovak practice with regimes that are more accommodating to debtors.
The legislature quickly took up and adopted the Justice Ministry's bold
revision of the bankruptcy law in November 2016, effective March 1, 2017.43
Departing from the European standard and all but abandoning fear of abuse,
the new Slovak regime offers debtors a free choice between asset liquidation
and immediate discharge or a five-year payment plan,44 parallel to the U.S.
choice between chapters 7 and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Debtors must be
represented by the publicly supported Centre for Legal Aid,45 and the now
reduced 500 application fee can be lent by the Centre (for repayment in
installments over three years) to debtors unable to pay the fee immediately.4 6
To make liquidation an even more attractive option, the range of debtors'
property exempt from liquidation has been expanded with a homestead
exemption of ¬10,000 in unencumbered value in a home.4 7
41. See id. (providing discharge application and administration statistics by district from 2011
through 2016).
42. See id. (reporting discharge statistics by district from 2006 through 2016).
43. See Kordos & Takie, supra note 35, at 34 (describing the implications of the amendment).
44. Zkon, c. 7/2005 Z.z. o konkurze a restrukturalizicii a o zmene a dopneni niektor ch
zikonov [Law on Bankruptcy and Restructuring and on Amendment and Supplementation of
Several Other Laws] (Slovk.), https://www.noveaspi.sk/products/lawText/1/59304/1/2
[https://perma.cc/WKK2-D6D6] (current version).
45. Id. 166k.
46. CENTRUM PRAVNEJ POMOCI, OSOBNV BANKROT 4-5 (2017) (Slovk.),
http://www.centrumpravnejpomoci.sk/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Bro%C5%BE%C3%BAra-
OB-02_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/NFR3-4WHV].
47. Zikon, c. 7/2005, supra note 44, 167h(4). The Justice Ministry issued a press release on
the new law and homestead exemption. Dostupnejsi osobnf bankrot, MINISTERSTVO




In stark contrast with recent U.S. practice, Slovak lawmakers embedded
in their new system a clear preference for quick liquidation-and-discharge
relief, actively discouraging debtors from pursuing the payment plan route.
For debtors who choose to preserve their nonexempt assets and propose a
payment plan, the reserved budget for family support must cover the debtor's
family's housing and basic needs (still undefined in the law48 ) and offer
creditors a minimum 30% dividend (and at least 10% more value than a
liquidation would produce). 49 For debtors whose disposable income does not
appear sufficient to meet these thresholds, the statute directs the trustee to
recommend that the debtor file a petition for bankruptcy liquidation. 50
By the end of November 2017, the Centre for Legal Aid had registered
nearly 63,000 consultations with debtors interested in the new discharge
procedure.51 Over 8,000 petitions were filed in the first nine months of
availability of the new processes, 7,800 seeking liquidation and discharge,
and slightly more than 200 proposing a five-year payment plan.52 The courts
quickly accelerated their formerly languid administration process, granting
admission to 6,454 bankruptcy cases and 117 payment plan cases. 5 3 Of these,
about half of the bankruptcy cases have already closed with a discharge,
while a payment plan has been confirmed in forty cases. 54 In the nine months
from March to November 2017, the number of petitions for bankruptcy
exceeded the entire number filed in the eleven-year period of the old law by
a factor of four. The number of cases admitted in the first nine months of the
new procedure was 13.5 times as large as the total number admitted over the
previous ten years, and 17 times as as many discharges have been granted.55
The new Slovak system is a unique example of the modern European retreat
from fear of abuse and embrace of standardized, low-burden personal
discharge.
48. See Silvia Beloviovi, New Personal Insolvency Regime in Slovakia, 0-1-CEE! CENT. EUR.
LEGAL NEWS & VIEWS BLoG (Dec. 16, 2016), http://www.ceelegalbog.com/2016/12/857/
[https://perma.cc/7MQ7-98WR] (noting that debtor living expenses are to be determined by trustees
and courts, "and let's hope they will use their discretion wisely").
49. Zkon, c. 7/2005, supra note 44, 168c(4)-(5).
50. Id. 168c(7).
51. Rok 2017 na ministerstve spravodlivosti, MINISTERSTVO SPRAVODLIVOSTI SLOVENSKEJ
REPUBLIKY (Dec. 19, 2017) (Slovk.), http://www.justice.gov.sk/Stranky/aktualitadetail.aspx





55. See Slovak Bankruptcy Statistics, supra note 38 (reporting bankruptcy admission and
discharge statistics in Slovakia from 2006 through 2016); 2017 at the Ministry of Justice, supra note
51 (reporting bankruptcy admission and discharge statistics from March through November of
2017).
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C. Poland 2009-2015
A somewhat similar story played out in Poland, though over a shorter
period of time. Poland's first consumer discharge law was adopted much later
than the Slovak version, and it ran into serious trouble immediately. Effective
at the end of March 2009,56 the Polish Law on Bankruptcy and Rehabilitation
was supplemented to allow consumers to seek discharge relief, but, again,
fear of abuse compelled legislators to place two major obstacles in the way
of access to this relief. First, debtors had to establish that their insolvency
resulted from exceptional circumstances entirely beyond their control.57 As
if this were not sufficient to bar access to all but a small handful of applicants,
admission also required a demonstration of sufficient assets to cover the costs
of administration, which varied from case to case and were estimated at
between 1,000 and 5,000.58
In the nearly four years from March 2009 through the end of 2012, just
over 2,160 consumer debtors applied for discharge relief under the new law,
but only sixty (2.8%) were admitted into the system. 59 The Justice Ministry
was not pleased. The Ministry proposed a reform, expressing its feeling that
these statistics "and legislative experiences of other countries show, the
current restrictive approach envisaged in Polish law should be liberalized." 60
A little over a year later, a bill was on the floor of the legislature with an
explanatory statement reminding lawmakers of the many benefits of
consumer discharge law, observing that the Polish approach had failed due
to the cost and qualification barriers noted above and aiming to "reduce or
completely remove" these barriers.61 The bill traveled through the legislative
process quickly, and legislators put fear of abuse behind them as they passed
the liberalizing amendments into law at the end of August 2014, effective
December 31, 2014.62 Meanwhile, statistics on the operation of the old law
came to an ignominious end, with a total of 2,735 applications submitted over
56. Marek Porzycki & Anna Rachwal, Consumer Insolvency Proceedings in Poland 5 (Instytut
Allerhanda, Working Paper 12/2015, 2015).
57. Prawo upadosciowe [Bankruptcy and Reorganization Law] (2003 r. Dz. U. Nr 175, poz.
1361), Art. I (Pol.); Katarzyna Kolodziejczyk, Consumer Bankruptcy in Poland, MONEY MATTERS,
no. 14, 2017, at 20, 20.
58. Kolodziejczyk, supra note 57, at 20.
59. See Ewidencja spraw upadlosciowych (w tym upadlosci konsumenckiej "of") za lata 2005-
2015, INFORMATOR STATYSTYCZNY WYMIARU SPRAWIEDLIWO$CI (Pol.), https://isws.ms.gov
.pl/pl/baza-statystyczna/opracowania-wieloletnie/download,2853,56.html
[https://perma.cc/GAN4-WSXM] (reporting bankruptcy applications and admissions in Poland
from 2009 through 2012).
60. MINISTERSTWO SPRAWIEDLIWCI, REKOMENDACJE ZESPOLU MINISTRA
SPRAWIEDLIWO$CI DS. NOWELIZACJI PRAWA UPADLOSCIOWEGO I NAPRAWCZEGO 270 (2012)
(Pol.) (original in Polish).
61. 0 zmianie ustawy - Prawo upadosciowe i naprawcze oraz niektrych innych ustaw [Bill
Amending the Bankruptcy and Reorganization Law] (2014 Nr 2265) (Pol.) (original in Polish).
62. Porzycki & Rachwal, supra note 56, at 5.
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nearly six years and only 120 successfully admitted-an ultimate aggregate
admission rate of just 4.4%.63
From 2015 forward, Polish debtors have been free to seek discharge
relief so long as they did not cause their insolvency "intentionally or as a
result of gross negligence." 64 For debtors with limited assets, administration
costs are initially covered by the state treasury (and the costly formality of
publication of case information in newspapers was scrapped in favor of
electronic publication to reduce expense). 65 After liquidation of the debtor's
assets, Polish practice still follows the European norm of imposing a payment
plan on debtors to earn their discharge, but both the term (up to three years,
down from five in the earlier law) and payment amount are still left to
unfettered court discretion.66 In a powerful move away from fear of abuse,
however, the law explicitly recognizes that many debtors will lack payment
capacity beyond meeting their basic needs, so it provides for an immediate
discharge if the court finds that this is "clearly shown."67 For cases where a
payment plan is imposed, it can be amended for improvements in the debtor's
payment capacity, but only for "reasons other than an increase in
remuneration for work or services personally performed by the debtor."68
This provides a creative incentive for debtors to maximize their productivity
immediately following insolvency proceedings.
As in Slovakia, Polish debtors eagerly accepted the invitation to this
newly liberalized relief. Already in the first year of the new Polish law, more
than 5,600 debtors applied and 2,153 were admitted-nearly twenty times as
many admitted cases as in the previous six years combined. 6 9 Those figures
nearly doubled again in 2016, with almost 8,700 applications and 4,447
admission orders, and the acceptance rate rose above 50% for the first time.70
Many applications are still being rejected, but largely for incorrect
completion of the forms, 71 and the average four-month processing time for
cases suggests that the admission rate will rise as the crush of new cases
63. See INFORMATOR STATYSTYCZNY WYMIARU SPRAWIEDLIWO$CI, supra note 59
(presenting applications and admission statistics from 2009 through 2014).
64. 0 zmianie ustawy - Prawo upadoiciowe i naprawcze, ustawy o Krajowym Rejestrze
Sqdowym oraz ustawy o kosztach sqdowych w sprawach cywilnych [Amendment to the Bankruptcy
and Reorganization Law] (2014 r. DZ. U. poz. 1306), Art. 4914(1) (Pol.) [hereinafter Prawo
upadiogciowe] (original in Polish).
65. Id., Art. 491(1), Art. 49116(2); Porzycki & Rachwal, supra note 56, at 10, 29.
66. Prawo upadlosciowe, supra note 64, Art. 49114, Art. 49115.
67. Id. at Art. 49116(1) (original in Polish).
68. Id. at 64, Art. 49119(3) (original in Polish).
69. See INFORMATOR STATYSTYCZNY WYMIARU SPRAWIEDLIWO$CI, supra note 59
(providing applications and admission statistics from 2009 through 2016).
70. Id. Admissions levelled off in 2017 at just over 5,500, though with a sharp turn upward in
the last three months of the year. 2017 upadlosc konsumencka, CENTRALNY OSRODEK INFORMACJI
GOSPODARCZEJ, http://www.coig.com.pl/2017-upadlosc-konsumencka-lista_osob
.php [https://perma.cc/SR3D-WPAU].
71. INFORMATOR STATYSTYCZNY WYMIARU SPRAWIEDLIWO$CI, supra note 59.
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makes its way through the procedure. Fear of abuse is in definite retreat in
Poland.
II. Most Recent Developments: Less Discretion, Less Fear of Abuse
A. Russia 2015-2017
Only two years old, the new Russian consumer bankruptcy system has
already encountered and addressed the same cost impediments that hindered
the operation of the Slovak and Polish systems. It also confronted an
unexpected form of resistance when lower courts creatively interpreted the
new law to prohibit use by most consumer debtors. Here again, in a decisive
rejection of fear of abuse, the Russian Supreme Court last year put the system
back on track to achieve its primarily rehabilitative purposes.
In the transition back to a market-based economic system following
decades of stagnation under Communism, Russia adopted a consumer
bankruptcy law in December 2014, with a delayed effective date of
October 1, 2015.72 This law carried few of the hallmarks of fear of abuse seen
elsewhere. Though it appears to follow European standards by requiring
debtors to relinquish both nonexempt asset value and some amount of future
income, the income expropriation period seems to last only six months, and
debtors are entitled to a nondiscretionary exemption of a statutorily
determined portion of their income. 73 So far so good.
The ironic problem, as in Slovakia and Poland, seems to be money, as
debtors have struggled to afford the costs of the procedure. In the first year
of the law, of an estimated avalanche of 670,000 potential overindebted
applicants, only 33,000 debtors petitioned for relief, only 14,800 cases were
opened, and fewer than 500 made their way completely through the complex,
ten-month-long average procedure. 74 Lawmakers first thought cost barriers
were keeping the sea of applicants back, so in November 2016 they reduced
the filing fee from 6,000 rubles to a nominal 300 rubles (from about $244 to
$12 at Purchasing Power Parity exchange rate (PPP)), effective January 1,
2017.75 But by the end of the second year of the new law's operation, the total
72. Jason J. Kilborn, Treating the New European Disease of Consumer Debt in a Post-
Communist State: The Groundbreaking New Russian Personal Insolvency Law, 41 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 655, 686 (2016).
73. Id. at 698-700, 710-11.
74. Natalia Shvabauer, Zhizn'vzafmy, Ros. GAZ. (Nov. 7, 2016) (Russ.), https://rg.ru
/2016/11/07/sredi-rossijskih-grazhdan-okazalos-bankrotov-bolshe-chem-sredi-kompanij.html
[https://perma.cc/47DW-PL7X].





number of consumer cases commenced had little more than doubled to just
over 40,000.76
The reduction in filing fees was merely a drop in the bucket compared
to the real problem: the cost of the required "financial administrator," set by
statute at 25,000 rubles (about $1,000 at PPP) but in reality often higher, and
other administrative expenses reportedly boost the total cost of a personal
bankruptcy filing to at least 100,000 rubles in Moscow ($4,000 PPP) and at
least 60,000 rubles in provincial regions (about $2,500 PPP). 77 This is in
addition to the logistical challenge of filing a bankruptcy case in the often
distant commercial courts, only one of which is located in each "subject"
(governmental region) of Russia's expansive territory. 78
Both the cost factor and another less obvious obstacle to relief were
revealed as serious doctrinal problems when one of the first cases under the
new law made its way to the Russian Supreme Court. 79 Two months after the
effective date of the new law, the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Court in the remote
Western Siberian Tyumen Oblast opened a personal bankruptcy case only to
close it five months later on two grounds, both related to the absence of any
substantial asset value in the case.8 0 First, the court felt that the absence of
sufficient asset value to offer even a partial distribution to unsecured creditors
undermined the very purpose, in its view, of the bankruptcy law-that is, to
offer proportionate satisfaction of creditors' claims from the debtor's assets. 81
Second, insufficient asset value to pay administrative costs constitutes a basis
for case closure under Article 57 of the Law on Insolvency, and the court
held that funds could not be advanced by a nondebtor to cover these costs.82
The Supreme Court struck back at these philosophical constraints on the
new law and dealt another blow to fear of abuse of consumer discharge.
Consumer bankruptcy has other purposes, the Court asserted, beyond
satisfying creditors. Access to legislatively prescribed relief cannot be
restricted simply on the basis that the debtor has no asset value to offer
creditors, and this cannot be equated to "bad faith," more specific evidence
76. Tat'ana Zamakhia, Dobrosovestnym grazhdanam predlozhili spisat' dolgi, Ros. GAz.
(Nov. 8, 2017) (Russ.), https://rg.ru/2017/1 1/08/dobrosovestnym-grazhdanam-predlozhili-spisat-
dolgi.html [https://perma.cc/LVG2-P67P].
77. Tat'iana Zykova, Bol'she ne dolzhen, Ros. GAZ. (Jan. 12, 2017) (Russ.),
https://rg.ru/2017/01/12/chislo-bankrotov-v-rossii-za-poslednie-3-mesiaca-vyroslo-na-27.html
[https://perma.cc/8RL9-VG29].
78. Kilborn, supra note 72, at 691-93.
79. Opredelenie Verkhovnyi Sud Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 23 iavara 2017 [Decision of the
Russian Federation Supreme Court of Jan. 23, 2017], N. 304-ES16-14541, Delo N. A70-
14095/2015. 2017 (Russ.).
80. Id. at 2-3.
81. Id. at 2.
82. Id.
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of which is required to deny a discharge. 83 And while debtors must, indeed,
somehow cover the administrative costs of the proceeding (which at the time
were much smaller than now, with only a 10,000 ruble fee for the financial
administrator), the Court pointed out that the law contained no provision
forbidding debtors from seeking help from third parties in covering these
fees. 84
For debtors without generous friends, the law does indeed still require
full payment of administrative costs, 85 which clearly remains a deterrent for
many debtors, as it was in Slovakia and Poland. Fortunately, the Ministry of
Economic Development has already proposed a simplification of the
procedure-mainly exclusion of the costly financial administrator-for cases
involving debtors with limited debts and assets (less than 900,000 rubles of
debt, about $37,000 at PPP, fewer than ten creditors, and income less than
the statutory minimum livable income). 86 This further step away from fear of
abuse has been met with some resistance, so this will be a developing story
to watch in 2018 and beyond. Incidentally, lawmakers in neighboring
Ukraine have long agitated for a personal bankruptcy law as well, but to date,
they have not progressed beyond the stage of a draft bill, the most notable of
which has been pending for two years. 87
B. Austria 1995-2017
Perhaps the biggest change ushered in at the start of the new year is a
major withdrawal from fear of abuse at the culmination of a long-fought
battle in Austria. This is one of the small handful of consumer discharge
regimes that was already in operation beginning in 1995, before Jay wrote
his commentary, and it exemplifies the fear of abuse that he discerned in
Europe at the time. For over twenty years, the Austrian procedure imposed
three classic European hurdles to deter feared abuse by consumer debtors.
After decades of criticism by counseling centers and other observers, 88 each
83. Id. at 3 (original in Russian).
84. Id. at 4.
85. Federal'nyi Zakon o Nesostoiatel'nosti (Bankrotstve) [Federal Law on Insolvency
(Bankruptcy)], N 127-FZ. st. 57(1) (Russ.); see also Zykova, supra note 77 (noting that the
administrator can request case closure at any point if his fees and expenses are not paid by the
debtor).
86. Elena Berezina & Irina Zhandarova, Vernut' vse, ROS. GAz. (Mar. 13, 2017) (Russ.),
https://rg.ru/2017/03/13/grazhdanam-uprostiat-bankrotstva.html [https://perma.cc/ZV55-Z7HH];
Zykova, supra note 77.
87. Natalia Mytskovskaia, Kak stat' bankrotom: novyi zakon mozhet pomoch' yzbavyt'sia ot
nevyplachennykh dolhov, KOMsOMOL'SKAIA PRAVDA V UKRAYNE (Nov. 15, 2017) (Ukr.), https://
kp.ua/print/economics/592146-kak-stat-bankrotom-novyi-zakon-mozhet-pomoch-yzbavytsia-ot-
nevyplachennykh-dolhov [https://perma.cc/K28J-M8A5].
88. E.g., ASB SCHULDNERBERATUNGEN, SCHULDENREPORT 2016 14, 18 (2016) (Austria)
(calling for overdue reforms in Austrian insolvency law); Christiane Moser, Osterreich: Reform des
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of these three obstacles was cleared away by near-unanimous legislative
reform effective November 1, 2017.89
First, like in Poland and Russia, the Austrian law originally required
debtors to pay at least the administrative costs of the proceeding. For those
unable to do so immediately upon applying for relief, such debtors had to
comply with another prerequisite: a mandatory attempt to work out their debt
problems privately through an out-of-court negotiation with creditors. 90 This
negotiation was, unsurprisingly, very seldom successful, so in the reform it
was finally scrapped. 91 Austria thus joins Sweden in having abandoned
mandatory debt counseling and negotiation as a prerequisite for formal
consumer insolvency relief.92
Second, like virtually every European consumer discharge regime, the
Austrian procedure requires both a liquidation of nonexempt assets and a
payment plan. Historically, most such plans were accepted by a vote of
creditors. Debtors had to propose to pay creditors an amount equal to five
years' worth of their projected nonexempt income, and they could string out
those payments over as many as seven years to lighten the burden.9 3 Such a
plan is accepted by an affirmative vote of creditors who represent a majority
in number and amount of the claims of all voting creditors. 9 4 While the great
majority (70%) of Austrian personal insolvency cases in the past have
concluded with such a court-mediated payment plan,95 low-income debtors
have been largely shut out of the process by the unique final minimum-
payment hurdle discussed below. With the reform to allow low-income
debtors realistic access to relief, the necessity to propose a payment plan for
creditor voting has now been limited to debtors with substantial nonexempt
Privatkonkurses aberfdllig, DAS BUDGET, no. 78, 2016, at 6, 6 (Austria) (noting that Austria is
lagging behind in private bankruptcy reform).
89. Clemens Mitterlehner & Christa Kerschbaummayr, Reform of Personal Bankruptcy
Procedure in Austria, MONEY MATTERS, no. 15, 2017, at 8, 8.
90. KONKURSORDNUNGS-NOVELLE 1993 [BANKRUPTCY AMENDMENT OF 1993]
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] No. 974/1993, 183(2) (Austria), https://www.ris.bka
.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblPdf/1993_974_0/1993_974_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/B79C-HTTF].
91. Philipp Wetter, Austria: Major Changes in Personal Bankruptcy Law, SCHOENHERR
(July 4, 2017), https://www.schoenherr.eu/si/publications/publication-detail/austria-major
-changes-in-personal-bankruptcy-law/ [https://perma.cc/32US-3T5X].
92. Jason J. Kilborn, Out with the New, In with the Old: As Sweden Aggressively Streamlines
Its Consumer Bankruptcy System, Have U.S. Reformers Fallen Off the Learning Curve?, 80 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 435, 458 (2006).
93. KONKURSORDNUNGS-NOVELLE 1993, supra note 90, 193(1), 194(1).
94. INSOLVENZRECHTSANDERUNGSGESETZ 2010 [IRAG 2010] [INSOLVENCY LAW
AMENDMENT 2010] BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] No. 29/2010, 147(1) (Austria), https://www
.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2010_I_29/BGBLA_2010_I_29.html
[https://perma.cc/3JXX-4ALX].
95. GEORG KODEK, HANDBUCH PRIVATKONKURS: DIE SONDERBESTIMMUNGEN FUR DAS
INSOLVENZVERFAHREN NATQRLICHER PERSONEN 384 tbl.C.3 (2015).
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income. That is, debtors with little or no nonexempt income can proceed
immediately to the final stage, a court-imposed earned discharge period.9 6
This earned discharge period and its culmination were the subjects of
the third and most substantial reform. Neither the length of this period nor
the amounts demanded from debtors were ever subject to any notable degree
of court discretion. Originally, debtors formally assigned to a trustee all of
their actual income in excess of an objective statutory "existence minimum"
amount for seven years. 97 An additional requirement echoed the sentiment of
the Russian Tyumen Oblast Court discussed above regarding the purpose of
bankruptcy: at the conclusion of this seven-year period, Austrian debtors
received a discharge only if they had paid off administrative costs and
produced a dividend of 10% of unsecured creditors' claims. 9 8 Debtors who
missed this mark only slightly could hope for a hardship discharge at court
discretion, perhaps after an additional three-year period of toil and sacrifice,
but the discharge could be and sometimes was denied to debtors who failed
to produce a satisfactory dividend for creditors.99 Many more low-income
debtors were doubtless deterred from even attempting to obtain discharge
relief, knowing they likely could not cover costs and produce the minimum
10% dividend for creditors.100
As of November 1, 2017, in a tectonic shift from longtime fear to full
acceptance of consumer discharge, Austrian legislators scrapped the 10%
minimum dividend, softened the requirement to cover administrative costs,
and reduced the earned discharge period from seven to five years.101 At the
conclusion of the now five-year period, the court enters a discharge
regardless of whether the debtor has covered costs and produced a dividend
for creditors.' 0 2 Administrative costs that cannot be covered by debtors are
advanced from the state Treasury, to be collected from the proceeds of
liquidation of debtors' nonexempt assets or collection of nonexempt
income.103 If the debtor's asset value and five years of nonexempt payments
96. INSOLVENZRECHTSANDERUNGSGESETZ 2017 [IRAG 2017] [INSOLVENCY LAW
AMENDMENT 2017] BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] No. 122/2017, 193(1), 194(1) (Austria),
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2017_I_122/BGBLA_2017_I_122.html
[https://perma.cc/LWF7-RPRE].
97. KONKURSORDNUNGS-NOVELLE 1993, supra note 90, 199(2).
98. Id.Q 194, 213.
99. Id.
100. See ASB SCHULDNERBERATUNGEN, supra note 88, at 14-15 (discussing the 10%
minimum); KODEK, supra note 95, at 165-202, 249-338.
101. INSOLVENZRECHTSANDERUNGSGESETZ 2017, supra note 96, 199(2), 213(1).
102. Id. 213(1).
103. INSOLVENZORDNUNG [INSOLVENCY CODE] BUNDESGESETZBLATT I [BGBL]





have not managed to cover administrative costs, the debtor remains liable to
cover those costs only "if and when he is in a position to do so without
impairment of his [and his family's] necessary support."1 04 Even this
obligation prescribes (i.e., is barred by a statutory limitations period) three
years after the conclusion of the proceedings. 105 The Czech Republic now
stands alone in the European Union with a law that requires a minimum
dividend to unsecured creditors (30%) for consumer debtors to earn their
discharge. 106 Perhaps not enough time has passed for fear of abuse to abate
since the Czech consumer discharge became available in 2008, but one hopes
the Czech Republic will follow Austria's example in far less than the twenty-
two years it took for Austria to do so.
C. Croatia 2016, Romania 2018
The two newest consumer discharge procedures in Europe reveal a bit
of unfortunate backpedaling toward fear of abuse, though there is good
reason to expect that discretion will be exercised sparingly and within
relatively narrow boundaries in these two latecomer systems. Both will be
unfolding stories to watch in the years to come.
1. Croatia.-Croatia was the most recent European Union Member
State to adopt a consumer bankruptcy procedure, effective January 1, 2016.107
It immediately took two steps backward toward fear of abuse by adopting the
prereform Austrian procedure, minus the minimum dividend to creditors. Not
learning from the repeated failures of these processes in neighboring regions,
Croatian legislators reimposed two futile access restrictions just abandoned
by Austria, along with what seems like a fairly menacing multiyear payment
obligation.
First, Croatian debtors can gain entry to the in-court discharge procedure
only after engaging a counseling center to propose an out-of-court settlement
plan to creditors. 108 When the counseling center inevitably concludes that this
effort is doomed to failure, it issues a certificate to that effect, which the
debtor must present within three months with a petition for bankruptcy
104. Id. 184(3).
105. Id.
106. KILBORN, supra note 29, at 30, 37.
107. Zakon o steajupotrosada [Law on Consumer Bankruptcy], NN 100/2015 (1936) (Croat.);
Emir Bahtijarevic & Ema Mendusic Skugor, New Insolvency Legislation to Thoroughly Change
Bankruptcy Procedures in Croatia, CEE LEGAL MATTERS, Feb. 2016, at 88, 88.
108. OZREN IVKOVIc & MARKO KRUC, SCHONHERR, CROATIA: CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
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relief. 109 The state agency that oversees these counselors, the Financial
Agency (FINA), has released statistical data on the first two years of the new
Croatian procedure indicating that a total of 1,159 debtors have engaged
counseling centers to initiate the out-of-court process.1 0 These debtors had
an average of only six creditors and mostly quite small debts, but in only one
case were all creditors somehow convinced to sign onto the debtor's
proposed settlement plan (and in only sixteen cases was an agreement
reached even with some of the debtor's creditors).1 " Certificates of failure
had thus been issued to 795 debtors, with the same result most likely awaiting
most or all of the remaining applicants.1 2
Second, to gain access to the formal discharge procedure, debtors must
again present a settlement plan to creditors in an in-court process. Only after
that effort inevitably fails again, a liquidation of the debtor's nonexempt
assets ensues, and like in Austria, Croatian debtors are relegated to an
additional "behaviour checking" period of between one and five years. 113
While the law appears to leave the precise duration of this period to judicial
discretion, it seems likely that courts will in most cases choose the maximum
five-year term. This was the result in the very first personal bankruptcy case
in Croatia, where a fifty-one-year-old former entrepreneur with no assets and
only pension income was assigned a five-year term from which she filed an
appeal for a reduction to a year and a half.1 4 During this period, debtors are
subject to a nondiscretionary requirement of turnover of all income above the
statutory exemption. The Croatian statutory minimum income figures seem
far less livable than their Austrian equivalents, with one Croatian journalist
characterizing them as "neoliberal euthanasia."115 This likely explains why
only a fraction of the expected 10,000-20,000 potential debtors have applied
for relief."11 In this respect, the newest European consumer discharge system
109. Id.
110. FINANCIJSKA AGENCIJA (FINA), PREGLED ZBIRNIH PODATAKA IZ SUSTAVA PROVEDBE
STECAJA POTROSACA ZA RAZDOBLJE OD 1.1.2016. DO 03.04.2018. GODINE 2 (2018) (Croat.), http://
www.fina.hr/lgs.axd?t=16&id=19566 [https://perma.cc/J4YR-U2LM].
111. Id. at 2, 7.
112. Id. at 7.
113. IvKOVIC & KRuc, supra note 108.
114. See Ljubica Gatari6, Prva u osobni bankrot otisla propala poduzetnica iz Krapine,
VECERNJI LIST (Oct. 17, 2016) (Croat.), https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/prva-u-osobni-bankrot
-otisla-propala-poduzetnica-iz-krapine-1 121543 [https://perma.cc/7FKP-QUE9] (reporting the
details of Croatia's first personal bankruptcy case).
115. See Leo Bujan, Mozete li preziveti s 800 kuna mjeseno? Ako potpisete osobni steaj,
boije da nauite!, PORTAL DNEVNO (June 26, 2014) (Croat.), http://www.dnevno.hr/novac/mozete-
li-prezivjeti-s-800-kuna-mjesecno-ako-potpisete-osobni-stecaj-bolje-da-naucite-126174/
[https://perma.cc/APA5-RYJR] (original in Croatian) (citing minimum income figures of $133 per
month for the debtor, $80 for an adult family member, and $53 for each child (not at PPP)).
116. See IvKOVIC & KRUC, supra note 108 ("According to the Ministry, somewhere between
10,000 and 20,000 of the indebted citizens might take advantage of this opportunity.").
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may reveal something of a resurgence of fear of abuse, though not in the guise
of judicial discretion.
2. Romania.-Meanwhile, the latest European consumer discharge sys-
tem to actually begin operations has just come online in Romania as of Jan-
uary 1, 2018. While the Romanian legislature unanimously adopted its Law
no. 151/2015 "on the insolvency procedure of natural persons" in June
2015,117 the government pushed back the effective date several times.l"8 This
delay was attributable in part to government efforts to constrain discretion in
evaluating debtors' capacities to support settlement plans with creditors and
to endure a multiyear earned discharge period.
The Romanian law adopts the French approach' 9 of routing debtors
through standing insolvency commissions, which evaluate whether cases
should be directed to a negotiation with creditors and a potential five-year
payment plan, or, for debtors whose financial situation is "irremediably
compromised," to a liquidation-and-discharge procedure.12 0 In performing
the sensitive and critical evaluation of debtors' payment capacities that
determines which path is pursued, the insolvency commissions are not left to
their own devices; rather, the Ministry of Justice directed the chair of the
central insolvency commission to publish detailed criteria for determining a
"reasonable standard of living" for debtors in insolvency proceedings. These
criteria must be based on a list of national economic benchmarks, including
cost-of-living indices, various family and household compositions, and
transportation and housing guidelines.121 The publication of these criteria
seems to have been delayed as of this writing, but the effort to constrain
discretion and contain fear of abuse is manifest.
If Romanian institutions embrace the French approach to the notion of
"irremediably compromised" debtors (as seems highly likely), many if not
most debtors will be routed to an immediate liquidation-and-discharge
117. Legii 151/2015 privind procedura insolventei persoanelor fizice [Law on the Insolvency
Procedure of Natural Persons] publicata in Monitorul Oficial al Romaniei, Partea I, nr.
464/26.06.2015 (Rom.); Mihaela Condrache & Liviana Andreea Niminet, Personal Bankruptcy and
the Romanian Realities, STUD. & SCI. RES., no. 22, 2015, at 7, 8.
118. See, e.g., Ordonanta de urgent pentru prorogarea termenului de intrare in vigoare a Legii
nr. 151/2015 privind procedura insolventei persoanelor fizice [Government Emergency Ordinance
for the extension of the entry into force of Law no. 151/2015 on insolvency procedure of natural
persons] publicata in Monitorul Oficial al Romaniei, Partea I, nr. 962/24.12.2015 (Rom.).
119. See KILBORN, supra note 29, at 34-35 (tracing the development of France's commission-
based approach to processing debtors' cases).
120. Condrache & Niminet, supra note 117, at 9-11.
121. Hotarare 419/2017 pentru aprobarea Normelor metodologice de aplicare a Legii nr.
151/2015 privind procedura insolventei persoanelor fizice [Decision Approving Methodological
Norms for the Application of Law on the Insolvency of Natural Persons] publicata in Monitorul
Oficial al Romaniei, Partea I, nr. 436/13.06.2017, art. 2 (Rom.).
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procedure. 122 The insolvency commissions can send particularly low-income,
elderly debtors to simplified proceedings, which require a simple observation
period of three years before a final discharge is granted. 123 For all others, the
asset liquidation is followed by a payment period, during which a court-
determined proportion of the debtor's income in excess of reasonable living
expenses must be paid to creditors. 124 This proportion is determined in
accordance with the published budgetary guidelines for a "reasonable
standard of living." 125 The duration of the payment period is determined by
the percentage of debts paid off-as little as one year if 50% of debts are paid
within that time-but given the finances of most debtors, the most common
objectively determined term will be five years for debtors unable to produce
at least a 40% dividend. 12 6 These nondiscretionary and sensitive terms for
earning discharge relief reflect further relaxation of fear of abuse at the most
recent launch of a consumer insolvency system.
III. Consumer Discharge-in-Waiting: Fear of Abuse Manifest in Laws in
Development
In countries that have not by this point followed the personal bankruptcy
trend sweeping across Europe, one would expect to find a great deal of
resistance to the notion of offering such relief. A resurgence of fear of abuse
is fairly obvious in the last European straggler, Bulgaria, where proposed
bills reflect this fear in objective, but all-but-insurmountable, barriers to
relief. Beyond Europe, advanced-stage proposals developing in China and
Saudi Arabia confirm that newcomers to personal discharge approach the
policy conversation with great hesitancy.
A. Bulgaria
In 2000, household debt was hardly a blip on the social policy radar
screen in Bulgaria. By 2008, household debt had exploded and while still not
reaching the worrying levels of some other European states, had risen to and
remained at a level that caught the attention of policymakers. 12 7 Concerned
122. See KILBORN, supra note 29, at 34-35 (describing the increasing number of cases
administered under France's "personal recovery" procedure for debtors whose financial situation is
"irremediably compromised"); Jason J. Kilborn, Determinants of Failure ... and Success in
Personal Debt Mediation, TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT. Nov. 2017 at 1, 11-12 (discussing the growth
of France's bankruptcy commission regime).
123. Legii 151/2015 privind procedura insolventei persoanelor fizice, supra note 117, arts. 65-
70.
124. Id. art. 57(1)(b).
125. Id. art. 3(25) (original in Romanian).
126. See id. art. 72 (prescribing the procedure for determining the duration of a debtor's
payment period).
127. See Miroslav Nikolov, Households Indebtedness: State-of-the-Art, MONEY MATTERS,
no. 14, 2017, at 7, 8 fig.3 (illustrating the sizeable growth in Bulgaria's household debt between
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Bulgarian legislators finally introduced a bill in February 2015 to provide
"protection against overindebtedness of natural persons" in the form of a
cost-free, European-style procedure of asset liquidation followed by a three-
year earned discharge period of relinquishment of nonexempt income.12 8 The
explanatory note to the bill commented that "[t]he public interest requires
'eternal debtors' to be given an opportunity to engage anew in socially
beneficial activity," consistent with European practice.129
This controversial bill made no progress before another was introduced
on July 21, 2017. The tone and approach of this new bill are quite different
from its predecessor's: debtors are deemed overindebted and allowed access
to relief only if they have worked consistently during three of the preceding
five years, their debts do not exceed 150,000 Bulgarian levs (about $95,000),
and they nonetheless appear unable to pay their debts with ten years of
expected income.' 30 In such cases, the earned discharge period would be ten
years on minimum income.13 Moreover, during this ten-year period, debtors
are prohibited from entrepreneurial activity as members or directors of
companies.' 32 Excluding retired people and long-term unemployed debtors
and calling on ten years of earning capacity is sure to produce a remedy for
very few maladies. One suspects Bulgaria is still some distance from a
consumer discharge law of any kind, let alone an effective one. One can just
picture the fear in legislators' eyes!
B. China
A most exciting recent development in China comes not from a central
government project, but from a controlled provincial experiment. While
China is in principle a highly centralized state, central authorities often afford
significant autonomy to regional governments to pursue large-scale trial runs
of new policies. Nowhere is this trend more powerful and more obvious than
in the "special economic zones" developed during the period of "reform and
opening" initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1979.133 Deng's famous "southern
2000 and 2008); Bulgaria Household Debt 2000-2016, CEIC, https://www.ceicdata.com/en
/indicator/bulgaria/household-debt [https://perma.cc/STW7-L7ZN] (reporting that Bulgaria's
household debt "reached an all-time high" in December of 2008).
128. Proekt, Zakon za zashtita pri svrikhzadnlzhenost na fizicheskite litsa [Draft, Law of
Protection Against Overindebtedness of Natural Persons], 554-01-30 ot 12/02/2015, arts. 3(2), 6,
16, 26 (Bulg.).
129. Id., Notes at 12 (original in Bulgarian).
130. Bill, Zakon za zashtita pri svrtkhzadnlzhenost na fizicheskite litsa [Bill, Law of Protection
Against Overindebtedness of Natural Persons], 754-01-46 ot 24/07/2017, arts. 4(1), 5 (Bulg.).
131. Id. art. 22(1), 30.
132. Id. art. 31.
133. ARTHUR R. KROEBER, CHINA'S ECONOMY: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 5 (2016).
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tour" in 1992 took him to one of the most prominent of these zones,
Shenzhen, just to the north of Hong Kong. 134
This hotbed of economic development and local initiative appears to be
the likely future birthplace of personal bankruptcy law in China. In June
2014, a subgroup of the Shenzhen Bar Association began developing a
personal bankruptcy bill for the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.'35 A draft
law emerged by September 2015, with some unique and intriguing provisions
that suggest Shenzhen authorities are stepping lightly into this new legal
terrain.' 36
A preliminary review of the proposed law, working from this author's
rather rudimentary foundation in Chinese, reveals what seem to be fairly
rigorous and restrictive requirements for accessing the procedure and
obtaining relief. To access the personal liquidation process, debtors must
submit evidence of five years of income and expenditures (which presumably
indicate their payment ability and substantiate their claimed inability to clear
their debts timely), and their current standard of living must not exceed a
level corresponding to the local minimum wage.137 The draft law seems to
require the debtor to pay creditors the value of any nonexempt property-
including disposable income-the debtor reasonably anticipates receiving
over the next two years, which must in any case suffice immediately to cover
administrative costs.' 38
The discharge provision is a bit puzzling, but it seems to require a
minimum distribution to creditors of at least the amount distributed to them
by the debtor during the two-year period preceding the debtor's filing an
application for liquidation; otherwise, a discharge is conferred only by the
(extremely unlikely) unanimous vote of the creditors' committee.' 39 This
134. Id. at 7.
135. SHENZHEN JINGJI TEQU GEREN POCHAN TIAOLI CAO'AN JIANYI GAO FU LIYOu (JII-
' 344 A MP 9A x i WINEH) [SHENZHEN SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE PERSONAL
BANKRUPTCY REGULATION DRAFT PROPOSAL WITH ACCOMPANYING REASONING] (Lu Lin
(l *), ed., 2016) (China) [hereinafter Shenzhen Draft Bankruptcy Proposal]; see also "Shenzhen
Jingji Tequ Geren Pochan Tiaoli" Dashiji ( ((, JI 1 L i'P I)) )t iE) [ "Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone Personal Bankruptcy Ordinance "Retrospective], JIANGSU HUIJIN BANKR.
LIQUIDATION FIRM LTD. (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.js-hj.com/content/?190.html
[https://perma.cc/MAC3-AMC7] [hereinafter JIANGSU HUIJIN] (China) (providing a timeline of the
development of the Shenzhen bankruptcy proposal).
136. JIANGSU HUIJIN, supra note 135.
137. Shenzhen Draft Bankruptcy Proposal, supra note 135, arts. 95, 103.
138. Id. arts. 111, 113-16, 120.
139. Id. arts. 158-59. This unique discharge provision seems to be based on the discharge
provision of the Taiwan Consumer Insolvency Act of 2008. Xiaofeizhe Zhaiwu Qingli Tiaoli
(#1% (( ]) [Consumer Debt Clean-Up Regulation] (amended Dec. 26, 2010), art. 133




provision could spell trouble for any potential discharge procedure, and it
suggests a deep fear of abuse by opportunistic debtors. Indeed, since 2013,
the current nationwide approach to defaulting debtors in China has been a
Supreme Court blacklist banning some debtors from using such "luxuries" as
airplane and high-speed-train travel and hotels. 14 0 Time will tell whether the
Shenzhen draft or something like it becomes law and, if so, how it is applied
by Chinese courts who seem to be both wholly unaccustomed to and quite
skeptical of the concept of relief for defaulting debtors.
C. Saudi Arabia
The Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry delivered a bombshell
when in April 2015 it released a policy paper on an initiative to revamp the
Kingdom's insolvency law. 141 That paper projected that a new procedure
would encompass all private individuals, including ordinary consumers, and
would offer an automatic discharge of unpaid liabilities following a
liquidation and waiting period of twelve months.214 Another comment
expectedly but ominously noted that "Shari'a compliance would be an
important element when choosing public policies and the underlying
rules." 14 3 This is ominous because no school of Islamic Law (shari'ah)
seemed to support or even accept the notion of discharging debts without the
consent of creditors.144 An imprint of the name of a Western law firm
(Clifford Chance) on every page of the English portion of the policy paper
offered reason for hope, however, so the announcement of a potential Islamic
discharge was both confusing and exciting.
As it turned out, the Western law firm had apparently not sufficiently
appreciated the implications of shari'ah compliance. The ultimate draft law
released in September 2016 indeed adhered to Islamic Law and did not offer
a nonconsensual discharge.145 The explanatory note to the new draft makes
140. See Yongxi Chen & Anne Sy Cheung, The Transparent Self Under Big Data Profiling:
Privacy and Chinese Legislation on the Social Credit System, 12 J. COMP. L., no. 2, 2017, at 356,
362, 370 (describing travel restrictions on judgment defaulters and public disclosures of public
credit information); Yuan Yang, China Penalizes 6.7m Debtors with Travel Ban, FIN. TIMES
(Feb. 15, 2017) (reporting that a man surnamed Liu "almost lost his bride after the man's father ...
was named on the local television as being blacklisted"), https://www.ft.com/content/ceb2a7fD-
f350-11e6-8758-6876151821a6 [https://perma.cc/FUF3-AQSU].
141. MINISTRY OF COMMERCE & INDUS., THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA INSOLVENCY LAW




144. Abed Awad & Robert E. Michael, Iflas and Chapter 11: Classical Islamic Law and
Modern Bankruptcy, 44 INT'L LAWYER 975, 981, 997, 999 (2010); Jason J. Kilborn, Foundations
of Forgiveness in Islamic Bankruptcy Law: Sources, Methodology, Diversity, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J.
323, 347 (2011).
145. MINISTRY OF COMMERCE & INDUS., Mashru' Nizam al-Iflaas [Draft of the System of
1350 [Vol. 96:1327
Fear of Abuse in Consumer Bankruptcy
no mention of the Western concept. The provisions on liquidation do apply
to ordinary individuals, but the "rehabilitation" article is quite clear that
following a liquidation of nonexempt assets, the debtor "is not discharged
from his liability for remaining debt except for under a special or general
discharge from creditors." 146 In other words, perfectly consistent with Islamic
Law, the new Saudi bankruptcy law offers individual debtors a discharge
only with the consent of creditors, which one suspects is unlikely to be
forthcoming. The current draft is reportedly on its way to becoming law in
early 2018,147 leaving Saudi Arabia without consumer discharge. While
adherence to Islamic Law may not be fairly equated with fear of abuse, there
is a congruent reticence here to allow debtors to evade their obligations over
creditor opposition-a reticence that appears likely to persist indefinitely in
the Kingdom.148
Conclusion
Virtually none of the developments described here would have a
counterpart in U.S. experience. Even the advent of the infamous means test
for constraining access to quick chapter 7 relief is of a very different nature
than the aggressive constraints on consumer discharge access witnessed in
Europe over the past twenty years. Following these comparative
developments (in English) has allowed policymakers and academics
worldwide to explore more deeply and in greater detail the fear of abuse that
Jay observed in the United States and Europe in the late 1990s, along with its
gradual but definite abatement in recent years. Comparative analysis has
greatly enriched the conversation about the proper balance of relief,
restriction, and responsibility with the "rich harvest of new evidence" that
Jay predicted. I am thrilled to have been part of that harvest and to say, once
again, thanks, Jay!
Bankruptcy] (2016) (Saudi Arabia), http://mci.gov.sa/MediaCenter/elan/Documents/01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9E8P-KWSR].
146. Id. art. 160.
147. Saudi Arabia Advisory Council Approves Draft Bankruptcy Law, REUTERS (Dec. 13,
2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/saudi-bankruptcy/update-1-saudi-arabia-advisory-council
-approves-draft-bankruptcy-law-idUSL8N1OD2IP [https://perma.cc/YF5A-8PYH].
148. The same is true elsewhere in the region, as the new United Arab Emirates bankruptcy law
does not apply to nonmerchants at all, leaving overindebted consumers, particularly those who write
NSF checks, still subject to arrest and imprisonment. See Qanun al'iiflas al-qanun al-aitihadaa ragm
(9) lisanat 2016 [Bankruptcy Law] (Official Gazette 29 Sept. 2016, effective 29 Dec. 2016)
(U.A.E.), https://www.mof.gov.ae/En/Lawsandpolitics/govlaws/pages/federalbankruptcy
.aspx [https://perma.cc/M4KQ-A5DQ]; Issac John, Why UAE's New Bankruptcy Law Is a Boon for




Local Legal Culture from R2D2 to Big Data
Robert M. Lawless* & Angela Littwin**
I. Introduction
If you ask Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, or Jay Westbrook about
the early years of their groundbreaking Consumer Bankruptcy Project (CBP),
they eventually will tell you about R2D2, their mobile photocopier. They
carted R2D2 across the country to copy the bankruptcy court records that
formed the backbone of their examination of the lives of consumer
bankruptcy filers. Courthouses charged twenty-five cents per page for
photocopies, so it was cheaper to bring R2D2, although they had to purchase
a separate airplane ticket for "him." Journeying to courthouses across the
country resulted in several anecdotes, such as the time R2D2 "made a break
for it" on Grand Avenue in Chicago by sliding out of the back of the station
wagon rented for the purpose of transporting the machine or when they had
to lug R2D2 up three flights of stairs in Danville, Illinois. 1 In 1981, gathering
data on consumer bankruptcy filers in three states took a tremendous amount
of time and effort.
Once they had the data, analyzing it posed another hurdle. At the time
of the first study, Westbrook had just obtained his first Apple II Plus, which
was an order of magnitude slower than even today's cell phones. To analyze
their data, they used the campus mainframe. They could access it by
telephone but had to hire a graduate student who knew how to operate it.
Fast-forwarding to today, we obtained a database with over 12.5 million
records on every U.S. bankruptcy case that was pending sometime during the
government fiscal years 2012-2016. We added Census Bureau data to
estimate demographic and other characteristics by matching debtor zip codes
to those in the Census database. We analyzed these data and obtained our
results within weeks of formulating our analysis plan. We did this all without
having to raise money or leave our offices. 2 Our world of ready data
*Max L. Rowe Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. The coauthors' names
appear in alphabetical order.
**Ronald D. Krist Professor of Law, The University of Texas School of Law.
1. Telephone Interview with Professor Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Benno C. Schmidt Chair of
Business Law, Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law (Jan. 20, 2018).
2. That said, we both believe in the value of researchers leaving their offices to interact with the
systems they are studying and to generate their own data. Lawless is a coprincipal investigator on
the current CBP, which gathers court-record data and surveys consumer bankruptcy filers on an
ongoing basis. See, e.g., Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless, Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne,
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availability and computers to analyze them compares to photocopier R2D2
about the same as the world of science-fiction R2D2 compares to the U.S.
Space Shuttle program (a contemporary of photocopier R2D2).
We do not use the term "groundbreaking" lightly when describing the
early CBP. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook changed the nature of the
consumer bankruptcy field. They shattered myths such as the idea that
debtors were marginalized workers rather than part of the middle class.3 They
developed the dominant framework of why consumers file for bankruptcy, as
reported by the debtors themselves: job loss, medical problems, and divorce. 4
They were the first research team to discover that fewer than half of
chapter 13 cases receive a discharge.5 Most importantly, Sullivan, Warren,
and Westbrook created the norm of empirical research in the field, making it
unacceptable to write about consumer bankruptcy without engaging in real-
world analysis.
One key contribution of Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook was putting
"local legal culture" on the scholarly map. Along with Professor Jean
Braucher, who was writing contemporaneously, 6 the CBP researchers
realized that debtors experienced a theoretically federal and theoretically
uniform consumer bankruptcy law very differently based on where they
lived. 7
In some areas of the country, such as Alaska, Connecticut, and Indiana, 8
the overwhelming majority of debtors were filing under chapter 7 of the
"No Money Down " Bankruptcy, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1071 (2017) (analyzing data from the
2007 and 2013-2015 CBP). Littwin has collected qualitative and quantitative data for analysis in
recent years. See, e.g., Angela Littwin, Adapting to BAPCPA, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J. 183, 189 (2016)
(reporting data from fifty-three interviews with consumer bankruptcy attorneys); Angela Littwin
with Adrienne Adams & McKenzie Javorka, The Frequency, Nature, and Effects of Coerced Debt
Among a National Sample of Women Seeking Help for Intimate Partner Violence, VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN (forthcoming 2020). We are both nonetheless glad that we did not have to carry
a copy machine up three flights of stairs.
3. TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE
MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 238-52 (2000).
4. Id. at 73-74.
5. TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS WE
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 17, 217 (1989)
(reporting that only one-third of chapter 13 debtors in their database completed their bankruptcy
plans).
6. Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 501, 503 (1993).
7. Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of Local
Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 801, 810-11 (1994). The Bankruptcy Code also incorporates some elements of state
law, most notably state exemption law. 11 U.S.C. 522(b) (2012). But the researchers found a wide
variety of practices within states, which suggested that state law could not be driving regional
differences. Sullivan et al., supra note 7, at 828-29; Braucher, supra note 6, at 515-16.
8. Sullivan et al., supra note 7, at 825 tbl.3.
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Bankruptcy Code9-the quicker and cheaper consumer chapter that provides
the majority of bankruptcy debtors the relief they need. Under chapter 7,
debtors liquidate all of their nonexempt property and receive a discharge of
most unsecured debts.' 0 The liquidation requirement has little bite because
very few chapter 7 filers have unencumbered, nonexempt assets that a
bankruptcy trustee can sell to pay creditors." Most chapter 7 debtors receive
their discharge within a few months.'2
In other areas of the country, such as Alabama and the Western District
of Tennessee, most debtors were filing under chapter 13,13 which requires
debtors to pay all of their disposable income over a period of three to five
years.'4 Chapter 13 does provide tools for some consumers trying to save
their homes" and a broader discharge than chapter 7 (although Congress has
narrowed this discharge since the time of the original CBP research).' 6 Still,
the differences in chapter 7 and chapter 13 were highly improbable sources
for the huge variation in chapter choice bankruptcy scholars observed around
the country.
Although the Bankruptcy Code leaves the decision of which chapter to
use mostly in the debtor's hands,17 the scholars argued that the results of this
9. 11 U.S.C. 701-27 (2012).
10. Id. 523, 727.
11. Dali6 Jimnez, The Distribution of Assets in Consumer Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Cases, 83
AM. BANKR. L.J. 795, 797 (2009); Lois R. LOPICA, AM. BANKR. INST. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF
BANKR. JUDGES, THE CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY CREDITOR DISTRIBUTION STUDY 6,44-45 (2013).
12. Dov Cohen & Robert M. Lawless, Less Forgiven: Race and Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, in
BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 175, 175 (Katherine Porter ed., 2012);
Katherine Porter, The Pretend Solution: An Empirical Study of Bankruptcy Outcomes, 90 TEXAS L.
REV. 103, 116 (2011).
13. Sullivan et al., supra note 7, at 825-26 tbl.3. Consumers may also file under chapter 11, but
only a tiny percentage of consumer debtors use this option. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, CASELOAD STATISTICS DATA TABLES, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/
caseload-statistics-data-tables [https://perma.cc/4AN2-2LMN] (showing statistically that a minimal
number of nonbusiness filings fall under chapter 11 while the majority fall under chapter 7 and
chapter 13).
14. 11 U.S.C. 1325(b)(4) (2012).
15. Id. 1322(b)(5), (c).
16. Id. 1328(a)(2) (incorporating some but not all of the nondischargeability provisions in
523(a)).
17. In 2005, Congress added the means test to prevent high-income debtors from filing under
chapter 7. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
102(h), 119 Stat. 23, 33-34 (2005). The change appears to have had little effect on the ratio of
chapter 7 to chapter 13 filings. Chrystin Ondersma, Are Debtors Rational Actors? An Experiment,
13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 279, 295-303 (2009).
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choice and other choices18 were, in fact, driven by local legal culture. As
Professor Westbrook explained:
The evidence strongly suggests that the "choices" given to debtors are
often exercised in fact by creditors, lawyers, by judges through
lawyers, and by judges through debtors. The average consumer debtor,
faced with an extraordinarily complex statute at a moment of financial
and personal crisis, will be guided by lawyers and pressures exerted
through lawyers.19
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook identified local legal culture as
"systematic and persistent variations in local legal practices" that arose
because of "perceptions and expectations shared by many practitioners and
officials in a particular locality." 20 Persistence over time was a key feature of
their conceptualization, and their foundational article on the topic examined
local culture features that persisted across 1970, 1980, and 1990.21 Braucher
similarly defined local legal culture as the "context created by" a locality's
"administrative practices of judges and trustees, and prevailing professional
attitudes," 22 although she did not emphasize persistence. The CBP
researchers and Braucher each used qualitative data to develop portraits of
the complex interactions among judges, trustees, and debtor attorneys that
shaped local legal culture.23
Authors working with the databases from the CBP since that time have
produced findings on local legal culture, but the focus has shifted to race.
Specifically, beginning with the 1991 CBP, researchers documented a
disturbing trend. Black debtors, and sometimes Latino debtors, were
overrepresented in chapter 13, the chapter that takes more time,2 4 costs more
money, 25 and has a significantly lower discharge rate.26 These patterns
18. Bankruptcy chapter is not the only debtor choice guided by local legal culture. Sullivan,
Warren, and Westbrook also studied filing rates and proposed payments to creditors in chapter 13
plans. Sullivan et al., supra note 7, at 811. Braucher additionally studied repayment rates in
chapter 13 cases. Braucher, supra note 6, at 530-34. We focus on chapter choice in this Article for
two reasons. First, once a debtor decides to file for bankruptcy, the choice of chapter influences-
and frequently determines the outcome of-the other choices in the case. Second, most of the recent
research on local legal culture has focused on chapter choice because of the disturbing racial trends
associated with that decision. See infra subpart I1(B).
19. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Local Legal Culture and the Fear ofAbuse, 6 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 25, 30 (1998).
20. Sullivan et al., supra note 7, at 804.
21. See generally Sullivan et al., supra note 7.
22. Braucher, supra note 6, at 503.
23. See infra subpart II(A).
24. See supra Part I.
25. Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee Study: Final Report, 20 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 17, 58 fig.4, 69 fig.7 (2012).
26. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 222; Sara S. Greene, Parina Patel & Katherine Porter,
Cracking the Code: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Bankruptcy Outcomes, 101 MINN. L. REV.
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remained even when controlling for income, homeownership, and a variety
of other factors associated with chapter 13.27 Research from the 2007 CBP
additionally controlled for judicial district and found that the correlations
between chapter 13 and black debtors remained significant. 28 An article based
on the 2007 and 2013-2015 CBPs found that judicial districts with high
chapter 13 rates significantly correlated with the overrepresentation of black
debtors in chapter 13-and that the effect of judicial district became more
pronounced once researchers controlled for debtor financial variables
associated with chapter 13.29
The current study adds to this recent work with new methods. Using a
public database collected by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, we
analyzed chapter choice in consumer bankruptcies filed from fiscal years
2012-2016.30 We developed three sets of factors expected to influence
chapter choice in a consumer bankruptcy case: (1) case characteristics,
particularly features of the debtor's economic situation that make chapter 7
or 13 more appropriate; (2) a debtor's geographic community based on
demographics of her zip code; and (3) judicial district. We analyzed both
geographic community and legal district to shed light on an ambiguity in the
scholarship of local legal culture-what does "local" mean? Is it the debtor's
neighborhood or the debtor's legal neighborhood that counts?
Our results support and extend the prior research. Race, once again,
matters. More specifically, race, case characteristics, and judicial district are
the only variables that matter. We find that case characteristics are
significantly associated with each bankruptcy chapter in the expected ways.
For example, real property correlates with chapter 13, almost certainly
because of the tools chapter 13 provides for saving debtors' homes.3 1
Unsecured debt correlates with chapter 7, which provides a more effective
mechanism for discharging it.32 At the community level, the most interesting
point is what we do not find. Although most of the community variables we
tested are statistically significant when the regression includes only case and
community variables, once we add judicial district to the regression, the only
variable that retains its statistical significance is race, specifically the
percentage of the debtor's zip code that is black. The disappearance of
significance for most of the community variables once we add district fixed
effects suggests that the "work" of local legal culture is being done at the
legal level rather than at the community level. Finally, most judicial districts
in the United States are statistically significant at a very high level. The
1031, 1042 (2017).
27. See infra Part II.
28. Cohen & Lawless, supra note 12, at 185.
29. Foohey et al., supra note 2, at 1088.
30. See infra subpart III(A).
31. See 11 U.S.C. 1322(b)(5) (2012) (providing an option to cure a mortgage in default).
32. Foohey et al., supra note 2, at 1093 tbl.5.
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pattern we find among judicial district chapter 13 rates both confirms and
complicates the conventional wisdom of chapter 13 as a southern
phenomenon.
This Article makes several contributions. First, we use observational
data on the universe of bankruptcy filers. All of the recent CBPs are surveys
of a national random sample, which means that participation in them is
voluntary. Thus, researchers using the CBP data could never rule out
nonresponse bias, the possibility that study participants somehow differed
from debtors who chose not to participate. 33 Second, although the prior
research, especially that of the early CBP and Braucher, leaves little doubt
that local legal culture exists, the phrase contains ambiguities. This study
considers competing definitions of "local" and thus provides quantitative
evidence suggesting that legal boundaries may be more relevant than
geographic ones. Third, our finding that race is the only community-level
variable that retains significance when we add judicial districts to the
regression provokes more questions than it addresses. This unsettling result,
combined with the importance of judicial districts, suggests directions for
future research. Legal professionals and their attitudes need further
examination. A return to the qualitative methods of Braucher and the early
CBP may be a particularly fruitful line of inquiry.
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II is a literature review.
Part III provides our methodology, results, and interpretation of findings.
Part IV concludes with more directions for future research.
II. Literature Review
A. What Is Local Legal Culture? Definitions and Origins in the Literature
The first study to probe local legal culture, although it did not use the
term, was Stanley and Girth's seminal Brookings Institution study. They
found wide variation in chapter XIII rates-the predecessor to chapter 13-
among the seven districts they studied.34 Chapter XIII cases ranged from 76%
of all filings in the Northern District of Alabama to 52% in Maine to 11% or
fewer in four districts.3 5 Their "unit of locality" was district, but they did not
study any districts within the same state,36 limiting their ability to identify
judicial district or state as the level of locality for the effect.
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook began to fill this gap by examining
33. Jean Braucher, Dov Cohen & Robert M. Lawless, Race, Attorney Influence, and Bankruptcy
Chapter Choice, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 393, 423-24 (2012).
34. DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 74-
75 (Brookings Inst. ed., 1971).
35. Id. at 74.
36. See id. at 41-42 (studying districts of Northern Ohio, Northern Alabama, Maine, Northern
Illinois, Oregon, Western Texas, Southern California, and Southern New York).
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the variation between judicial districts within the same state, using survey
and court-record data from ten judicial districts studied in the CBP. They
argued that because bankruptcy is federal law and incorporates some state
law, variations between districts within a state that persist over time must be
due to local culture.37 Their examination of chapter choice found tremendous
variation between states as well as judicial districts within states. For
example, 20% of the filings in the Southern District of Alabama were
chapter 13 cases compared to 66% in the Middle District of Alabama. 38
Moreover, the authors found statistically significant persistence in the district
rates over time.3 9
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook argued that the complex and
numerous decisions that went into a bankruptcy case made the consumer
bankruptcy system particularly susceptible to the development of local legal
cultures. 40 They also argued that influential individuals in a legal community
changed over time and thus were an unlikely source for their findings about
patterns that had held up over twenty years. 41
Braucher studied four bankruptcy divisions42 from two pairs of cities
that shared a federal judicial district.4 3 The two pairs of cities were in two
parts of the country-Ohio and Texas-that had distinct chapter 13 rates.44
Braucher demonstrated the existence of local legal culture through in-depth
qualitative interviews with legal professionals. 45 She showed how judges and
especially trustees shaped local legal culture by imposing requirements not
in the Bankruptcy Code and incentivizing attorneys to use chapter 7 or
chapter 13.46 She also analyzed the complex interactions among the
incentives of attorneys and their clients that led to the use of one bankruptcy
chapter or another.47
Taken together, the Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook and Braucher
studies left little doubt that many local legal cultures existed in the
37. Sullivan et al., supra note 7, at 812.
38. Id. at 828.
39. Id. at 829-30 (basing this finding on data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
covering 1970, 1980, and 1990).
40. Id. at 836-39.
41. Id. at 839.
42. A division is a subunit within a judicial district. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 124 (2000) (dividing
the Northern District of Texas into seven divisions).
43. Braucher, supra note 6, at 515.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 512-13.
46. See, e.g., id. at 546-47 (finding that, while consumer attorneys earned higher fees for
chapter 13 cases than chapter 7s in all four divisions, the divisions with higher chapter 13 rates
featured larger differences in the amount by which the attorney fees for a chapter 13 exceeded those
for a chapter 7 case).
47. Id. at 562-63.
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bankruptcy system. Using different research methods, two sets of scholars
had come to the same fundamental conclusions about the existence and
nature of the local legal cultures. The idea was on the scholarly map, and
many scholars both replicated and expanded their findings.
Using data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO),
Whitford showed wide variation in chapter 13 rates among judicial districts
in 1990, 1992, and 1993.48 Whitford later updated these findings using 1993,
2002, 2009, and 2010 data, suggesting that the percentage of chapter 13 cases
in each district had remained relatively consistent across these four years.4 9
Bermant, Flynn, and Bakewell drilled down to divisions as the unit of
locality. They used 2001 AO data to demonstrate that state chapter 13 rates
masked variations among districts and that district chapter 13 rates masked
variation among divisions." Norberg and Schreiber Compo found
widespread disparities in chapter 13 rates among seven judicial districts in
the South and mid-Atlantic regions and that the high-chapter 13 districts
tended to have fewer chapter 13 debtors with mortgages than the other
districts, suggesting that debtors without mortgages were filing under
chapter 13 in the former districts due to local legal culture.5 1 Ondersma
replicated Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook's analysis of the persistence of
local legal culture with an expanded dataset that included data on exemption
laws, poverty and unemployment rates, and foreclosure rates, none of which
could explain the variation of chapter 13 choice across localities. 52
B. Race and Ethnicity
The concept of "local legal culture" was at the same time both
pathbreaking and incomplete. As one of this Article's authors put it:
"Local" is a problem because it is generally taken to mean areas
defined by political boundaries ... rather than boundaries that are
psychologically meaningful to people. "Legal" is a problem because
the cultural values we discuss may be a product of broad community
sentiment, rather than ones unique to the local legal community.
"Culture" is a problem because. . . we have no measures of the
attitudes, values, and beliefs of professionals in the legal system. On
48. William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as
Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J.
397, 411-14 (1994).
49. William C. Whitford, Small Ball, 90 TExAS L. REv. SEE ALSO 9 app. A (2011).
50. Gordon Bermant, Ed Flynn & Karen Bakewell, Bankruptcy by the Numbers: Thoughts on
the "Local Legal Culture ", AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2002, at 24, 24.
51. Scott F. Norberg & Nadja Schreiber Compo, Report on an Empirical Study of District
Variations, and the Roles of Judges, Trustees and Debtors' Attorneys in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy
Cases, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431, 436-37 (2007).
52. Ondersma, supra note 17, at 303-05.
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the other hand, the advantage of the present definition is that it fits
with a common conception of the term that many people have-local
legal culture is what the people in a local legal community "do"; it is
their practices that define them.53
Thus, scholars needed to and did start to unpack the constituent parts of
what made for a "culture" that was both "local" and "legal." The most widely
known of these efforts have focused on racial and ethnic differences in who
files chapter 13. In her original study, Braucher noted that Ohio standing
trustees were concerned that black debtors were overrepresented in
chapter 13, with one stating that black debtors were possibly "being taken
advantage of."54
The earliest efforts appeared either as byproducts of research with other
goals or based on nonrandom samples that limited statistical inference. In a
paper about the rise of filings after the 1978 implementation of the
Bankruptcy Code, White found that the percentage of African-American
debtors in a county's population was associated with a statistically significant
increase in the proportion of chapter 13 cases.5 5 Interestingly, she found no
statistically significant relationship between African-Americans and
chapter 7 filings, but the proportion of Spanish-speaking debtors in a county
was significantly negatively associated with chapter 7 filings.5 6
Using data from the 1991 CBP, Chapman found that although African-
Americans appeared to be overrepresented in consumer bankruptcy, they
were not overrepresented in chapter 7, which implied that they were
overrepresented in chapter 13.57 Specifically, his data analysis found that
non-Hispanic whites were statistically significantly more likely to file under
chapter 7 than other racial and ethnic groups.58 Chapman found that this
effect was uniform in all but one of the studied districts that yielded data
appropriate for his analysis. 59 Van Loo used data from the 2001 CBP to find
61.8% of black debtors used chapter 13 compared to 29.4% of Hispanic and
20.5% of white debtors. 6 0 After controlling for the influence of income,
education, and employment, he found that only 19.8% of blacks and 19.4%
of Hispanics in chapter 13 obtained a discharge compared to 28.3% of non-
53. Cohen & Lawless, supra note 12, at 180.
54. Braucher, supra note 6, at 559-60.
55. Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code: An Economic
Analysis, 63 IND. L.J. 1, 48 (1987).
56. Id. at 47.
57. Robert B. Chapman, Missing Persons: Social Science and Accounting for Race, Gender,
Class, and Marriage in Bankruptcy, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 347, 387 n.226 (2002).
58. Id.
59. Id.




Hispanic whites. 61 Van Loo attributed the lower discharge rates to more
aggressive uses of motions to dismiss in the chapter 13s of black debtors as
compared to debtors of other races. 62 Although doing more extensive data
analysis than the previous articles, the Chapman and Van Loo studies relied
on earlier iterations of the CBP that were not national random samples,
limiting the statistical inferences that could be drawn.
Using CBP data from 2007 that was collected from a national random
sample, Braucher, Cohen, and Lawless found that blacks were
disproportionately likely to file under chapter 13.63 This effect held even
when controlling for twenty variables that theoretically should determine a
filing under chapter 13 including: home ownership, pending foreclosure,
legal representation, monthly income, asset levels, total debt, priority debt,
the percentage of debt that was secured or credit card debt, and demographic
variables such as marital status and education. The study also developed a
control variable that effectively isolated the effects of geography from those
of race, and yet race was still a statistically significant determinant in chapter
choice. 64 Even after controlling for the variables that should determine
chapter choice, blacks were roughly twice as likely to file chapter 13 as
debtors of other races. The authors also found that blacks did not receive
more favorable treatment in chapter 13 and were indeed slightly more likely
to have their cases dismissed. In articles for a symposium discussing this
paper, Doherty65 and Eisenberg 6 6 reanalyzed the authors' data and confirmed
their findings.
The same Braucher, Cohen, and Lawless paper also included an
experimental vignette that asked consumer bankruptcy attorneys to select a
bankruptcy chapter for a hypothetical couple with a mix of financial
characteristics that could suggest chapter 7 or 13.67 The only variations were
the race of the couple (white, black, no race identified) and the couple's
expressed chapter preference (chapter 7, chapter 13, no preference). 6 8
Attorneys who thought they were counseling a black couple were about twice
61. Id.
62. Id. at 237. He was not able to analyze Hispanic debtors because the sample of those
receiving a discharge was too small. He limited this analysis to discharged debtors because almost
all of the debtors with dismissed cases were subject to motions to dismiss. Id. at n.28.
63. Braucher et al., supra note 33, at 400-04.
64. Id. at 403; see also Cohen & Lawless, supra note 12, at 186-87 (reporting an earlier version
of the study).
65. Joseph W. Doherty, One Client, Different Races: Estimating Racial Disparity in Chapter
Choice Using Matched Pairs of Debtors, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 651, 678 (2012).
66. Theodore Eisenberg, The CBP Race Study: A Pathbreaking Civil Justice Study and Its
Sensitivity to Debtor Income, Prior Bankruptcy, and Foreclosure, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
683, 700 (2012).
67. Braucher et al., supra note 33, at 405.
68. Id. at 406-07.
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as likely to recommend chapter 13 as attorneys who thought they were
counseling a white couple. 69 Attorneys were less likely to say that a black
couple who wanted chapter 7 were persons of "good values" or were
"competent" but had directly the opposite reaction to a white couple who
wanted chapter 7.70
Greene, Patel, and Porter found that the debtor's race had a major impact
on chapter 13 plan completion.7 ' Using data from the 2007 CBP, they found
black debtors were 17% less likely to receive a discharge than their non-black
counterparts when controlling for all the other statistically significant
variables in the study. 72 The authors concluded: "More than amount of debt,
prior bankruptcies, trying to save a home from foreclosure, or having a job-
all features that are imbedded in chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code-race
matters."73
Using a sample from Cook County, Illinois, Morrison and Uettwiller
found many of the same racial pathologies that other researchers have
documented. 74 But they provided a new possible explanation for the high
chapter 13 rates and poor chapter 13 outcomes among black debtors-
parking tickets and related government fines, which are dischargeable in
chapter 13 but not chapter 7.75 Blacks were overrepresented among bankrupt
debtors with more than $500 in fines, the group of filers that had the highest
termination rates. Within this group, blacks and debtors of other races had
similar chances of having their cases terminated.76 Moreover, when the
authors excluded the "fines" group from the population of bankruptcy filers,
blacks remained disproportionately represented but at smaller rates.7 7
Morrison and Uettwiller suggest that government fines may be driving the
chapter 13 racial disparities in Cook County because African-Americans
appear to be particularly vulnerable to receiving these fines, and debtors
69. Id. at 411-12.
70. Id. at 413-15.
71. Greene et al., supra note 26, at 1086. Race appeared to be the second most important factor.
Slightly edging out race, the variable with the largest impact (a 19% difference) was amount of
unsecured debt. Id. The greater the amount of non-priority unsecured debt, the more likely the debtor
was to receive a discharge. Id. at 1051. The authors argue that debtors with high levels of unsecured
debt have increased incentives to complete their plans. Id. at 1089.
72. Id. at 1060, 1086.
73. Id. at 1086.
74. Edward R. Morrison & Antoine Uettwiller, Consumer Bankruptcy Pathologies, 173 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 174, 176 (2017).
75. See 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(7) (2012) (prohibiting discharge of government fines); id.
1328(a)(2) (incorporating several nondischargeability provisions from 523(a) into the
chapter 13 discharge but excluding 523(a)(7)). In addition, bankruptcy's automatic stay prevents
creditor collection activity while a debtor is in bankruptcy and lasts for the duration of a chapter 13
case. Id. 362(a), 1301.
76. Morrison & Uettwiller, supra note 74, at 187 fig.l.
77. Id. at 185 tbl.4, 186.
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within the "fines" group have low incomes that make it challenging to
complete chapter 13 plans. 78
Foohey, Lawless, Porter, and Thorne have found blacks
disproportionately represented among so-called "no money down"
chapter 13s, where the entire attorney's fee is funded through the chapter 13
plan. Indeed, the largest determinants of a no-money-down chapter 13 are the
judicial district where the case is filed and the race of the debtor. Using data
from the 2007 and 2013-2015 CBPs, they found that the financial
characteristics of debtors filing no-money-down chapter 13 cases resembled
those of chapter 7 debtors more than those of debtors filing "traditional
chapter 13s."79 They tied these findings to local legal culture by
demonstrating that, when controlling for other relevant factors, the higher the
chapter 13 rate in a district, the higher the use of no-money-down plans and
the higher the racial difference in chapter use.8 0 In fact, much of the racial
disparity in chapter use in high-chapter 13 districts may be accounted for by
no-money-down cases.
In an article for ProPublica, Kiel and Fresques used AO data
supplemented by demographic data via zip codes to find that nationally the
odds of filing under chapter 13 were twice as high for debtors living in a
mostly black area. 81 Compared to black debtors who filed under chapter 7,
the black chapter 13 debtors had less income, fewer assets, lower secured
debts, and dramatically lower unsecured debts. 82 The authors did an in-depth
study on two districts with especially troubling disparities-the Northern
District of Illinois and the Western District of Tennessee. 83 In both districts,
Kiel and Fresques found that a handful of law firms accounted for a
significant number of all chapter 13 filings, and, at least in Tennessee, the
practice "nearly always" was to file with no money down. Like Morrison and
Uettwiller, Kiel and Fresques found many black debtors were filing under
chapter 13 to avoid suspension of their driver's licenses. 84
Most recently, Cohen, Lawless, and Shin replicated the 2007 CBP
findings about racial disparities in chapter use with 2013-2015 data from the
current CBP. 85 Further, the authors surveyed a national random sample of
78. Id. at 194.
79. Foohey et al., supra note 2, at 1077-80.
80. Id. at 1089 fig.4. It is important to note that, even in low-chapter 13 districts, African-
Americans are approximately 10% less likely to file chapter 7 as debtors of other races in the
presence of controls. Id.
81. Paul Kiel & Hannah Fresques, Data Analysis: Bankruptcy and Race in America,





85. Dov Cohen, Robert M. Lawless & Faith Shin, Opposite of Correct: Inverted Insider
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consumer bankruptcy attorneys and found that their beliefs about the
percentage of African-Americans and whites who filed under chapter 13 was
exactly reversed from the real-world percentages. 86 On average, attorneys
believed that whites were more than twice as likely to file under chapter 13
as African-Americans when in fact the opposite is true.8 7
III. Data and Analysis
A. Methodology
Our theory conceptualizes the chapter choice decision as being the result
of three different dynamics: (1) the individual debtor's circumstances; (2) the
community from where the debtor comes; and (3) the legal norms and rules
of the debtor's judicial district. The first idea captures traditional
explanations for chapter choice, such as the idea that homeowners will be
more likely to file chapter 13 because it offers greater protections to
homeowners than chapter 7. Because these determinants are individual to the
debtor, they would not represent a "local culture." The second idea is that
certain communities may offer financially distressed debtors fewer options
or constrain debtors' bankruptcy choices. Given the previous findings, the
racial composition of a community may be a particularly important factor.
The third idea is that the legal professionals-lawyers, trustees, and judges-
implement formal rules or have informal norms that direct bankruptcy
debtors to a particular chapter choice.
Our data came from the Integrated Database assembled by the AO and
made available through the Federal Judicial Center.8 8 Specifically, we used
the "Bankruptcy Snapshot 5-year File" for the governmental fiscal years
2012-2016.89 This file contains all bankruptcy cases filed, pending, or
terminated at any point from October 1, 2011 to September 30, 2017;
although, we only used cases filed on January 1, 2012, and after. The database
contains (1) much of the information found in the bankruptcy petition-such
as chapter choice, legal representation, method of paying filing fees, debtor's
zip code, case status (pending/dismissed)-and (2) the information found in
the summary of schedules on asset, debt, income, and expense levels.9 0
It is possible for a case to appear more than once in the database if it is
Perceptions of Race and Bankruptcy, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 623, 630-32 (2017).
86. Id. at 638. The authors surveyed these attorneys before publishing the results of their
original work on race and chapter 13 in Less Forgiven: Race and Chapter 13 Bankruptcy. Cohen &
Lawless, supra note 12, at 175.
87. Cohen et al., supra note 85, at 638.
88. Integrated Database, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/research/idb
[https://perma.cc/ZSF6-PR4S].





pending for more than one year. The full database contains 12,502,973
records of 6,675,597 unique bankruptcy cases. Because we are interested in
the filing decision for chapter 7 and chapter 13, we used the case record from
the year of filing. We further eliminated (1) cases filed outside the fifty states
and the District of Columbia; (2) records representing a reopened case;
(3) cases where the debtor's bankruptcy petition identified the debts as
predominately business in nature; (4) cases filed by nonindividuals; and
(5) cases filed by persons who were not U.S. residents. Our final database
had 4,343,794 unique bankruptcy cases filed from fiscal year 2012-2016.
We then downloaded zip-code level data using the U.S. Census
Bureau's American FactFinder website. 91 The American Community Survey
(ACS) 92 provided data on population by race, Hispanic/Latino origin, owner-
vs. renter-occupied housing units, and income. We used ACS five-year
estimates for the years 2012-2016, exactly overlapping with our bankruptcy
data.
The U.S. Census Bureau's County Business Patterns 93 series provided
zip-code level data on consumer-lending storefronts as a measure of
constrained financial advice and lending within a community. We used the
2014 data from this series because that year is the midpoint of our bankruptcy
database. Consistent with Bhutta,94 we downloaded the count of
establishments identified in two North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS) codes:95
* 522390 Other Activities Related to Credit Intermediation: This
code provides information on services such as "Check cashing
services, Money order issuance services, Loan servicing,
Travelers' check issuance services, Money transmission
services, Payday lending services."
* 522291 Consumer Lending: This code provides information on
"establishments primarily engaged in making unsecured cash
loans to consumers. Illustrative Examples: Finance companies
(i.e., unsecured cash loans), Personal credit institutions (i.e.,
unsecured cash loans), Loan companies (i.e., consumer,
personal, student, small), Student loan companies."
91. American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://factfinder.census.gov
[https://perma.cc/6VAN-WRLW].
92. American Community Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-
surveys/acs/ [https://perma.cc/WEV6-9D4D].
93. County Business Patterns, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-
surveys/cbp.html [https://perma.cc/G5KQ-XEUD].
94. Neil Bhutta, Payday Loans and Consumer Financial Health, J. BANKING & FIN., Oct. 2014,
at 230, 235.
95. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NORTH AMERICAN
INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM (2017), https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/
[https://perma.cc/99S2-W2NQ].
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For a shorthand reference, we call the sum of these counts "fringe
lending," although the term is overinclusive. We used the zip-code level
population counts from the ACS to construct a measure of fringe lending
storefronts per 1,000 residents in the zip code.
We merged the zip-code level data from the U.S. Census with the
bankruptcy database using the zip code for the first debtor listed in the
bankruptcy petition. This method has two complications. First, the ACS uses
zip-code tabulation areas (ZCTAs), which in most instances are identical to
the corresponding zip code, but ZCTAs can sometimes diverge from exact
contiguity with a zip code depending on where census tract boundaries fall.
Second, in 2.9% of the joint cases, the second debtor listed a zip code
different from the first debtor. As a robustness check, we reran our
regressions omitting these cases, and the results did not change.
B. Results
To test our theories, we constructed a series of regressions on the
determinants of the bankruptcy chapter choice between chapter 7 and
chapter 13. Because the outcome is a binary variable, we ran a logistic
regression, and for ease of interpretation we report odds ratios. The odds ratio
can be interpreted as the effect of the variable on the probability of filing
chapter 13. Table 1 reports the regression results with an expanded table of
the odds ratios for the fixed effects of each judicial district appearing in the
Appendix.
The first regression captures case characteristics. The second regression
adds zip-code level data as our measure of the debtor's community. The final
regression then adds fixed effects for each judicial district. Our measures are
not perfectly mutually exclusive. For example, the racial composition of a
neighborhood tells us something both about the probability of the debtor's
race and perhaps the socioeconomic status of the neighborhood.
Finally, we created a map (Figure 1) grouping the judicial districts into
six clusters based on the final regression. The map reports the odds ratio and
thus can be interpreted as the probability of observing a chapter 13 filing in
each district as compared to the median district, the Middle District of
Florida, after controlling for the variables in the regression. The map provides
a visual overview of the wide variation in chapter 13 use across the country




Table 1. Logistic Regression on Probability of Filing Chapter 13, Odds Ratios
(1) (2) (3)
Case Characteristics
Real Property (ln) 1.02* 1.03* 1.03*
Personal Property (ln) 1.01 1.03 1.05*
Secured Debts (ln) 1.10* 1.09* 1.08*
Priority Debts (ln) 1.11* 1.11* 1.10*
Unsecured Debts (ln) 0.58* 0.59* 0.60*
Income (ln) 1.72* 1.78* 1.88*
Filing Fee (Reference Category:
Installments Completed)
Installments in Progress 2.05* 1.95* 1.76*
Full at Filing 0.47* 0.53* 0.55*
Fee Not Paid 0.31 0.33 0.31
Waived (IFP) 0.002* 0.002* 0.002*
Prior Bankruptcy 5.20* 4.81* 4.68*
Joint Filing 0.87* 0.95 0.95
Pro Se Filer 0.21* 0.26* 0.37*
Filing Year (Reference Category:
2012)
2013 1.03* 1.02 1.01
2014 1.13* 1.10* 1.10*
2015 1.22* 1.18* 1.18*
2016 1.24* 1.20* 1.21*
Zip-Code Characteristics
Black Percent in Zip Code 5.00* 3.06*
Latino Percent in Zip Code 1.01 1.09
Mean Income ($1,000s) 0.99* 1.00
Mean Income Squared ($1,000s) 1.00* 1.00
"Fringe Lending" (per 1,000) 2.29* 1.05
Renter-occupied Property Percent 0.40* 0.96
Judicial District Fixed Effects Yes
NOTES: The table reports odds ratios for the probability of filing a chapter 13 out of
a database composed of all chapter 7 and chapter 13 cases filed from FY 2012 to
2016. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district level in all three regres-
sions. For the case characteristic and zip-code characteristic variables, an asterisk
indicates statistical significance where p < .05. Full results for the district fixed ef-
fects are presented in the Appendix.
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Figure 1. Judicial District Fixed Effects from Regression, Probability of Filing Chapter 13 vs. Chapter 7






NOTES: The map shows the odds ratios from the judicial district-fixed effects from Regression (3) in Table 1. Using the odds ratios,
the map shows the judicial district's fixed effect on the probability of a bankruptcy debtor choosing chapter 13 as compared to the
median judicial district, which is the Middle District of Florida where 29.9% of the cases are chapter 13s. As the probabilities come
from the Regression (3), they represent the probabilities after controlling for the case characteristic variables and zip-code
characteristic variables of the debtor. Judicial districts with striped fill did not differ from the Middle District of Florida at a











The most striking finding is that, at the zip-code level, the only variable
that matters consistently is the zip code's racial composition. At the case
level, the characteristics that one would expect to drive chapter 13 filings are
in fact associated with chapter 13 cases. Chapter 13 is more likely with higher
amounts of real property, secured debts, priority debts, unsecured debts, and
income, as well as paying the filing fee in installments, prior bankruptcy, and
retaining an attorney. Higher amounts of real property, secured debt, and
priority debt are likely to make chapter 13 attractive to debtors because that
chapter provides tools for managing real estate and those debts.9 6 A higher
income increases a debtor's ability to propose and complete a feasible
chapter 13 plan.97 Chapter 13 is associated with debtors paying legal fees in
installments,98 so the chapter's correlation with debtors paying filing fees in
installments is not surprising. Prior bankruptcy is strongly associated with
chapter 13, partly because debtors face longer waiting periods after an earlier
discharge to file again under chapter 7 than under chapter 13.99 In addition,
chapter 13 debtors who drop out prior to discharge because they cannot afford
the payments often try again later.' 00 Finally, given the greater complexity of
chapter 13 and the dismal track record of pro se filers in confirming
chapter 13 plans, 101 it makes sense that being represented is positively
associated with filing chapter 13.
But once we move to the zip-code level, the logical connection between
chapter 13 and factors associated with it becomes more complex. We tested
96. See 11 U.S.C. 1322(a)(2) (2012) (stating that, unless the creditor consents, all priority
debts must be paid in full, although without interest); id. 1322(b)(5) (providing an option to cure
mortgage in default).
97. Although the requirement that debtors pay all of their disposable income in chapter 13
would appear to lessen the relevance of income level to plan success, a debtor's income also must
be high enough to pay the required thresholds of secured and priority debt. Id. 1325(b); see id.
506(a)(2) (valuing collateral on secured debts); id. 1322(a)(2) (requiring full payment of priority
debts, although without interest); id. 1322(b)(2) (prohibiting modification of mortgages on
primary residences); id. 1325(a)(5) (prohibiting modification of many secured debts in personal
property). In addition, some districts require a certain percentage payment to the general unsecured
creditors beyond the disposable-income requirement. Morrison & Uettwiller, supra note 74, at 189.
98. Foohey et al., supra note 2, at 1074.
99. Compare 11 U.S.C. 727(a)(8) (2012) (listing an eight-year waiting period if prior
discharge was in a chapter 7 case), and id. 727(a)(9) (prescribing a six-year waiting period if prior
discharge was in a chapter 12 or chapter 13 case), with id. 1328(f) (requiring a two-year waiting
period if prior discharge was in a chapter 13 case and a four-year waiting period if discharge was
obtained via any other bankruptcy chapter).
100. Sara Sternberg Greene, The Failed Reform: Congressional Crackdown on Repeat
Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Filers, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 241, 252 (2015).
101. See Angela Littwin, The Do-It-Yourself Mirage: Complexity in the Bankruptcy System, in
BROKE: How DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 157, 160 tbl.9 (Katherine Porter ed., 2012)
(finding that represented debtors were approximately 45 times more likely to confirm chapter 13
plans than their pro se counterparts when controlling for demographic and bankruptcy variables).
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zip-code income, Latino percentage of the zip code, black percentage of the
zip code, fringe lending, and percentage of zip-code housing that is rental
units. The fringe-lending variable examines the effects of living in lower-
quality neighborhoods. Because we used racial percentages in zip codes as a
proxy for race, we needed to consider the possibility that black
neighborhoods were associated with chapter 13 rather than black debtors.
African-Americans tend to live in poorer-quality neighborhoods due to
decades of housing discrimination during and after the Jim Crow Era.10 2 Zip-
code percentage of housing that is rented was another proxy for
neighborhood quality, but this variable's inclusion also reflects our thinking
that homeowners are more likely to file under chapter 13. At the zip-code
level, both of these variables were significant. Fringe lending was positively
associated with chapter 13. When interpreting that result, it is important to
note that most zip codes have zero or one fringe lender per thousand
residents, with more than half of zip codes having no fringe lenders. So the
odds ratio of 2.21 means that the difference between having zero and one
fringe lender per thousand people in a zip code is a 221% increase in the
likelihood of a debtor in that zip code filing under chapter 13. Percentage of
property in a zip code that was renter-occupied is negatively correlated with
chapter 13, supporting the classic association of chapter 13 with
homeowners. Income was negatively correlated with chapter 13, which is
surprising because it was positively correlated with chapter 13 at the case
level. Reconciling the findings suggests that, all else equal, an increase in an
individual debtor's income is an indicator of chapter 13, while a decrease in
zip-code income is an indicator of chapter 13. The latter result supports Kiel
and Fresques' counterintuitive finding that, in high-chapter 13 districts, lower
incomes were associated with chapter 13.103
The only variable that was not significant at the zip-code level was
Latino percentage. On one hand, this result is surprising. Like African-
Americans, Latinos experience lending discrimination, 104 so we might expect
them to be steered into chapter 13 the way that black debtors appear to be.105
And the analyses of data from early CBPs identified Latino as well as black
disparities in chapter use1 o6 and case outcomes. 10 7 In addition, Puerto Rico
102. MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL
WEALTH GAP 141-42 (2017).
103. Kiel & Fresques, supra note 81.
104. Ethan Cohen-Cole, Credit Card Redlining, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 700, 700 (2011);
Simon Firestone, Race, Ethnicity, and Credit Card Marketing, 46 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING
1205, 1206 (2014).
105. Braucher et al., supra note 33, at 417-18.
106. Chapman, supra note 57, at 387 n.226.
107. Van Loo, supra note 60, at 234.
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has a long-standing history as a high-chapter 13 district, 10 8 which may result
from some of the same implicit racial associations found with respect to
blacks in the attorney-vignette study. 109 On the other hand, neither of the two
most recent CBP studies found a Latino effect,1 0 and this study's lack of
Latino findings supports those results.
More interesting than the significance of income, fringe lending, and
rental housing at the zip-code level is the fact that none of these variables
retain their significance once we control for judicial district by adding fixed
effects in the third regression. Our database contained the universe of over
4.3 million bankruptcy filings in the study period. Although we are cautious
to interpret from a null result, we believe our finding suggests that the
geographic pattern of chapter use is being determined by legal boundaries
rather than neighborhood boundaries.
The one variable that remains significant even when controlling for
district fixed effects is the black percentage in a zip code. It is positively
correlated with the chapter 13 rate, and the effect is strong. The difference
between a debtor living in a zip code that is 0% black and 100% black is a
306% increase in likelihood of that debtor filing under chapter 13.1" Of
course, we cannot rule out the possibility that debtors of other races living in
predominantly black zip codes also have high odds of filing under chapter 13.
There could be unobserved characteristics of black neighborhoods that are
associated with chapter 13. Our attempts to control for neighborhood quality
provide some evidence that neighborhoods are not the issue but cannot fully
address this concern.
Prior studies also give us more confidence that our racial finding is
hardly spurious. The 1991, 2001, 2007, and current iterations of the CBP all
found racial disparities in chapter use, 112 and this study provides important
support for these findings. However, all of these CBPs were surveys and are
thus subject to the critique of nonresponse bias. 113 A major contribution of
this study is to provide support for the racial disparities found by the CBP
using data that did not require voluntary participation by respondents.
While the most important characteristic of the results of adding the
district fixed effects is the effect that the addition has on other variables, the
distribution of chapter 13 filings among judicial districts also sheds light on
108. Bermant et al., supra note 50, at 24; Whitford, supra note 48, at 406-07.
109. Braucher et al., supra note 33, at 415-16.
110. Id. at 400; Foohey et al., supra note 2, at 1081.
111. We also ran the same regressions with a binary variable for whether the zip code was
majority black. We get a similar result: a 170% increase in the probability of filing under chapter 13
for persons living in majority-black districts.
112. Braucher et al., supra note 33, at 404; Chapman, supra note 57, at 389; Foohey et al.,
supra note 2, at 1086; Van Loo, supra note 60, at 234.
113. Braucher et al., supra note 33, at 423-24.
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the relationship between chapter 13 and the South. The South has been
viewed as the chapter 13 belt since at least 2002.114 As Figure 1 shows, our
results support this finding in interesting ways. First, the South appears to be
committed to chapter 13. With the exception of Kansas, all of the states that
have a majority of districts in the top two chapter 13 clusters were part of the
Confederacy during the U.S. Civil War." Conversely, Florida is the only
former Confederate state that does not have a majority of districts with
greater-than-median chapter 13 filing rates, although several Southern
districts have chapter 13 rates that are not significantly different from that of
the reference, median district, the Middle District of Florida. On the other
hand, there are several high-chapter 13 districts in other parts of the country,
such as the Northern District of California, the District of Kansas, and the
District of Utah. However, most of the non-Southern states with high
chapter 13 rates have districts that fall in the third-highest cluster, meaning
that their chapter 13 percentages are 102% to 157% greater than the reference
district. And none of these states have any districts in the highest cluster, with
chapter 13 rates that are 439% to 703% greater than those in the Middle
District of Florida.
This map also sheds interesting light on Sullivan, Warren, and
Westbrook's original findings. The 1981 CBP covered three states: Illinois,
Pennsylvania, and Texas. 116 Illinois and Pennsylvania have turned out to be
two of the non-Southern states that contain above-median chapter 13
districts. This may have made it more difficult to notice the concentration of
the chapter 13 belt in the South until relatively recently.
IV. Conclusion
Our research builds on and extends prior studies. We confirmed CBP
findings on race and chapter choice with a non-survey database. Specifically,
we found that race and judicial district appear to be the key factors in chapter
choice beyond the economic profile of a bankruptcy case. We began to
address the question of whether the "local" in "local legal culture" is shaped
by legal geography or general geography. Our findings suggest that legal
boundaries are playing a more important role.
This study also points to directions for future research. We obtained one
finding on the meaning of "local" in "local legal culture." Additional research
would make the relationship between "local" and "legal" clearer. For
114. See Bermant et al., supra note 50, at 24 (noting an "intensive chapter 13 practice runs in a
broad band across the South and includes Puerto Rico").
115. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. See, e.g., G. Edward White, Recovering the Legal History
of the Confederacy, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 467, 482, 495 (2011).
116. Sullivan et al., supra note 7, at 834 n.105.
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example, it could examine places where zip codes span more than one judicial
district to see if the changes in chapter 13 rate are occurring at the zip-code
or district boundaries. Already, our finding on the meaning of "local"
suggests the need to explore the roles of professionals more deeply. One
possibility is to examine law-firm patterns in districts with varying chapter 13
rates. Kiel and Fresques's study of Tennessee suggests that law-firm
concentration may be playing a role in the relationship between race and
chapter 13.117 Finally, this study points in the direction of returning to the
methods of Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook and Braucher's original
scholarship on local legal culture by supplementing big data with in-depth
qualitative research with judges, lawyers, trustees, and other bankruptcy
actors.
117. Kiel & Fresques, supra note 81.
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Appendix
Table 2. Judicial District Level Fixed Effects from Logistic Regression































































































































































































NOTES: Odds ratios are reported for each judicial district's fixed effect on the prob-
ability of filing chapter 13 as compared to the median district, the Middle District
of Florida. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district level in the regres-
sions. The table is an expansion of Regression (3) from Table 1. For the district-
fixed effects, an asterisk indicates statistical significant where p < .0006, using a
Bonferroni adjustment from the standard statistical significance threshold ofp < .05











A Functional Analysis of SIFI Insolvency
Stephen J. Lubben*
In a 1989 article that remains one of the clearest, most sensible
explications of an especially tricky point of bankruptcy law, Jay Westbrook
announced a forthright methodology: "I call my approach 'functional,'
because it proceeds by working through the problem from first principles." 1
The same basic technique can tell us a lot about how banks-and other bank-
like creatures or SIFIs, 2 to use the industry lingo-should fail.
Since the disgrace of Lehman, the question of how to handle failing
SIFIs has been quite vexed. 3 On the one hand, governmental rescue of
shareholders and other investors is beyond annoying, and there is some
intuitive sense that if management does a poor job, they and their investor
backers should face the consequences just like any other firm.4 That bank
managers would have the temerity to pay themselves large bonuses shortly
after a taxpayer rescue only emphasizes the point.5
On the other hand, there is a widespread understanding that a large bank,
or a sufficiently interconnected one, is not quite like Kmart, Enron, or even
American Airlines, in that when the bank fails, it tends to take a large chunk
of the economy along with it. 6 Pre-failure regulation can mitigate some of the
*Harvey Washington Wiley Chair in Corporate Governance & Business Ethics, Seton Hall
University School of Law. I am grateful for Dan Awrey and Art Wilmarth's comments on an earlier
version of this Paper.
1. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV.
227, 230 (1989). In a recent article, Professor Westbrook abandoned the phrase "Functional
Analysis" in favor of the alternative "Modern Contract Analysis," but I take that change to be limited
to the specific context of 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. Jay Lawrence Westbrook & Kelsi Stayart
White, The Demystification of Contracts in Bankruptcy, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 481, 484 n.16 (2017).
2. Systemically Important Financial Institutions.
3. Kathryn Judge, The First Year: The Role of a Modern Lender of Last Resort, 116 COLUM.
L. REV. 843, 849 (2016).
4. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving In to Wall
Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1379-81 (2013) (noting that major banks have entered relatively
modest settlements with the SEC without admitting liability-a practice that one judge criticized as
"half-baked justice at best" because it fails to impose sanctions on specific individuals).
5. Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-
Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 415 (2011).
6. Kathryn Judge, Interbank Discipline, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1262, 1272 (2013); see also Henry
T.C. Hu, Swaps, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation and the Vulnerability of a Regulatory
Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 367-70 (1989) (contending that there is widespread belief that
the collapse of a financial institution "could cause the money supply to drop unexpectedly, thereby
causing unemployment to rise and output to fall").
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effects, 7 but by the time we get to insolvency-or "financial distress," if we
want to acknowledge that here we are talking as much about liquidity as
balance sheets 8-the regulatory string has pretty much played out.9 And in
the end, we have trouble deciding if we really mean to treat large financial
institutions like normal failed firms. 10
Thus, the 2010 legislative response to Lehman, and AIG, and Bank of
America, and Citibank, and every other large financial institution that almost
failed (or did, in the case of Lehman) was notably wobbly on the question of
"how will a big bank fail?" Dodd-Frank created a new, FDIC-focused
"orderly liquidation authority" (OLA) to handle these cases but then made it
incredibly difficult to actually use OLA.11 Instead, banks are told to plan for
failure under the Bankruptcy Code, and this time they should not expect any
of the help that Lehman got.12
When, if ever, the new system will be used is left uncertain, particularly
given that the ability to invoke the process is left in the hands of a politically
appointed Treasury Secretary after consultation with the President. 13 In past
administrations we might have assumed that, when push came to shove, the
Secretary would do the right thing. Present-day developments might leave us
a bit more circumspect on this point.4
Ultimately, after nearly a decade of waffling between "special" and
"normal" bankruptcy for banks, I believe we are now ready to build upon
7. See Martin Wolf, Banking Remains Far Too Undercapitalised for Comfort, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 2017, at 9 ("Banking remains less safe than it could reasonably be. That is a deliberate
decision.").
8. See Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 455-56 (2011) (explaining
how a "domino effect" can exist among financial firms, expanding financial distress beyond
insolvency and into liquidity).
9. See Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV. 409, 419 (2012)
(highlighting the fact that Dodd-Frank is a preventative regulatory measure that seeks to prevent
financial crises and taxpayer-funded bailouts).
10. Anat R. Admati, Financial Regulation Reform: Politics, Implementation, and Alternatives,
18 N.C. BANKING INST. 71, 74-75 (2013).
11. See David A. Skeel, Jr. & Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency and the New
Finance in Bankruptcy, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 152, 196 (2012) (explaining that the trigger for using
the OLA is "more complex-calling for U.S. Treasury initiation with the concurrence of the Federal
Reserve and FDIC ... ").
12. Stephen J. Lubben, Transaction Simplicity, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 194, 203 (2012).
13. 12 U.S.C. 5383(b) (2012).
14. Cf Barry Schwartz, George Washington and the Whig Conception of Heroic Leadership,
48 AM. SOC. REV. 18, 26 (1983). Schwartz observes:
At a time when most Americans take for granted their government's ability to outlive
its unscrupulous leaders and protect individual liberties, it is difficult to appreciate the
whiggish obsession about abuse of power, or to take seriously the conviction that
government stands or falls on the virtues of its leaders.
Id.
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what we have learned and to take the necessary further step: stop feigning
that bank insolvency can or should happen in bankruptcy court.
I reach this conclusion through application of Professor Westbrook's
functional analysis. Namely, we need to consider what it is that we are trying
to achieve in a bank-insolvency case and how that compares with bankruptcy
law in general. Bank insolvency, I submit, is all about special priorities: both
ordinal and temporal. The Bankruptcy Code, on the other hand, takes an
"equality is equity" approach to priorities as a baseline, mostly using state
law to draw the claim-asset border.1 5 Bargaining for results within the
general "equality" framework is another key feature of traditional
insolvency law.'6
Financial institution insolvency law expressly rejects this model; it
instead is all about protecting some favored group from the effects of
insolvency." There is no equality here, and it was never intended that there
would be equality. 18 And thus it is time to stop pretending SIFI insolvency is
"normal" corporate insolvency-it is bigger.
I. The Problem
Large American financial institutions are typically made up of a holding
company and several additional key pieces. 19 Each piece of the financial
institution, including the holding company, is subject to a different regulatory
and insolvency regime.20
15. See, e.g., Westbrook, supra note 1, at 252 (characterizing the principle that "all creditors be
treated equally" as the "most universal of all insolvency principles throughout the world"). For more
on the stated goals of chapter 11, see Sarah Pei Woo, Regulatory Bankruptcy: How Bank Regulation
Causes Fire Sales, 99 GEO. L.J. 1615, 1621-22 (2011).
16. Thomas S. Green, Comment, An Analysis of the Advantages of Non-Market Based
Approaches for Determining Chapter 11 Cramdown Rates: A Legal and Financial Perspective, 46
SETON HALL L. REV. 1151, 1155 (2016).
17. See Daniel R. Fischel et al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA.
L. REv. 301, 318 (1987) ("The primary difference is that the thrust of bankruptcy laws is to ensure
that creditors of the same class are treated equally, whereas federal deposit insurance ensures that
certain classes of creditors are paid in full."). The authors of the foregoing argue that "the economic
functions of bankruptcy laws and federal deposit insurance are very similar." Id. In this Paper, I
argue otherwise.
18. In an earlier era, the bank and bankruptcy systems may have had similar goals, but that was
before the advent of deposit insurance and the general move away from creditor equality in the
financial context. See Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 284 (1896) ("[O]ne of the objects
of the national bank system was to secure, in the event of insolvency, a just and equal distribution
of the assets of national banks among all unsecured creditors, and to prevent such banks from
creating preferences in contemplation of insolvency.").
19. This part of the paper draws heavily on my forthcoming book: STEPHEN J. LUBBEN, THE
LAW OF FAILURE: A TOUR THROUGH THE WILDS OF AMERICAN BUSINESS INSOLVENCY LAW
(forthcoming 2018).
20. See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a
Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REv. 707, 719-20 (2009) (describing the United States' unique approach to
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For example, in a June 2017 report to the Federal Reserve and the FDIC,
JPMorgan Chase & Co. noted that it is "supervised by multiple regulators." 21
The Report describes the domestic front as follows:
" The Federal Reserve acts as an umbrella regulator ....
" The firm's national bank subsidiaries, JPMCB and CUSA, are
subject to supervision and regulation by the OCC and, with
respect to certain matters, by the Federal Reserve and the FDIC.
" Nonbank subsidiaries, such as JPMS LLC, are subject to
supervision and regulation by the SEC and, with respect to
certain futures-related and swaps-related activities, by the
CFTC.
" The firm conducts securities underwriting, dealing[,] and
brokerage activities in the United States through JPMS LLC and
other broker-dealer subsidiaries, all of which are subject to SEC
regulations, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority[,] and
the New York Stock Exchange, among others.
" Certain of the firm's subsidiaries are registered with, and
subject to oversight by, the SEC as investment advisers.
" In the United States, one subsidiary is registered as a futures
commission merchant, and other subsidiaries are either
registered with the CFTC as commodity pool operators and
commodity trading advisors or exempt from such registration.
These CFTC-registered subsidiaries are also members of the
National Futures Association.
" JPMCB, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, J.P. Morgan Securities,
PLC[,] and J.P. Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation have
registered with the CFTC as swap dealers.
" The firm's commodities business is also subject to regulation
by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, London Metals
Exchange[,] and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.22
Other large American financial institutions would also be subject to
insurance regulators, typically at the state level. Most, of course, are also
subject to foreign regulation.23
There are historical reasons for this fragmentation, mostly tied to the
tendency to develop American financial law in times of crisis, beginning with
regulation: three different agencies oversee banks, while another agency oversees securities and yet
another oversees futures); Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The
Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1343 (2009).
21. JPMORGAN CHASE & Co., RESOLUTION PLAN PUBLIC FILING 134 (2017).
22. Id.
23. JPMorgan Chase specifically mentions regulators in England, Japan, and Hong Kong. Id.
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the Civil War, with new laws being added piecemeal to address then-recent.
events. 24 As with most American legislation, particularly at the federal level,
there has never been a single reform law enacted to consolidate the whole.
The result is that both pre-failure regulation and post-failure "resolution" of
a large financial institution is typically achieved piece by piece, with one
regulator taking an arm while another takes a leg. As discussed below, Dodd-
Frank only partially improves on this situation.
A. The Fundamentals of Financial Institution Insolvency
A prototypical large American financial institution or SIFI is comprised
of four basic regulated pieces: a holding company, one or more depository
banks, a broker-dealer, and insurance companies. 25 Interspersed between is
the "dark matter" of global banks: unregulated subsidiaries. These allow
banks to do financy stuff outside the regulatory architecture of the core parts
of the bank, although in theory they remain subject to the umbrella regulation
of the Federal Reserve. 26
In a world before Dodd-Frank, or in a world where OLA is not invoked,
the holding company is subject to the normal Bankruptcy Code process,
presumably chapter 11.27 While the Federal Reserve has regulatory powers
over the holding company under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,28
that Act contains no insolvency provisions. 29 Thus, we fall back on the
business insolvency system of general applicability. Recent examples have
24. See Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the
United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927, 1948-49 (1993) (introducing the development of American
banking regulation); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services
Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215,
225-27, 313-14 (2002) (summarizing the restructuring of the banking industry, including the
passage of the FDICIA in 1991 in response to banking failures); see also Kenneth E. Scott, The
Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9 (1977) (stating
that "the national banking system was created during the Civil War"); Edward L. Symons, Jr., The
"Business of Banking" in Historical Perspective, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 676, 698-99 (1983)
(discussing the National Bank Act).
25. Howell E. Jackson, The Expanding Obligations of Financial Holding Companies, 107
HARV. L. REV. 507, 509 (1994).
26. Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 99
(2012).
27. See Cassandra Jones Havard, Reconciling the Dormant Conflict: Crafting a Banking
Exception to the Fraudulent Conveyance Provision of the Bankruptcy Code for Bank Holding
Company Asset Transfers, 75 DENY. U. L. REV. 81, 81-82, 89-92 (1997) (clarifying that the
"Bankruptcy Code ... governs the insolvency proceedings of the bank holding company" and
providing examples of holding companies filing under chapter 11).
28. 12 U.S.C. 1841 (2012).
29. Cf Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking
System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 697-98 (1988) (noting that "[t]he Bank Holding Company Act




included the notorious September 15, 2008, chapter 11 filing of Lehman
Brothers Holdings, Inc. and the chapter 11 filing of Washington Mutual's
parent company. 30
Most depository banks are insured by the FDIC. 31 Whenever the
Comptroller of the Currency appoints a receiver for an insured national bank,
the Comptroller must appoint the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
receiver. 32 As the exclusive statutory receiver of any insolvent insured
national bank, the FDIC cannot be removed as receiver, and the courts have
no ability to interfere with the process. 33 Likewise, even under the old pre-
New Deal rules, and those still applicable to uninsured national banks (mostly
trust companies), the Comptroller has the ability to appoint the receiver
without ever going to court.34
Recent examples of the modern FDIC approach include the
aforementioned Washington Mutual primary operating subsidiary and the
banks shown on the table, which includes all the FDIC receiverships in
2017.35 Note the inevitable resolution of these banks by transferring the
deposits to a healthy institution;36 the FDIC pursued a similar strategy with
Washington Mutual, where Chase took over its branches and deposits. 37
30. See Diane Lourdes Dick, The Chapter 11 Efficiency Fallacy, 2013 BYU L. REV. 759, 790
(2013) (describing the Washington Mutual bankruptcy); see also Stephen J. Lubben & Sarah Pei
Woo, Reconceptualizing Lehman, 49 TEx. INT'L L.J. 297, 303 (2014) (describing the Lehman
bankruptcy).
31. Key exceptions include certain financial technology companies (at this point, more potential
than real) and trust companies, both of which might operate under a national bank charter without
deposit insurance. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. 27(a) (2012) (outlining when the comptroller may authorize
an association to commence banking).
32. 12 U.S.C. 1821(c)(2)(A)(ii) (2012); see also Edward H. Klees, How Safe Are Institutional
Assets in a Custodial Bank's Insolvency?, 68 Bus. LAW. 103, 108-09 (2012) (explaining that the
FDIC acts as receiver for insolvent national banks).
33. 12 U.S.C. 1821(j) (2012).
34. HIRSCH BRAVER, LIQUIDATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION OF BANKS, TRUST COMPANIES, AND BUILDING
AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS 1015, at 1182 (1936).
35. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FAILED BANK LIST, https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual
/failed/banklist.html [https://perma.cc/AU5F-9LVM].
36. Cheryl D. Block, A Continuum Approach to Systemic Risk and Too-Big-to-Fail, 6 BROOK.
J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 289, 334-35 (2012).
37. Dick, supra note 30, at 793-94.
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Bank Name City State Acquiring Bank Closing
Date
Washington Federal Bank for Chicago IL Royal Savings Bank 15-Dec-17
Savings
The Farmers and Merchants State Argonia KS Conway Bank 13-Oct-17
Bank of Argonia
Fayette County Bank Saint Elmo IL United Fidelity Bank, 26-May-17
fsb
Guaranty Bank Milwaukee WI First-Citizens Bank & 5-May-17
Trust Company
First NBC Bank New LA Whitney Bank 28-Apr-17
Orleans
Proficio Bank Cottonwood UT Cache Valley Bank 3-Mar-17
Heights
Seaway Bank and Trust Company Chicago IL State Bank of Texas 27-Jan-17
Harvest Community Bank Pennsville NJ First-Citizens Bank & 13-Jan-17
Trust Company
Normally broker-dealers are handled under SIPA-the Securities
Investor Protection Act. SIPA created SIPC-the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation-a quasi-private company that oversees an insurance
fund for customers. 38 Although SIPC is an independent body, the SEC has
oversight power over its bylaws and rules and may compel SIPC to
promulgate regulations to effectuate the purposes of SIPA.39 The insurance
in this case, unlike the more familiar FDIC deposit insurance, protects only
against securities or cash that are missing at the point of insolvency; there is
no guarantee of value. 4 0
The law provides that SIPC or the SEC may file an application for a
protective decree with a federal district court if SIPC determines that any
member has failed or is in danger of failing to meet obligations to customers
and meets one of four worrisome conditions. 4 ' Upon filing, the case is
38. Onnig H. Dombalagian, Substance and Semblance in Investor Protection, 40 J. CORP. L.
599, 600 (2015).
39. 15 U.S.C. 78ccc(e) (2012).
40. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Is Article 8 Finally Ready This Time? The Radical Reform of
Secured Lending on Wall Street, 1994 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 291, 463-64 ("SIPC buys [unsatisfied
customer] claims ... up to the statutory maximum amount ... and is subrogated to the customers'
general credit claims against the debtor.").
41. 15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)(A), 78eee(b)(1), 78ggg(b) (2012). The institution of a case under
the SIPA brings any pending bankruptcy case to a halt. Irrespective of the automatic stay, the SIPC
may file an application for a protective decree under SIPA. 11 U.S.C. 742 (2012).
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quickly referred to the bankruptcy court.4 2 The powers of the trustee in a
SIPA case are essentially the same as those vested in a chapter 7 trustee
appointed under the Bankruptcy Code, but the SIPA trustee operates with
somewhat less judicial oversight. 43 Before the case even gets underway
before the court, customers will have their accounts transferred to a healthy
broker.44
While the holding company is in chapter 11, the depository bank is
handled by the FDIC, the broker-dealer is liquidated by a SIPA trustee, and
the insurance companies will be subject to state court receiverships under the
oversight of the state insurance commissioner. 45 Insurance companies, no
matter what size, are regulated by the states, and thus their insolvencies are
also a question of state law.4 6
The basic structure of insurance failure is fairly uniform across the
states: the insurance regulator goes to court and gets a receiver appointed,
often the regulator itself,47 to take control of the insurance company.4 8 State
guaranty funds, set up and paid for by solvent insurance companies operating
within the jurisdiction, pay covered policyholder claims up to certain limits,
which are often rather low.4 9
42. 15 U.S.C. 78eee(b)(4) (2012).
43. 15 U.S.C. 78fff-1(a) (2012); see also id. 78fff-1(b)(2) (describing trustee's conditional
authority to guarantee all or part of the indebtedness of the debtor to a lender).
44. Dombalagian, supra note 38, at 605.
45. Stephen J. Lubben, Financial Institutions in Bankruptcy, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1259,
1274 (2011).
46. See generally, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE, 1064.1-1064.13 (West 2012) (giving examples of
insolvency under California state law).
47. IOWA CODE ANN. 505.9 (West 2015). In New York, the regulator acting as receiver has
a separate, dedicated staff, collectively known as the New York Liquidation Bureau. See also State
ex rel. ISC Financial Corp. v. Kinder, 684 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1985) ("The
director of insurance is to be the receiver and he is to conduct the affairs of the receivership under
the supervision of the court, in accordance with the statutory system.").
48. See ALA. CODE 27-34-50 (2007) (fraternal benefit societies); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18,
5906 (West 2015) (domestic insurers); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. 432:2-606 (LexisNexis 2014)
(domestic societies); IOWA CODE ANN. 508.22 (West 2015) (life insurance companies); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. 696B.220 (West 2015) (domestic insurers); N.Y. INS. LAW 7405 (McKinney
2016) (domestic insurers); UTAH CODE ANN. 31A-27a-401 (LexisNexis 2017) (domestic
insurers); W. VA. CODE ANN. 33-10-6 (LexisNexis 2017) (domestic insurers).
49. See, e.g., ALA. CODE 27-44-8 (2007) (capping liability at $100,000 in cash values per
insured); CAL. INS. CODE 1063.2 (West 2014) (describing the mechanics of compensating insured
persons in case of an insurance company's insolvency); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 304.36-020
(LexisNexis 2011) (establishing funding for insured persons in cases of insurers' insolvency);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175D, 5 (West 2007) (same); 27 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 27-34.3-8
(West 2017) (discussing the association's ability to pay the impaired insurer's contractual
obligations); WYO. STAT. ANN. 26-42-106 (2018) (same); see also de la Fuente v. Fla. Ins. Guar.
Ass'n, 202 So. 3d 396, 401 (Fla. 2016) (describing and applying Florida's statutory fund for claims
against insolvent insurance companies). In New York, there are three distinct, statutory security
funds, known as the Property/Casualty Insurance Security Fund, the Public Motor Vehicle Security
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And then the unregulated bits of a big financial institution bring us back
to chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. At least the holding company and the
"extra" bits of the financial institution end up in the same process; the other
pieces are in a variety of forums-some in courts, some not.
B. Dodd-Frank's OLA Solution
Recognizing that this overall system was somewhat less than ideal, the
drafters of Dodd-Frank created a new super bankruptcy system, OLA. But
OLA only partially solves the problem of an integrated financial institution
being pulled apart by regulatory (and insolvency) balkanization.50 And it does
nothing to address the issue of cross-border SIFIs, which is rather important,
considering that every SIFI is, almost by definition, a cross-border SIFI.51
First, Dodd-Frank's drafters had no stomach for a fight with state
insurance regulators, and thus insurance company insolvency remains
outside the new order.52 Broker-dealers are swept up in the process, but in an
opaque way: the OLA receiver can take whatever assets it wants, leaving the
residue behind. And the entire process is extremely difficult to commence
and operates only as a backstop to the normal rules.53
In particular, to invoke OLA, the FDIC needs the agreement of the
Federal Reserve Board of Governors (by a two-thirds majority) and the
Treasury Secretary, who is required to consult with the President.54 If the SIFI
in question is more broker-dealer than depository bank-Goldman Sachs
might be an example here-the SEC takes over the FDIC's role in initiation,
but the FDIC will, nonetheless, become the receiver if the process goes
Fund and the Workers' Compensation Security Fund. In addition, life insurance policy holders are
protected by the Life Insurance Company Guaranty Corporation of New York, created under
Article 77 of the State's insurance law. See Ky. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Nat. Res. & Envtl. Prot. Cabinet,
885 S.W.2d 315, 316, 318 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994) (construing broadly Kentucky's statutory fund for
claims against insolvent insurance companies).
50. Lubben, supra note 45, at 1268.
51. Edward F. Greene & Joshua L. Boehm, The Limits of "Name-and-Shame " in International
Financial Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REv. 1083, 1106 (2012); see also Oscar Couwenberg &
Stephen J. Lubben, Corporate Bankruptcy Tourists, 70 Bus. LAW. 719, 722 (2015) (stating that
"most large corporate groups have at least some international operations").
52. See Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in Financial Regulation, 101 CAL. L.
REv. 327, 371 (2013) ("Because insurance companies are state-regulated, the Act does not change
states' insolvency regimes but establishes a mechanism that allows the federal government to trigger
the insolvency process at the state level."); see also Matthew C. Turk, The Convergence of
Insurance with Banking and Securities Industries, and the Limits of Regulatory Arbitrage in
Finance, 2015 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 967, 1007 (2015) (explaining how Dodd-Frank maintains a
"decentralized state-led system").
53. See David Zaring, A Lack of Resolution, 60 EMORY L.J. 97, 124 (2010) (detailing the
complexity of commencing the resolution-powers process).
54. 12 U.S.C. 5383(a)(1)(A) (2012).
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forward.5 5 The statute expressly provides that the regulators must consider
the effect of default on financial stability, on low income, minority, or
underserved communities, and on creditors, shareholders, and
counterparties.56
The Treasury Secretary is separately charged with evaluating the use of
OLA under a two-part test.57 First, the Secretary looks at whether the SIFI is
in default or in danger of default. 58 A bank is in default when it is likely to
file for bankruptcy, has incurred debts that will deplete all or most of its
capital, has more debts than assets, or will likely be unable to pay its debts in
the normal course of business. 59 In essence, a bank is insolvent if it is
insolvent under any reasonable definition of the term.
Second, the Secretary must evaluate the systemic risk involved in the
potential default of the SIFI in question. 60 The Secretary also must find that
"no viable private sector alternative is available to prevent the default of the
financial company." 61
If the SIFI clears these hurdles, the company's board is presented with
a choice: consent (and be exculpated from any potential liability to
shareholders) or we, the regulators, will go to court.62 Presumably, the board
consents in most cases, and the FDIC is appointed as a receiver for the
company.
As a receiver, the FDIC takes on the duties of transferring or selling
assets, creating bridge financial organizations that can help assume assets or
liabilities during the liquidation process, and approving valid claims against
the company that will need to be paid.63 The Orderly Liquidation Fund acts
as a government-run DIP loan64 throughout the process. 6 5 The Treasury lends
55. See id. 5383(a)(1)(B). The statute provides:
In the case of a broker or dealer, or in which the largest United States subsidiary (as
measured by total assets as of the end of the previous calendar quarter) of a financial
company is a broker or dealer, the Commission and the Board of Governors, at the
request of the Secretary, or on their own initiative, shall consider whether to make the
written recommendation ....






62. Id. 5387, 5382(a)(1)(A)(i).
63. See generally id. 5390 (outlining the powers and duties of the FDIC once appointed as
receiver).
64. Companies that enter chapter 11 continue to be run by their existing management in almost
all cases. The ongoing entity is known as the debtor in possession (DIP). DIP loans are typically
asset-based, revolving working-capital facilities agreed to at the start of a chapter 11 case to provide
both immediate cash as well as ongoing working capital during the process.
65. Id. 5390(n).
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the FDIC money to resolve the institution. 66 If there is a net cost, the FDIC
then recoups the money spent by imposing a fee on surviving large, complex
financial institutions. 67
OLA provides a set of basic rules for all proceedings. 68 All action under
OLA must be taken to preserve the financial stability of the economy as a
whole, not merely to preserve the specific company in question.6 9
Shareholders cannot receive payment until all other claims are paid-that is,
the normal priority rules apply.7 0 Management "responsible" for the SIFI's
failure must be "removed." 71 Presumably, that means they must be fired-
and not banished, or transported to Australia, or something like that. The
FDIC is also prohibited from providing equity financing to the SIFI, which
makes sense, given that other parts of Title II also call for liquidation of the
defaulting SIFI.72
C. SPOE and "Chapter 14"
Because the application of OLA to an entire financial institution would
appear to be unwieldly and would not cover the international aspects of the
corporate group, a new approach was needed. 73 Single point of entry (SPOE)
was that new strategy.
The SPOE idea benefits from a simple elegance: insolvency should only
involve the holding company and no other part of the institution. 74 All
problems would be solved at the holding-company level by having the
holding company take on the burdens of financing the entire operation. 75
Other subsidiaries might interact with the outside world as part of their
normal trading operations-the swaps subsidiary would continue to engage









73. See generally Stephen J. Lubben, Resolution, Orderly and Otherwise: B of A in OLA, 81 U.
CIN. L. REV. 485 (2012) (examining the complexity of resolving Bank of America under OLA and
accompanying issues).
74. For a critical review of SPOE, see Stephen J. Lubben & Arthur Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big and
Unable to Fail, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1205 (2017).
75. Kwon-Yong Jin, How to Eat an Elephant: Corporate Group Structure of Systemically
Important Financial Institutions, Orderly Liquidation Authority, and Single Point of Entry
Resolution, 124 YALE L.J. 1746, 1751-52 (2015).
76. Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe, Bank Resolution in the European Banking Union:
A Transatlantic Perspective on What It Would Take, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1297, 1325 fig.3 (2015).
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Thus, if the financial institution were to encounter financial distress, its
equity interests in its subsidiaries would quickly move to a new "bridge
bank," while its bondholders would look to the equity of that new holding
company for their recovery. 77 Shareholders in the old institution-"to use an
expression more forcible and familiar than elegant" 78-would be wiped out.
At the same time, the subsidiaries would benefit from forgiveness of their
liabilities to the parent company, providing a source of relief for strained
balance sheets.
SPOE itself addresses the problems of using OLA, but there remains the
issue of Dodd-Frank's stated preference for normal bankruptcy procedures.
To meet this challenge, a variety of parties have come forth with proposals
to amend the Bankruptcy Code to facilitate a SPOE-style bankruptcy
proceeding. 79 Lumped under the general heading of "chapter 14," after one
of the early Hoover Institute proposals, 80 these plans would allow a quick
holding-company-only bankruptcy case for a financial institution. In some
cases, the new chapter 14 would replace OLA entirely, while in others it
would simply make the Bankruptcy Code a more attractive alternative
to OLA. 81
Most of the recent versions of chapter 14 have been designed to use
SPOE within a procedure that at least resembles chapter 11. The debtor
holding company would file a petition and would initiate a near immediate
77. Catherine Gallagher Fauver, The Long Journey to "Adequate ": Wells Fargo's Resolution
Plan, 36 REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 647, 658 (2017).
78. Adrian H. Joline, Railway Reorganizations, 8 AM. LAW. 507, 508 (1900) (referring to
shareholders in railroad foreclosure cases).
79. Edward J. Janger & John A.E. Pottow, Implementing Symmetric Treatment of Financial
Contracts in Bankruptcy and Bank Resolution, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 155, 180 (2015);
Jodie A. Kirshner, The Bankruptcy Safe Harbor in Light of Government Bailouts: Reifying the
Significance of Bankruptcy as a Backstop to Financial Risk, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 795,
831 (2015).
80. Stephen J. Lubben, What's Wrong with the Chapter 14 Proposal, DEAL BOOK, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 10, 2013), https://deabook.nytimes.com/2013/04/10/whats-wrong-with-the-chapter-14
-proposal/?mcubz=3 [https://perma.cc/D97Z-U5SW].
81. Stephanie P. Massman, Developing a New Resolution Regime for Failed Systemically
Important Financial Institutions: An Assessment of the Orderly Liquidation Authority, 89 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 625, 637 (2015). One early version, which would have replaced Title II entirely, is
reviewed in Bruce Grohsgal, Case in BriefAgainst "Chapter 14, " AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2014,
at 44, 113. Instead of creating a new chapter 14 of the Code to deal with large financial institutions
that seek bankruptcy protection, the Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2014, passed by the
House but never acted upon by the Senate, sought to create a new Subchapter V of the Code to deal
with such entities. Compare H.R. 5421, 113th Cong. (2014) (enacted) with Financial Institution
Bankruptcy Act of 2014, H.R. REP. NO. 113-630, at 11 (2014). The pending CHOICE Act,
discussed later in this Paper, would combine the latter approach with a full repeal of Title II of
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363 sale of its assets to a buyer-trust.82 The debtor would then move toward
confirmation of a liquidating plan that would distribute interests in the trust
as payment to creditors.83
Chapter 14 thus tethers the Bankruptcy Code to the SPOE approach to
bank resolution. The vital question then is whether SPOE will work, or, more
aptly, whether it will work most of the time.8 4 Undoubtedly, there is
something odd about fixing a shortcoming in a financial institution through
the holding company when the holding company itself is probably the least
likely place for such a flaw to develop. 85 Almost like doing a root canal by
way of orthoscopic surgery on the knee-it could work, but it seems terribly
indirect.
And the notion that all the operating subsidiaries throughout the world
will continue business as usual in the days after the parent company has failed
assumes a high degree of rationality in the midst of financial collapse. It is
almost as if the proponents of SPOE have already forgotten what happened
in 2008. At the very least, they assume that the presence of Dodd-Frank will
provide the assurance and calm that was rather obviously lacking before.
And while US regulators seem to be in favor of SPOE for domestic
SIFIs, they seem quite happy to force "multiple points of entry" on
international banks operating in the United States through mechanisms such
as the Fed's foreign bank (intermediate) holding company rules.86 This has
the predictable effect of undermining resolution planning at the international
level as regulators jockey for position in anticipation of the next Lehman
Brothers Europe. 87
Overall, SPOE has something of the character of a parlor trick or one of
those 1980s law review articles that suggested that chapter 11 could be
replaced with a few simple contracts. One is left with the nagging feeling that
it's all a bit too crafty to actually work outside the parlor or the slide deck.
82. For more on the 363 sale process, evaluated from a comparative perspective, see Stephanie
Ben-Ishai & Stephen J. Lubben, Involuntary Creditors and Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 U.B.C. L.
REV. 253, 256, 272 (2012).
83. Id. at 272.
84. Lubben & Wilmarth, supra note 74.
85. John Crawford, "Single Point of Entry": The Promise and Limits of the Latest Cure for
Bailouts, 109 Nw. U. L. REV. ONLINE 103, 107 (2014); Nizan Geslevich Packin, Supersize Them?
Large Banks, Taxpayers and the Subsidies that Lay Between, 35 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 229, 276
(2015).
86. Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Fed. Reserve, Federal
Reserve Board Approves Final Rule Strengthening Supervision and Regulation of Large U.S. Bank
Holding Companies and Foreign Banking Organizations (Feb. 18, 2014), https://www
.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20 14021 8a.htm [https://perma.cc/BZD5 -
CAWP].
87. See Lubben & Woo, supra note 30, at 326-27 (predicting international regulators'
responses to banking regulations in the United States and the United Kingdom).
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D. The Fundamental Problem
Chapter 14, SPOE, and OLA contain a stated preference for the
Bankruptcy Code that papers over the reality that this country does not
typically address bank insolvency under the Code. Rather, a receiver,
appointed by a regulator, runs the show when a bank fails.
And while broker-dealers, insurance companies, and SIFIs more
generally may not be "banks" in the narrow, legalistic sense, they are banks
in the economic sense. 88 They take in funds with the promise of liquidity and
invest those funds in longer-term assets, like loans, mortgage-backed
securities, and the like.89 And "when short-term debt funds longer-term
liabilities, a defining characteristic of banks and much of the shadow banking
system, the institutions that result are inherently fragile." 90
The fundamental problem, then, is what to make of the conflicting
approach to bank insolvency. I address that issue in the next part of this Paper
and argue that at heart this represents a confusion of bank insolvency and
bankruptcy.
II. Functional Analysis
"Whenever an area of law has become conceptually and doctrinally
confused, it is always helpful to return to first principles." 9 1 With regard to
bank or SIFI failure, such a return to core principles is long overdue.
"Equality of distribution among creditors is a central policy of the
Bankruptcy Code. According to that policy, creditors of equal priority should
receive pro rata shares of the debtor's property." 92 That is, traditional
business bankruptcy is focused on questions of creditor rank and equality
within ranks. 93
Rank questions have both temporal and ordinal components. For a
variety of practical reasons, some creditors get paid before others.94 And
88. Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REv.
183, 195 (2009); Morgan Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
75, 97 (2011).
89. Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank's
Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151, 158,
162 (2011).
90. Kathryn Judge, The Importance of "Money," 130 HARV. L. REV. 1148, 1150 (2017)
(reviewing MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION
(2016)).
91. Westbrook, supra note 1, at 243.
92. Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990).
93. See Chrystin Ondersma, Shadow Banking and Financial Distress: The Treatment of
"Money-Claims" in Bankruptcy, 2013 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 79, 106 ("[Not] all creditors have
always been treated equally without exception; secured creditors are protected up to the value of
their collateral .... ").
94. See Stephen J. Lubben, The Overstated Absolute Priority Rule, 21 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
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negotiations over a chapter 11 plan hinge on who gets paid what within those
classes that have yet to be paid when it comes time to formulate a plan.9 5
What counts as a "claim" and what counts as an "asset" for purposes of
bankruptcy is determined by reference to underlying state law, sometimes
with a federal Bankruptcy Code overlay.
While the Code provides the framework of rank, the precise treatment
of creditors within those ranks is a matter of negotiation. In a traditional
chapter 11 case, this negotiation results in a reorganization plan that provides
an outline of the reorganized debtor.96 The plan can radically alter the
debtor's management, its ownership, its tax profile, its relationship with
employees and future claimants, and perhaps even the type of business the
debtor performs.97 In place of a reorganization plan, the debtor might file a
liquidation plan or a plan containing features of both.
Consider a recent example. Teen-apparel specialty chain rue21, Inc.
emerged from bankruptcy on September 22, 2017.98 Under the confirmed
plan, prepetition holders of the $538.5 million term loan received about two-
thirds of the equity in the reorganized company. 99 Holders of the $250 million
9.0% senior unsecured notes due in 2021, and all other unsecured claims,
received a 4% equity stake. 100 The remainder of the new equity went to a DIP
lender.101
In all cases, the distribution of the new equity was the product of
negotiation between the various creditor groups, each trying to get as much
as possible. Those negotiations happen within the equality framework
established by the Bankruptcy Code. 102
FIN. L. 581, 605 (2016) ("Operating companies pay creditors according to business needs, without
regard for actual priority.").
95. See Maxx M. Johnson, The Not-So-Settled Absolute Priority Rule: The Continued Threat
of Priority-Deviation Through Interim Distributions of Assets in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 13 SETON
HALL CIR. REV. 291, 294 (2017) ("Priority for creditors could mean the difference between getting
paid in full and not getting paid at all.").
96. See Michelle M. Hamer, The Search for an Unbiased Fiduciary in Corporate
Reorganizations, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 469, 494 (2011) ("The creditor's objective and pursuit
of control ... might conflict with the debtor's restructuring plan or the efforts of other creditors or
shareholders to influence the process.").
97. See Chrystin Ondersma, Employment Patterns in Relation to Bankruptcy, 83 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 237, 247 (2009) (finding that companies lose around fifty percent of employees in the years
near bankruptcy filing).
98. Rue2 1, Inc., rue2l Completes Financial Restructuring Process, PR NEWSWIRE (Sept. 22,
2017), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/rue21-completes-financial-restructuring
-process-300524488.html [https://perma.cc/JQA3-5Q66].
99. First Amended Debtors' Disclosure Statement for the Debtors' First Amended Joint Plan of
Reorganization Pursuant to chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code at 10, 25, In re rue2l, Inc., 575 B.R.
90 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2017) (No. 17-22045).
100. Id. at 12, 26.
101. Id. at 16-17.
102. On the general construction of corporate bankruptcy systems, see Oscar Couwenberg &
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That stands in direct contrast to financial institution insolvency, where
the key decisions about who gets what have already been made before the
case commences.10 3  In particular, financial institution insolvency
mechanisms decide in advance that certain favored creditors will receive
priority at the expense of the remaining creditors. Indeed, what happens after
those favored creditors are taken out of the insolvency process is typically of
lesser concern.
We see this most directly in broker-dealer liquidations where customers
are made whole-through a segregated fund of customer property and a gap-
filling insurance scheme-before any other creditor is even considered.10 4 To
the same effect are insurance receiverships, where policyholders are
expressly elevated under the law of every state to an elite status that precedes
all others.
Depository banks operate under a similar regime, through a combination
of deposit insurance and, more recently, a federal depositor preference
statute. More practically, the frequent use of purchase and assumption-or
"P and A"-transactions, where depositors are transferred over to an
acquiring bank, represents an even more obvious means of excluding a
special class from an insolvency process.' 05
The "safe harbors" in the Bankruptcy Code provide a similar status for
repo and derivatives trades, excepting them from all of the key provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code.' 06 To be sure, the safe harbors are far sloppier in
providing their priority-in that they extend far beyond what is needed to
protect the financial institutions engaged in these trades.107 But whatever we
think about the merits, they represent a policy decision by Congress to ditch
Stephen J. Lubben, Essential Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 16 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. 39, 42-44
(2015).
103. Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Why Banks Are Not Allowed in Bankruptcy, 67
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 985, 989 (2010).
104. See In re Bernard L. MadoffInv. Sec. LLC, 654 F.3d 229, 240 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting that
the "SIPC provides advances on customer property"). To be sure, if we view broker-dealers as
holding assets in custody on behalf of their clients, they are somewhat different from the other
financial institutions because it is not that clients receive preferential treatment vis-i-vis other
creditors. Rather, it is that their assets never formed part of the bankrupt broker-dealer's estate in
the first instance. Of course, we also backstop that segregation from the estate with a special
insurance fund, which then pushes broker-dealers a bit closer to the traditional financial institutions.
Perhaps it is best to admit that they operate under a somewhat mixed model.
105. Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 895, 950-51 (1996).
106. Stephen J. Lubben, Failure of the Clearinghouse: Dodd-Frank's Fatal Flaw?, 10 VA. L.
& Bus. REV. 127, 152 (2015); Rizwaan J. Mokal, Liquidity, Systemic Risk, and the Bankruptcy
Treatment of Financial Contracts, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 15, 43 n.21 (2015).
107. Edward J. Janger, Response, Arbitraging Systemic Risk: System Definition, Risk
Definition, Systemic Interaction, and the Problem ofAsymmetric Treatment, 92 TEXAS L. REV. SEE
ALSO 217, 228-29 (2013).
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the normal insolvency rules in favor of a system in which a certain preferred
group prevails over the default rule of creditor equality.108
What, then, are the first principles of business insolvency at play here?
At heart, business bankruptcy, and most of business insolvency, is aimed at
recognizing a standard set of creditor priorities and ensuring creditor equality
within those priorities. Creditors are urged to bargain for their specific
treatment.
Bank insolvency, on the other hand, is about advancing legislatively
defined policy goals that have been set in advance of insolvency. 109 We may
disagree about the wisdom of certain of those goals, but they are set through
a legislative process and not within the framework of creditor bargaining so
familiar to bankruptcy attorneys.' 10
On the surface, bank insolvency thus looks like normal insolvency, but
it is really quite different."1 The next part of this Paper, thus, looks at the
implications of that conclusion for one key aspect of insolvency law: the role
of bankruptcy courts.
III. The Problem of Courts
In one of their myriad attempts to replace Dodd-Frank's OLA with a
new chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, House Republicans argued that:
[T]he bankruptcy process is administered through the judicial system,
by impartial bankruptcy judges charged by the Constitution to
guarantee due process in public proceedings under well-settled rules
and procedures. It is a process that is faithful to this country's belief
in the Rule of Law.12
108. John J. Chung, From Feudal Land Contracts to Financial Derivatives: The Treatment of
Status Through Specific Performance, 29 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 107, 136, 138-39 (2009). For a
general critique of the policymaking behind the safe harbors, see Stephen J. Lubben, Subsidizing
Liquidity or Subsidizing Markets? Safe Harbors, Derivatives, and Finance, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J.
463, 472-77 (2017).
109. Helen A. Garten, A Political Analysis of Bank Failure Resolution, 74 B.U. L. REV. 429,
445 (1994).
110. For key insights into the tensions that naturally exist between the bank and bankruptcy
frameworks, see Sarah Pei Woo, Simultaneous Distress of Residential Developers and Their
Secured Lenders: An Analysis of Bankruptcy & Bank Regulation, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
617, 664-76 (2010).
111. See Thomas W. Joo, Who Watches the Watchers? The Securities Investor Protection Act,
Investor Confidence, and the Subsidization of Failure, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1105 (1999)
("SIPA's goals are very different. It is concerned primarily with the health of the securities industry.
SIPA does not attempt to maximize the debtor's estate ... but only liquidation procedures.").
112. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON FIN. SERVES , 114TH CONG., THE FINANCIAL CHOICE ACT: A





It is hard to quarrel with the rule of law, capitalized or not. Nonetheless,
I use this part of the paper to explain why courts are an uneasy fit in the case
of a SIFI insolvency.
As a starting point, "corporate bankruptcy scholars tend to characterize
bankruptcy as an extension of the private transactional realm, with judges
external to that world."" 3 This conception of business bankruptcy, although
clearly overstated and even wrong, presents a problem for efforts to apply the
"normal rules" to SIFI insolvency. In short, given the broad public effects
and regulatory considerations tied to a SIFI's failure, the notion that a system
of private bargaining could or should address the matter is nonsensical." 4
Financial institutions create debt instruments that are something more
than debt, and indeed become valuable social products. 1 5 More broadly,
financial markets are integral to the production of commercial goods,
public goods, and social services. Many businesses and individuals
regularly rely upon financial institutions to provide short-term loans
when the individual or business experiences temporary cash
management difficulties.'
In addition, financial institutions play key roles in the creation of
money.1" About 70% of the U.S. money supply is in the form of deposits.1 1 8
For deposits to perform this function-and more broadly for banks to
function as the institutional backbone of the payment system-depositors
need to be reasonably confident that: (1) there will not be a significant delay
in transferring or withdrawing deposited funds (illiquidity) and (2) these
funds will not be written down or converted into equity in the context of any
bankruptcy proceeding (loss of value).' 19
113. Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 33 YALE J.
ON REG. 55, 69 (2016).
114. See Anna Gelpern, Common Capital: A Thought Experiment in Cross-Border Resolution,
49 TEX. INT'L L.J. 355, 356 (2014) ("Like the public-policy functions, government commitments
permeate the bank balance sheet. Central-bank liquidity support, deposit insurance, regulatory
valuation of assets and liabilities, and resolution procedures all represent government commitments
that shape the way in which a bank does business.").
115. See Donald F. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies,
82 HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1233 (1969) ("In short, if banking is peculiar in that bank failures pose a
particularly serious problem, it is also peculiar in that competition in lending performs a uniquely
valuable function.").
116. Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap Commons, 82
U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 185 (2011).
117. See Adam J. Levitin, Safe Banking: Finance and Democracy, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 361
(2016) (discussing ways in which banks' lending practices aid in wealth creation).
118. Money Stock & Debt Measures-H.6 RELEASE, Fed. Res. Sys.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/current/default.htm [https://perma.cc/FL8L-EBFM].
119. See Dan Awre & Kristin van Zwieten, The Shadow Payment System, 43 J. CORP. L.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 31-32), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn
.2843772 [https://perma.cc/7LUQ-3XBA] (making this argument with regard to shadow payment
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All would tend to argue against some sort of closed insolvency system
where the public interest is shut out in favor of bilateral or even multiparty
private negotiation.
And indeed the entire notion of systemic importance undermines the
basis for private bargaining.120 That the failure of a SIFI affects not only the
bank itself or its investors, but also other companies and individuals,
inherently takes it out of the realm of private bargain and into a more general,
public sphere.1 21
Turning to a more sensible conception of corporate bankruptcy, we have
to acknowledge that modern bankruptcy courts play an active role in moving
the case to confirmation of a plan.122 Thus, chapter 11 is a multifaceted
competition between various stakeholder groups and the debtor, with the
court pushing the entire thing forward within a framework that we shorthand
by reference to the "pari passu principle."12 3
A full theoretical conception of judging within chapter 11 is beyond the
scope of this Paper. But the aim here is to contrast any reasonable conception
of chapter 11 with the aims of financial institution insolvency. In short, we
have to consider chapter 11, a multiparty negotiation conducted within the
structure of creditor equality, with the policy aims of bank insolvency,
broadly defined. A bankruptcy proceeding:
is a specialized process for dispute resolution in connection with firms
and individuals in financial or economic distress, but it is hardly
narrow, technical, or specialized in substance. Bankruptcy cases
frequently raise a broad range of legal issues beyond the intricacies of
bankruptcy-specific doctrine. They routinely implicate non-
bankruptcy-specific rules of decision and have done so throughout the
modern history of federal bankruptcy law. Both as a matter of doctrine
and theory, bankruptcy law aims to honor to the greatest extent
systems).
120. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 198 (2008) (explaining the wide-
ranging economic consequences of failed financial institutions and the resultant need to account for
systemic risk).
121. See Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward Tripartism in
Financial Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621, 627 (2012) ("Thus, financial crises directly
implicate virtually every area of public concern, including housing, education, health care, labor
markets, and environmental protection.").
122. See Melissa B. Jacoby, What Should Judges Do in Chapter 11?, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 571,
580-81 (chronicling the widespread nature of "active case management" by judges in chapter 11
proceedings).
123. Cf Samuel L. Bufford, Coordination of Insolvency Cases for International Enterprise
Groups: A Proposal, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 685, 692 (2012) (discussing the application of the pari
passu principle to international insolvency cases); Christoph G. Paulus, The Interrelationship of
Sovereign Debt and Distressed Banks: A European Perspective, 49 TEX. INT'L L.J. 201, 205 (2014)




possible the parties' non-bankruptcy entitlements. Typically, state
common law or statutory rights make up those non-bankruptcy
entitlements, and bankruptcy courts therefore must decide matters that
require application of non-bankruptcy-specific common law or
statutory provisions.124
In contrast, financial institution insolvency advances the policy goals of
the legislature and financial regulators. Specifically, it advances the policy of
regulators-including the legislature-at the point of financial distress. 125 Its
primary aim is not adjudicatory, but rather regulatory.
The fact that bank insolvency has specific policy aims itself suggests an
immediate point of difference with chapter 11. Whereas normal corporate
insolvency provides a framework for negotiation, SIFI insolvency aims to
preordain the outcome of the process.
A bankruptcy judge is an uneasy fit in such a process, inasmuch as the
judge is left with little to do when the key decisions have all been made in
advance by statute or regulation. An example is seen in OLA itself, where
the court's sole role is to determine whether the Treasury Secretary's
determination on two points-"that the covered financial company is in
default or in danger of default and satisfies the definition of a financial
company under 5381(a)(11)"-was arbitrary and capricious. 126 After that
the court is essentially told to "go away." 12 7
The still-pending Financial CHOICE Act, a sweeping chapter 14-style
bill that the House passed in June 2017,128 follows a more extreme path.
Although it purportedly replaces OLA with normal bankruptcy procedures,
one of the first things to happen in a bank bankruptcy under the Act is the
removal of all of the debtor's assets from the bankruptcy estate.' 2 9
Essentially, the bankruptcy court is left to sort out a fight over the residue,
while the bulk of the action happens off stage.
Indeed, after the initial transfer, everything will apparently be resolved
under state trust law, presumably New York State's law. The bill provides
that "[a]fter a transfer to the special trustee under this section, the special
trustee shall be subject only to applicable nonbankruptcy law, and the actions
124. Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62
STAN. L. REv. 747, 773-74 (2010).
125. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Against Regulatory Displacement: An Institutional Analysis of
Financial Crises, 17 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 673, 710 (2015) (arguing that financial institution
insolvencies are regulated to achieve the policy goals of legislative bodies and regulatory agencies).
126. 12 U.S.C. 5382(a)(1)(A)(iv) (2012).
127. E.g., id. 5382(a)(1)(B), 5388, 5390(a)(9)(D).
128. Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. Sec. 122, 1181-1192 (2017) (as
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and conduct of the special trustee shall no longer be subject to approval by
the [bankruptcy] court in the case under this subchapter." 130
The CHOICE Act provides that the trust:
shall be a newly formed trust governed by a trust agreement approved
by the court as in the best interests of the estate, and shall exist for the
sole purpose of holding and administering, and shall be permitted to
dispose of, the equity securities of the bridge company in accordance
with the trust agreement.' 3 '
Thus, the bankruptcy court has some fleeting power before approval of
the trust, but that must be exercised under extreme time limits-perhaps as
little as one day.'3 2
The terms of the trust are only subject to a few vague rules, and the
pronouncement that "the trustee shall confirm to the court that the [Federal
Reserve] Board has been consulted regarding the identity of the proposed
special trustee and advise the court of the results of such consultation."133 The
latter leaves open at least the theoretical possibility that a trustee could be
appointed in the face of Fed objections-so long as the bankruptcy court is
willing to sign the order.
The only other express role for regulators is a requirement that the
trustee consult with the FDIC and the Fed before selling the shares of the
debtor, and, again, the trustee must disclose the results of those discussions
to the bankruptcy court.134 The court, however, has no actual power over the
trustee at this point.
Thus, an elected New York Supreme Court judge and (perhaps) the state
attorney general will exercise some loose oversight over the process, but
otherwise, the assets will largely disappear from the public eye. If that looks
too menacing to management, the trust could be formed under the law of
some other jurisdiction-indeed, there appears to be no express requirement
that the trust be formed under domestic law. Thus, the bankruptcy court might
have twenty-four hours to approve a trust governed by Manx law, to take one
possible example.
The trust might even avoid application of the Bank Holding Company
Act if it were established with a term of less than twenty-five years.135 The





134. The regulators are given general standing to appear before the bankruptcy court. Id.
1184.
135. 12 U.S.C. 1841(b) (2012) (excluding any trust with terms of less than twenty-five years
from the definition of "company," resulting in such trusts not being subject to BHCA regulation).
Presumably the bankruptcy court, particularly if asked by regulators, could order compliance with
the BHCA when transferring estate assets to the trust.
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regulation, but the trust has the potential to be entirely opaque. This from
legislation that is sold as increasing transparency.
In short, while a modern chapter 11 case features "hands on" judicial
involvement, and that is a key feature of chapter 11 as practiced, such a role
is inconsistent with the policy goals of a financial institution insolvency case.
The CHOICE Act, the most prominent of the recent chapter 14 proposals, is
at best a pretend bankruptcy case for financial institutions.
IV. Facing Facts
At a broad level, the global financial system is designed to fail.136 The
very structure of SIFIs and the nature of the explicit and implicit
governmental backstops baked into the system will always encourage banks
to take ever-larger risks.137 But this is inextricably linked to my earlier
observation that banks supply social goods; as a nation, we like money and
credit, but using the same institutions to provide both presents us with some
important and awkward policy trade-offs.
Regulators inevitably find it impossible to keep up, since bankers will
always beat them in resources and influence. 138 Nevertheless, because we
worry about a world without big banks, and what it would look like, we
tolerate this death-defying condition. 139
In this context, the insolvency system for SIFIs matters quite a bit.140 A
bank near insolvency must not be allowed to operate, since shareholders have
nothing left to lose from taking ever riskier bets, and have every incentive to
leave taxpayers "holding the bag." The credibility of the threat to take the
SIFI away from its owners-the shareholders and managers-and run it in
the public interest is vital if this downward spiral is to be avoided.
136. See generally ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS' NEW CLOTHES:
WHAT'S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT (2013) (arguing that despite
superficial reforms in the wake of the recent recession, the banking industry still practices risky
financial behaviors that reflect a fragile banking system).
137. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to
the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 1023-24 (2011) (arguing that Dodd-Frank fails
to eliminate the incentive for large banks to rely on federal bailout programs when considering risky
activities).
138. Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the
Promise ofRegulatoryIncrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1463 (1993); cf Frank Pasquale, Law's
Acceleration of Finance: Redefining the Problem ofHigh-Frequency Trading, 36 CARDOZO L. REV.
2085, 2114 (2015) (describing "the bleak realities at resource-starved agencies").
139. See Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank Regulation in a
Deregulatory Age, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 501, 536-37 (1989) (describing different capital-
regulation approaches aimed at motivating banks to avoid risk-taking behavior).
140. But see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, BankFailures, Risk Monitoring, and the
Marketfor Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1157 (1988) ("Despite the surface plausibility
of this theory, it is unlikely that a generalized bank panic like that which occurred during the
Depression would occur today.").
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One fundamental aspect of a credible SIFI insolvency system is that,
upon activation, the outlines of "what will happen" are both clear and
credible. 141 One part of that certainty traditionally comes from the complete
protection of certain favored classes of creditors-that is, in bank insolvency,
priority dominates over equality.
Another aspect of the clarity that SIFI resolution requires is an
understanding at the outset of the process of how the resolution case will
proceed.142 Bank, broker-dealer, and insurance company resolutions all
follow formally distinct insolvency models in this country, yet any such
entity works through its insolvency with similar goals. For example, when a
broker-dealer fails, customer accounts are moved to a healthy broker, any
gap in customer assets is made up by SIPC, and the typical customer ceases
to concern itself with the insolvency process.143 Stockbrokers from the local
Main Street broker to Lehman Brothers have followed this model.
Chapter 11 offers no similar certainty at inception. First, the parties
might dispute and litigate the question of what "equality" looks like in any
particular chapter 11 case. Next, the precise form of the reorganization plan
is up for grabs in every case. Plans in one case are often modeled on what
"worked" in a prior case, but the precise contours of the plan are largely
unknown at the commencement of the case.
This uncertainty does not work in the context of financial institution
insolvency.1 4 4 And thus, banks are resolved without court involvement, and
broker-dealers and insurance companies are resolved with court involvement
only in the later stages of the process, when the issue becomes reconciling
claims more than stabilizing the institution. These are fundamentally
different processes from chapter 11.145
141. See Edward J. Janger, Treatment of Financial Contracts in Bankruptcy and Bank
Resolution, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1, 4-5 (2015) (highlighting the disorderly outcome
of non-FDIC-administered resolutions in comparison to the predictable and prompt process of bank
insolvency proceedings).
142. See Robert R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, U.S. Corporate and Bank Insolvency Regimes:
A Comparison and Evaluation, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 143, 176-77 (2007) (concluding that
"[r]educing uncertainties surrounding the bank-insolvency-resolution process would further reduce
the adverse externalities from bank insolvencies" and "may also reduce the incentives for banks to
engage in excessive risk taking and moral hazard").
143. Kenneth J. Caputo, Customer Claims in SIPA Liquidations: Claims Filing and the Impact
of Ordinary Bankruptcy Standards on Post-Bar Date Claim Amendments in SIPA Proceedings, 20
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 235, 243 n.48 (2012).
144. Cf Andrea M. Corcoran, Markets' Self-Assessment and Improvement ofDefault Strategies
After the Collapse of Barings, 2 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 265, 291 (1996) (asserting that flexibility
in financial emergencies should not be compromised).
145. Irit Mevorach, Beyond the Search for Certainty: Addressing the Cross-Border Resolution
Gap, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 183, 213 (2015).
2018] 1399
Texas Law Review
OLA tries to hide this reality by providing a thin veneer of judicial
oversight at the outset of the case before quickly dispensing with the judge. 146
The CHOICE Act is in many respects even more disingenuous in that it
pretends to be a normal bankruptcy process. 14 7 But the court loses control
over the debtor's assets at the outset of the case, and the public agencies-
the FDIC and the Fed-are not granted any meaningful participation in the
process. Even the regulatory status of the post-transfer trust-which clearly
should be considered "a financial holding company" under the Bank Holding
Company Act, but might evade even that basic regulation-is left rather
vague under the proposed Act.
The CHOICE Act pretends to be a bankruptcy case pretending to be a
bank insolvency case, while being neither. Instead, it puts the bulk of the
control in the hands of a private trustee who has broad control over the SIFI's
assets with limited oversight. That trustee might be subject to only a state
attorney general's normal power over trusts.
The entire chapter 14 project is based on this same basic
misunderstanding of the goals of bankruptcy, as contrasted with the goals of
SIFI resolution. 14 8 In theory, a SIFI could be resolved in a bankruptcy
process, but policymakers have generally believed that the societal costs
would be too high. And indeed, if we think back to the pre-FDIC bank
receiverships-where depositors were mere unsecured creditors 14 9 -that
supposition is likely correct.
Chapter 14 advocates point to the transparency of chapter 11 as a virtue
to be lauded over normal bank insolvency procedures.10 The latter, in their
view, are too apt to become mechanisms of bailout and favoritism, whereas
chapter 11 looks like a more virtuous market system. The question is whether
realizing due process "up front"-as opposed to after the fact, in the form of
146. Stephen J. Lubben, A New Understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause, 64 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 319, 409 (2013).
147. See John Crawford, Lesson Unlearned?: Regulatory Reform and Financial Stability in the
Trump Administration, 117 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 127, 140 (2017) ("The CHOICE Act would
repeal Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act and replace it with a new subchapter of the Bankruptcy Code,
chapter 11, subchapter V.").
148. See Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1051, 1102-06
(2009) (reviewing the policies, procedures, and decisions evaluated in bankruptcy considerations).
149. HIRSCH BRAVER, LIQUIDATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION OF BANKS, TRUST COMPANIES, AND BUILDING
AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS 501 (1936).
150. See Hester Pierce, Eliminating Dodd-Frank's Overrated Escape Hatch, REALCLEAR
MARKETS (May 25, 2017), https://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2017/05/25
/eliminatingdodd-franksoverratedescapehatchl02707.html [https://perma.cc/BN5V-W4AG]
(calling bankruptcy "a predictable, time-tested, transparent mechanism"); see also Chadwick
Welch, Dodd-Frank's Title IHAuthority: A Disorderly Liquidation of Experience, Logic, and Due
Process, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 989, 992 (2013) (arguing that bank insolvency procedures
"muddl[e] what should be a framework of transparent rules").
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a lawsuit against the FDIC or other regulators-really works in conjunction
with the policy goals that motivate bank-resolution mechanisms.
Arguably, the CHOICE Act itself tells us that the answer to this question
is "no," since the actual in-court part of the process is so slight under the
proposed law. If that is the best that the advocates of "bankruptcy for banks"
can do, we might suspect that true bankruptcy will never actually work.
Conclusion
Bank insolvency uses much of the language of "normal" insolvency. But
bank resolution is not the same as chapter 11 or any other business insolvency
process. Bank insolvency is about special priorities, whereas corporate
bankruptcy is about creditor equality and bargaining. Too often, we let the
similar language confound the analysis.
In an idealized world, bank insolvency is a purely technical project with
fixed distributional consequences. In reality, particularly when the
insolvency has systemic consequences, it takes on a political dimension as
well. That is, while certain policy choices are made ex ante, through the
choice of resolution mechanism, other policy choices will have to be made
ex post, when failure actually happens.
All of the "super chapter 11" or "chapter 11 for banks" proposals-
including the actually enacted OLA-attempt to put a judicial gloss on the
policy and political process that is bank insolvency. Some, like the CHOICE
Act, appear aimed at moving policy choices away from regulators by
pretending to give power to judges, while actually moving policy choices to
private actors.151
It is thought that this judicial veneer will provide a kind of legitimacy to
bank insolvency that proponents believe was lacking in the rescue efforts in
2008. But, if taken seriously, the judicial role is entirely incompatible with
efforts to contain a systemic crisis. Moreover, the veneer is quite apt to crack
in any event: consider the broad role played by the U.S. and Canadian
governments in the automotive bankruptcy cases, which involved at best
marginally systemic debtors. 152 Somewhat confusingly, many of the critics
of those cases nonetheless support some form of chapter 14.
If we do not take the judicial role in bankruptcy for banks seriously and
see it as instead a smokescreen, the conclusions are even more disturbing. At
best, the CHOICE Act-and proposals like it-are little more than disguised
151. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Financial Industry's Plan for Resolving Failed
Megabanks Will Ensure Future Bailouts for Wall Street, 50 GA. L. REV. 43, 57-58, 58 n.57 (2015)
(discussing the benefits of a Wall Street proposal to private actors).
152. See Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 531, 531, 536 (2009) (discussing governmental involvement in the Chrysler and
General Motors chapter 11 bankruptcies).
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power grabs by insiders designed to use rule of law concerns as a cover for a
deregulatory agenda. When an actual systemic crisis comes, it seems
inevitable that the need for governmental assistance will arise yet again, and
we will be right back where we were in 2008.153
My goal has been to draw attention to the confused thinking involved in
many current approaches to bank insolvency. Bank and business insolvency
use similar language to describe fundamentally different mechanisms. Only
by a return to first principles can we reach sensible policy analysis.
153. See Recent Case, State Nat'l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 795 F.3d 48 (D.C. Cir. 2015),
129 HARV. L. REV. 835, 839 (2016) (describing future OLA litigation concerns).
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"Modified universalism" is to date the dominant approach for
addressing cross-border insolvency. 1 Heavily influenced by the scholarship
and advocacy of Professor Jay Westbrook, 2 it has evolved into a set of norms
that can guide parties in actual cases. Adapted to the reality of a world divided
into different legal systems and myriad business structures and insolvency
scenarios, modified universalism seeks to achieve global collective processes
with efficient levels of centralization of insolvency proceedings. It thus
requires the identification of a home country where proceedings would be
centralized, except where it is efficient to open additional proceedings
elsewhere. 3 This outbound aspect of modified universalism is complemented
by a choice-of-law norm that, in principle, refers to the lex fori concursus
(the law of the forum) with limited exceptions.
4 Norms concerning
* This Article is adapted from IRIT MEVORACH, THE FUTURE OF CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY:
OVERCOMING BIASES AND CLOSING GAPS 80-126 (2018), with permission from Oxford University
Press.
** Professor of International Commercial Law, School of Law, Faculty of Social Sciences,
University of Nottingham, U.K. I would like to thank Ian Fletcher, John Pottow, Janis Sarra, Adrian
Walters, Dino Kritsiotis, Marko Milanovic, Sandesh Sivakumaran, and Tomer Broude for reading
and providing invaluable comments on drafts of IRIT MEVORACH, THE FUTURE OF CROSS-BORDER
INSOLVENCY: OVERCOMING BIASES AND CLOSING GAPS 80-126 (2018), which form the basis of
this Article.
1. "Cross-border insolvency" (or international insolvency) means here any form of process or
solution, including liquidation, reorganization, or restructuring processes, concerning commercial
entities or financial institutions that have cross-border presence (e.g., assets, creditors, branches, or
subsidiaries).
2. See generally Jay L. Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 2276 (2000) (recognizing modified universalism as the best interim solution to addressing
multinational insolvencies before movement to a "true universalism" approach).
3. See, e.g., REINHARD BORK, PRINCIPLES OF CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY LAW 23 (2017)
(discussing the circumstances under which it may be reasonable to permit the commencement of
additional proceedings); IAN F. FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 16-17
(2d ed. 2005); ROY GOODE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 786 (4th ed. 2011)
("But some leeway is also given to the concept of territoriality to accommodate the legitimate
expectations of local creditors in relation to local assets. Thus the opening of territorial proceedings
is permitted in a State where the debtor has an establishment or assets .... "); Jay L. Westbrook,
SIFIs and States, 49 TEx. INT'L L.J. 329, 332 (2014) (advocating for the assignment of one
jurisdiction as the primer inter pares to most effectively coordinate international financial crises).
4. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 3, at 31 ("Second, the proceedings follow the law of the opening
state (lex fori concursus), which not only boosts efficiency but also constitutes an aspect of
universalism.") (citation omitted); Leif M. Clark & Karen Goldstein, Sacred Cows: How to Care
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recognition, cooperation, and relief ensure that the global collective
proceedings are given worldwide effect,5 subject to specific safeguards where
recognition or relief may be denied if universal standards of fairness,
nondiscrimination, and due process are not respected. 6  Modified
universalism has been quite prevalent in practice, including where key
international instruments such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency (Model Law) 7 and the EU Insolvency Regulation (EIR)8
seem to generally follow its approach. 9 There are, however, still gaps in the
cross-border insolvency system and in the available frameworks (even where
instruments seem to generally embrace modified universalism), including in
terms of the entities covered and the participating countries. 10 Generally, the
for Secured Creditors' Rights in Cross-Border Bankruptcies, 46 TEX. INT'L L.J. 513, 515 & n.7
(2011) ("The focus on which country would act as the home court was done in anticipation of that
country applying its own laws, including choice of law rules."); Jay L. Westbrook, Universalism
and Choice of Law, 23 PA. ST. INT'L L. REV. 625, 634 (2005). Professor Westbrook observes:
The emerging international rule in multinational bankruptcy cases focuses on the
center of the debtor's main interests. Up to now, that standard has been adopted
primarily as a choice-of-forum rule rather than a choice-of-law rule, but it is necessary
to use it for both purposes to achieve the goals of universalism.
Id.
5. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 3, at 32 (explaining that, for universalism to function, states must
cooperate and offer their assistance, especially by recognizing and enforcing foreign proceedings);
GOODE, supra note 3, at 786 (describing the key universalist elements, including recognition in
other countries of the forum state's judgments and assistance by local courts in asset recovery);
Westbrook, supra note 3, at 345 (noting the necessity of international coordination and cooperation
in the management of distressed financial institutions).
6. Such circumstances can be grouped under the notion of "public policy."
7. See generally U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE L., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION, U.N. Sales No.
E.14.V.2 (2014) (identifying as its four main features access to local courts for representatives of
foreign proceedings; recognition of foreign proceedings; relief to assist foreign proceedings; and
cooperation among courts and other competent authorities of the various states).
8. See generally Regulation 2015/848, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
20 May 2015 on Insolvency Proceedings, 2015 O.J. (L 141) 19, 19, 59 (EU) (repealing and recasting
Council Regulation 1346/2000); Council Regulation 1346/2000 of May 29, 2000, on Insolvency
Proceedings, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC). The Council Regulation observes:
The proper functioning of the internal market requires that cross-border insolvency
proceedings should operate efficiently and effectively and this Regulation needs to be
adopted in order to achieve this objective . . . . [T]here is a need for a Community act
requiring coordination of the measures to be taken regarding an insolvent debtor's
assets.
Id. The Recast EIR entered into force on June 26, 2017. Id. at 56. The regime applies directly to all
EU member states except Denmark, which opted out. Id. at 29.
9. See GOODE, supra note 3, at 785-86 ("The current trend, as exemplified by the UNCITRAL
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency and the EC Insolvency Regulation ... is clearly in favour
of a modified universalist approach .... ").
10. For example, the Model Law has been adopted by only 45 jurisdictions. U.N. Comm'n on
Int'l Trade Law, Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997),
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/enJuncitral-texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html
[https://perma.cc/N7SN-V8UT]. It does not fully cover the cross-border insolvency and resolution
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status of modified universalism is somewhat amorphous, and its norms are
often perceived as broad principles or aspects of a general trend." 1
This Article considers how modified universalism may be elevated from
a broad approach to a recognized, international legal source that can be
invoked and applied in a more concrete and consistent manner across legal
systems in circumstances of international insolvencies alongside the
application of written instruments where such instruments exist. 12 It draws
from sources of international law, specifically the concept of customary
international law (CIL), and shows that CIL is a key legal source that can fill
gaps in international instruments, influence existing instruments, and
regulate in areas not covered by instruments or regarding countries that are
not parties to them. CIL is also useful in taking into account certain biases
and territorial inclinations that can influence countries and implementing
institutions' decisions and that can, therefore, impede movement towards the
universal application of modified universalism.13 CIL is a "debiasing"
measure where its application does not require active action by all
participants, such as entry into a treaty or enactment of model laws, as it
operates as a default (opt-out) rule. It can thus overcome certain robust biases
such as status quo and loss aversion.14
of financial institutions-indeed, the absence of a uniform framework for cross-border insolvency
of such institutions is a major gap in the international system for cross-border insolvency and
resolution, Irit Mevorach, Beyond the Search for Certainty: Addressing the Cross-Border
Resolution Gap, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 183, 184, 218 n.160 (2015), and it does not
fully or expressly cover all aspects of cross-border insolvency (for example, it does not provide
specific rules concerning choice of law).
11. See for example the references of the U.K. court in In re HIH Cas. & Gen. Ins. Ltd. [2008]
UKHL 21, [2008] 1 WLR 852 (appeal taken from Eng.), to a "principle rather than a rule," an
"aspiration," and a "thread" or the reference of the U.S. court in In re Nortel Networks, Inc., 532
B.R. 494, 558 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015), to "terms such as 'universalism."'
12. I address the question of instrument choice, particularly the choice between a treaty regime
or a regime based on a model law for cross-border insolvency, in IRIT MEVORACH, THE FUTURE OF
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: OVERCOMING BIASES AND CLOSING GAPS 127-68 (2018).
13. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) (developing the "prospect theory" in decision-
making scholarship); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE (n.s.) 1124 (1974) (showing how choices and decisions are strongly biased
and often deviate in predictable ways from economically optimal behavior). "Behavioral
international law" provides further theoretical grounds and indicative studies regarding the
application of recognized biases in international law contexts. See generally Anne van Aaken,
Behavioral International Law and Economics, 55 HARV. INT'L L.J. 421 (2014); Tomer Broude,
Behavioral International Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1099 (2015) (showing that bounds on decision-
making may operate when actors in international law make decisions concerning international law
issues).
14. See generally Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL
STUD. 199 (2006) (analyzing how "debiasing" through law could work to address a variety of legal
questions). In the context of international law, see generally van Aaken, supra note 13, at 449. See
also infra Part II.
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The normative implication is a policy push towards the transformation
of modified universalism into CIL so that it can become part of the
international insolvency legal order. This Article thus explores to what extent
CIL can be utilized in the field of cross-border insolvency and considers
possible obstacles in this regard. It proceeds as follows. Part I overviews the
notion of CIL, including how it is formed and applied, its limitations and its
continued significance. Part II considers the advantages of CIL from a
behavioral perspective as a debiasing mechanism. Part III explores the
obstacles that might be in the way of formalizing modified universalism as
CIL in view of possible narrow perceptions of private international law and
cross-border insolvency, as well as the way modified universalism has been
conceptualized as an interim approach. Part IV argues that such perceptions
are no longer merited. Cross-border insolvency law has a significant
international role, and modified universalism has the characteristics of a
standalone norm. Part V suggests steps to transition modified universalism
from a general trend to CIL and demonstrates the benefits of such
development for future international insolvencies.
I. Customary International Law as a Key International Legal Source
A. Establishing CIL
CIL is one of the key sources of international law,'5 widely
acknowledged, and applicable in different legal traditions.16 It has a
privileged position in the international law system and forms the backbone
of many areas of international law." CIL arises from the general and
consistent practice of states, where that practice is based on a belief in the
conformity of the practice with international law.'8 This is the classical
15. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38 (San Francisco, 26 June 1945), 3 Bevans
1179, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, entered into force 24 Oct. 1945. CIL is considered one of the
three primary sources of international law, the other two being treaties and general principles of
law. See Brigitte Stern, Custom at the Heart of International Law, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
89, 89 (2011) (noting the centrality to the international order of both custom and treaty). "General
principles of law" is a source close to CIL but one that refers to fundamental principles concerning
substantive justice and procedural fairness and by which states are bound because of the universal
understanding of basic legal concepts by all legal systems. Charles T. Kotuby Jr., General
Principles of Law, International Due Process, and the Modern Role of Private International Law,
23 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 411, 412, 422 (2013).
16. ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW 43-44 (1985).
17. Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 115, 116
(2005).
18. See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF PEACE 59-60 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963) ("Evidence that a custom in this
sense exists in the international sphere can be found only by examining the practice of states ...
whether they recognize an obligation to adopt a certain course. . . [that] shows 'a general practice
accepted as law."'); VAUGHAN LOWE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 38 (2007) (describing the two
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understanding of CIL, consistent with its description in the Statute of the
International Court of Justice as "evidence of a general practice accepted as
law." 19 It encompasses objective and subjective elements, which are
complementary and intertwined.20 The objective element of CIL requires
sufficient evidence of state practice that follows the potential CIL.2 1 Such
evidence should show consistency and practice by various relevant actors,
although not necessarily by all countries.22 Additionally, the required
recurrence of the practice may depend on the frequency of circumstances that
require action pursuant to the CIL.23 The subjective (psychological) element
is what countries have accepted as law (opinio juris). Thus, evidence of state
practice should be complemented by evidence that the practice is regarded as
an expression of a rule of international law, a conviction that there was an
obligation to follow the norm.
The primary and most direct evidence of the existence of CIL would be
the actions of countries through the acts of their organs. Thus, when a country
acts in a legally significant way or refrains from acting, it contributes to the
development of state practice accepted as law. Countries' actions may be
discerned, for example, from decisions to adopt certain legislation and from
the decisions of national courts.24 Additionally, treaties and conventions may
point to the existence of CIL.25 Various instruments that may be considered
soft law may also provide evidence of an established CIL or contribute to the
evolution of new CIL, being determinative of the opinio juris or of state
practice.26 Thus, a nonbinding instrument can have a legal effect on
customary law. The wording in such an instrument is important because it
essential components of customary international law: a general practice of states and a belief in the
conformity of the practice with international law); HUGH THIRLWAY, THE SOURCES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 53-91 (2014) ("It is in fact the consistency and repetition rather than the
duration of the practice that carries the most weight.").
19. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b) (San Francisco, 26 June 1945), 3
Bevans 1179, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, entered into force 24 Oct. 1945.
20. THIRLWAY, supra note 18, at 62.
21. Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 91, 100-05
(Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2014).
22. See Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE
L.J. 202, 210 (2011) ("It is not clear how much state practice is required in order to generate a rule
of CIL, although most commentators agree that [it] must be 'extensive' or 'widespread' .... ")
(citations omitted).
23. THIRLWAY, supra note 18, at 65, 67.
24. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), Judgment, 2012
I.C.J. Rep. 99, 55 (Feb. 3).
25. Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 13, 27 (June 3); see
THIRLWAY, supra note 18, at 58-59 (describing the significance of the International Law
Association's Report on the Formation of Customary International Law in studying the relationship
between state practice and opiniojuris).
26. Alan E. Boyle, Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law, 48 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 901, 904 (1999).
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must be "of a fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be
regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law."2 7 It would also be
important to consider the level of support given to the instrument by countries
and any statements accompanying such instrument that may be relevant to
the assessment of countries' beliefs about the conformity of the practice with
international law.28
B. Effect of CIL
Once CIL has become pervasive enough, countries are bound by it
regardless of whether they have codified the laws domestically or through
treaties. Unanimity among all countries is not required for it to have a
universal effect. Likewise, if an obligation is included in a treaty but also
amounts to CIL, it will also bind countries that are not parties to the treaty. 2 9
Countries in some cases, however, may be exempted from CIL. Under the
doctrine of the "persistent objector," 30 countries can consistently object to
CIL (opt out) in its formative stages. 31 The threshold for being regarded a
persistent objector is, however, very high, and the objection should be made
widely known.32 Persistent objections should also be made while the rule is
still accumulating and before it becomes CIL. Thereafter, in principle, once
the CIL is established, it is no longer possible to opt out of the rule except
through specific bilateral agreements that establish a different rule.3 3
CIL may be invoked in domestic or international tribunals, yet the
application of CIL does not depend on establishing international enforcement
mechanisms. Application heavily relies on domestic enforcement structures.
Thus, all nations seem to accept that CIL forms an integral part of national
law34 and that courts should take judicial notice of CIL.35 When ascertaining
27. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 72
(Feb. 20); see Alan Boyle, Soft Law in International Law-Making, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 118,
130-33 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2014) (describing the importance of wording in nonbinding
instruments that may create customary law).
28. Boyle, supra note 27, at 130-3 1.
29. THIRLWAY, supra note 18, at 35-36.
30. See id. at 86-88 (providing an overview of the persistent objector doctrine).
31. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 22, at 211; Guzman, supra note 17, at 164-65.
32. Dino Kritsiotis, On the Possibilities of and for Persistent Objection, 21 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 121, 129 (2010) (noting, for example, the circumstances in Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.),
Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 116, 131 (Dec. 18), where it was ruled that "the ten-mile rule for the
closing lines of bays 'would appear to be inapplicable as against Norway inasmuch as she has
always opposed any attempt to apply it to the Norwegian coast"').
33. THIRLWAY, supra note 18, at 88.
34. Eileen Denza, The Relationship Between International and National Law, in INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 412, 426 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2014).
35. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 99-100 (7th ed. 2014) (describing the
doctrine of incorporation, which holds that customary international law is automatically part of the
local law without any need for constitutional ratification).
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the existence and nature of an alleged CIL, domestic courts may have
recourse to various types of sources and authoritative material, including
"international treaties and conventions, authoritative textbooks, practice and
judicial decisions." 36 The actual implementation of CIL in national laws
differs, however, to some extent, among jurisdictions.37 In civil law
jurisdictions, the general rule is that CIL takes precedence over inconsistent
ordinary national legislation and directly creates rights and duties within the
territory.38 In common law jurisdictions, CIL is recognized as part and parcel
of the legal system, and legislation is presumptively construed in a manner
that would avoid a conflict with international law.3 9
C. Limitations and Critique
CIL tends to be vague, and the way it emerges is rather unclear.4 0
Furthermore, because CIL is based on an evolving experience, it is evidently
problematic to ascertain when rules have reached the stage where they can
be applied as CIL.4 1 There is also a circularity problem. For a rule to qualify
as CIL, countries should feel obligated to follow it, but how would countries
feel such legal obligation before the rule becomes customary? 42 This
uncertainty, as well as CIL's reliance on domestic enforcement mechanisms,
also makes CIL prone to nonobservance, especially when it attempts to
address difficult cross-border conflicts. 43 There have also been challenges to
CIL for lacking a coherent theory and doctrine.44 It is arguably impossible to
observe the universe of countries' practices to be able to ascertain whether
references to CIL are made out of obligation. 45 It has also been argued that
36. The Cristina [1938] AC 485 (HL) 497 (appeal taken from Aust.).
37. See SHAW, supra note 35, at 99-127 (providing an overview of the implementation of CIL
in national laws).
38. See, e.g., Hans-Peter Folz, Germany, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC LEGAL
SYSTEMS 240, 245 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2011) (describing CIL's precedence over German statutes
and its creation of rights and duties for Germans); Giuseppe Cataldi, Italy, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS 328, 342-44 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2011) (describing Italy's practice
of automatically incorporating CIL into its domestic legal system such that CIL assumes the force
of constitutional law).
39. For example, CIL is part of the public policy of the UK and part of the domestic law and
does not necessitate the interposition of a constitutional ratification procedure. SHAW, supra note
35, at 99-100.
40. Id. at 102.
41. THIRLWAY, supra note 18, at 54-55.
42. ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 53,66 (1971).
43. See Barbara C. Matthews, Emerging Public International Banking Law? Lessons from the
Law of the Sea Experience, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 539, 556-57 (2010) (describing the questionable
level of domestic enforcement of CIL and detailing the difficulties of codifying the Law of the Sea).
44. See THIRLWAY, supra note 18, at 231 (noting that CIL is one of international law's
"intellectual puzzles"); KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW, at xiii (2d ed.
1993) (describing the ambiguity of the term "custom" with regard to international law).
45. See Guzman, supra note 17, at 150-53 (highlighting the numerous interpretations of state
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CIL does not actually affect country behavior and has little impact in view of
the lack of enforcement mechanisms on the international level.4 6 Another
uncertainty revolves around the question of whose practice and opinion
should be considered when attempting to identify the existence of CIL,
including the extent to which non-state actors' actions should be taken into
account, which countries' actions or omissions should be considered, and
whether only the actions of countries that are affected or that are capable of
taking action regarding a certain matter are relevant. 47 There is also a risk that
CIL is too sticky and fails to allow for developments to meet changing
circumstances and new needs of countries and of the international business
and financial community.48
D. CIL's Continued Significance
Notwithstanding the difficulties that CIL presents, it continues to hold a
privileged position in the international legal system.4 9 Furthermore, over time
there has been some shift from relying only on induction from national
practice in identifying CIL to deducing its emergence from broader data sets,
including international pronouncements and activities of non-state actors.50
Some scholars have also theorized CIL in functional terms, suggesting that
CIL may be effective when countries interact repeatedly over time, and it
may influence country behavior through reputational and direct sanctions. 51
It has also been considered that although the development of CIL might be a
slow process, with technological changes, the rise of international
institutions, and other developments, CIL may emerge more quickly than in
the past.52 The works of influential international committees of recent times
practice in discussions of CIL).
46. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (2005);
see also Guzman, supra note 17, at 128 (discussing the argument that because CIL lacks an
enforcement mechanism, CIL does not affect state behavior).
47. THIRLWAY, supra note 18, at 59-61; see also Till Mller, Customary Transnational Law:
Attacking the Last Resort of State Sovereignty, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 19, 28-30 (2008)
(reviewing scholarship regarding non-state actors' influence on the formation of CIL).
48. THIRLWAY, supra note 18, at 68.
49. Niels Petersen, Customary Law Without Custom? Rules, Principles, and the Role of State
Practice in International Norm Creation, 23 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 275, 309 (2007) (arguing that
such unwritten international law not only counts but "may even gain importance").
50. See, e.g., Roozbeh B. Baker, Customary International Law: A Reconceptualization, 41
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 439, 446 (2016) (discussing the debate concerning "modem custom" and
"traditional custom" viewpoints on customary international norms); Anthea Elizabeth Roberts,
Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J.
INT'L L. 757, 758 (2001) (describing the difference between traditional inductive and modern
deductive methods of identifying custom).
51. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 17, at 134, 139 (noting the role that reputational and direct
sanctions play in compliance with CIL).
52. See, e.g., Bin Cheng, Custom: The Future of General State Practice in a Divided World, in
THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 513, 532 (Ronald MacDonald & Douglas
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provide further guidance regarding the manner of CIL formation and
identification.53 Importantly, regarding the subjective acceptance of CIL, it is
explained that it should be "distinguished from mere usage or habit"5 4 and
may be negated where it can be shown that participants, when acting in a
particular way, were motivated by considerations such as courtesy,
convenience, or tradition rather than by a conviction that their acts amounted
to CIL.55
It is recognized that CIL is binding on all countries whether or not they
participated in the relevant practice. Any country in theory can affect CIL,
and the position of countries may be considered even where they could not
in fact take or refrain from taking an action.5 6 Surely, where countries do
possess the capacity to engage and interact with other parties, such countries
would be more influential and thus privileged regarding the formation and
shaping of CIL. However, the reliance of international law on the practice of
the more powerful countries can ensure fewer deviations from and violations
of CIL where such countries formed the rules. Constraining violations by
powerful countries is crucial for the stability of the system, as the impact of
breach could be much more pronounced and widespread when committed by
such jurisdictions. In addition, because powerful countries are less affected
by CIL violations (as they are more resilient to the implications of a breach),
they may be less deterred by them. Therefore, it is another advantage if these
countries play an important role in shaping the rules.57
M. Johnston eds., 1983) ("[C]ustomary international law, instead of being sluggish and backward
as a source of international law, is in fact dynamic, living, and ever-changing .... ").
53. See generally Int'l Law Ass'n, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of
General Customary International Law, Final Report of the Committee, London Conference (2000)
[hereinafter Statement of Principles] (attempting to create a practical guide with concise and clear
guidelines for the application of customary international law principles); Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep.
on the Identification of Customary International Law: Text of the Draft Conclusions Provisionally
Adopted by the Drafting Committee, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.872 (May 30, 2016) [hereinafter Draft
Conclusions] (describing the way in which the rules of customary international law are determined).
54. Draft Conclusions, supra note 53, at 3.
55. See Statement of Principles, supra note 53, at 35 (describing the practice of sending
condolences on the death of a head of state as an example of a practice that, although frequently
observed as a matter of comity, does not give rise to a legal obligation); see also North Sea
Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 77 (Feb. 20). The court
noted:
The frequency, or even habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough. There are
many international acts, e.g., in the field of ceremonial and protocol, which are
performed almost invariably, but which are motivated only by considerations of
courtesy, convenience or tradition, and not by any sense of legal duty.
Id.
56. See THIRLWAY, supra note 18, at 59-60 (noting, as to the question of whether customary
international law existed with respect to the use of nuclear weapons, the fact that a majority of states
did not possess nuclear weapons and could therefore neither choose to use them nor refrain from
using them).
57. Guzman, supra note 17, at 151.
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Today, treaty law covers many areas of international law. There are also
various other ways for countries to cooperate through soft-law instruments. 58
However, CIL remains binding on countries even outside the treaty
framework. The two sources operate in parallel, and the codification of CIL
in a treaty does not abrogate the rule as CIL. 59 CIL still plays an important
role "regulating both within the gaps of treaties as well as the conduct of non-
parties to the treaties" 60 because countries are bound by CIL even if they have
not expressed explicit consent. The effect of CIL is also important regarding
matters that are not regulated by treaties or by other instruments and for
newly emerging issues not yet covered by a treaty. 61 In addition, CIL can
serve to influence treaty regimes and may be important and relevant for treaty
interpretation where, for example, the treaty refers to rules of CIL.6 2 Thus,
important areas of international law, including the law of state responsibility,
foreign direct investment, diplomatic immunity, human rights, and state
immunity, 63 are governed wholly or partially by CIL where treaties are not
universal, where a treaty is absent, or where the treaty does not cover all
issues. CIL is in use, for example, in international investment law where
certain aspects of regulating foreign investment have become settled
international law64 and where CIL remains of fundamental importance
despite the proliferation of bilateral investment agreements in this field. 65
58. See Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreement, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 581,
614 (2005) (concluding that there has been a dramatic increase in international cooperation through
contracts, unwritten understandings, and pledges).
59. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. United States),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 177 (June 27). The Court held:
[E]ven if the customary norm and the treaty norm were to have exactly the same
content, this would not be a reason for the Court to hold that the incorporation of the
customary norm into treaty-law must deprive the customary norm of its applicability
as distinct from that of the treaty norm.
Id.
60. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 22, at 209.
61. Where both a treaty and CIL regulate the same situation, normally the treaty is the prevailing
lex specialis, at least regarding rules that existed at the time of the conclusion of the treaty. See
Thirlway, supra note 21, at 108-09 (observing that even in a situation where customary law exists
alongside treaty law, no problem of theory is raised, since the latter is free to modify customary
entitlements).
62. Guzman, supra note 17, at 120 & n.18 (noting the example of the United States Model
Bilateral Investment Treaty art. II (Apr. 1994), which refers to "treatment less favorable than that
required by [customary] international law").
63. Id. at116 n.l.
64. See Patrick Dumberry, Are BITs Representing the "New" Customary International Law in
International Investments Law?, 28 PA. ST. INT'L L. REv. 675, 676-78 (2010) (describing the role
of custom as a source of international law in the regulation of foreign investment).
65. CIL in this field includes, inter alia, the requirement of nondiscrimination, the fair and
equitable treatment of foreign investors, the entitlement of foreign investors to national treatment
once admitted into the country, and the requirement regarding nondiscriminatory regulatory
measures and obligations to respect human rights by multinational companies. For more detail, see
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E. CIL 's Relevance to the Cross-Border Insolvency System
The nature and characteristics of CIL make it an important legal source
for a cross-border insolvency system based on modified universalism and a
useful method to shape the international interactions in this subsystem of
international law. CIL is responsive to emerging trends in practice. It is based
on experience, and it can arise whether written instruments are applicable or
not. It applies to all countries, whereby treaties or other instruments apply
only to signatories or countries that adopted the instruments. Thus, if
modified universalism is recognized as CIL, gaps in the cross-border
insolvency system can be filled. Modified universalism is also sufficiently
flexible-its emerging norms accommodate different types of business
structures and different degrees of global or regional integration, and it can
also adapt to changing conditions. Thus, it is akin to CIL, which as a legal
source tends to be supple and adaptable. CIL is also not too rigid as a legal
source, notwithstanding its universal application through general experience.
It can develop gradually over time, and it is possible to change or create new
CIL to meet the developing needs of nations.6 6 Thus, conduct inconsistent
with CIL may in relevant circumstances be a way to create new rules.6 7 At
the same time, where CIL represents an emerging, widespread, and
normatively desirable practice, its tendency to stick is an important
advantage. 68
II. The Behavioral Force of CIL
A. CIL as a Debiasing Mechanism
CIL can also assist in overcoming territorial inclinations and biases. 6 9
Decision-makers, including actors making choices regarding issues of
international law, may be inclined to avoid changes and cling to the status
Surya P. Subedi, International Investment Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 727, 740-41 (Malcolm D.
Evans ed., 2014). These rules may apply in the absence of a bilateral agreement, where agreements
make reference to CIL, or to fill gaps in treaties when treaties are silent on certain issues.
66. THIRLWAY, supra note 18, at 69; cf id. at 102 (noting the permanent nature of general
principles of law).
67. The ICJ explained in this regard that "[r]eliance by a State on a novel right or an
unprecedented exception to the principle might, if shared in principle by other States, tend towards
a modification of customary international law." Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 207 (June 27).
68. Rachel Brewster, Withdrawing from Custom: Choosing Between Default Rules, 21 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT'L L. 47, 55 (2010) ("If customary international law already incorporates rules that
are net welfare increasing for the international community, then a shift towards the [provision of
more opt-out rights, including after formation,] may be welfare decreasing.").
69. For more detail on the possible operation of biases and bounds on decision-making in




quo, especially where choices of certain options are perceived as resulting in
a loss (e.g., loss of sovereignty or control over locally situated assets or
entities), and more so if the choice requires active action. 70 Additionally, the
way options are framed matter to people's choices. Specifically, cognitive
psychology studies have shown the effect of legislative framing and the use
of default options on choices between alternative options.71 It has been
shown, for example, that people favor agreements that are consistent with
legal default rules or terms of trade that are conventional for the type of
bargain at issue. 72 This may be due to the stress or sometimes physical effort
involved in making changes, but it is also likely because defaults tend to be
perceived as representing the existing status quo and the recommended,
endorsed option.73 Furthermore, switching from a default option may be
perceived as a risk and a loss; thus, it may be weighed more heavily than the
possible gains because of loss aversion. 74 Empirical research in international
law concerning adherence to options in treaties has also shown the significant
impact of default rules, which were likely perceived as the endorsed status
quo position, on countries' (and their implementing institutions') choices. 75
More generally, behavioral international law studies have noted the
70. The existence of loss aversion, whereby losses are exaggerated and given greater weight
than gains, and its link to a status quo bias and the endowment effect, has been observed in a wealth
of empirical research, including neurobiological experiments, which showed that this pattern of
behavior (responding differently to perceived losses as opposed to perceived gains, measured
against a perceived status quo position) is tied to the brain's greater sensitivity to potential losses
than to gains; experimental studies have also shown that loss aversion has a specific effect when
considering avoiding an option verses actively approaching an option. See generally Nicholas D.
Wright et al., Approach-Avoidance Processes Contribute to Dissociable Impacts of Risk and Loss
on Choice, 32 J. NEUROSCIENCE 7009 (2012); Nicholas D. Wright et al., Manipulating the
Contribution of Approach-Avoidance to the Perturbation of Economic Choice by Valence, 7
FRONTIERS IN NEUROSCIENCE 1 (2013).
71. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status
Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 199 (1991) (pointing to studies showing the effect of such
manipulation on a choice between alternative automobile insurance policies).
72. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 662 (2006) (explaining that a deviation from default terms can raise
suspicion among parties); Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and
the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1343-44 (1990) (concluding that participants'
preferences were dependent upon their reference positions); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias
and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 646-47 (1998) (stating that participants of
the experiment preferred whichever contract term was the default term given).
73. See, e.g., John Beshears et al., The Importance of Default Options for Retirement Savings
Outcomes: Evidence from the United States, in NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., SOCIAL SECURITY
POLICY IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 167, 184-87 (Jeffrey R. Brown et al. eds., 2009)
(describing this phenomenon in the context of experiments studying individuals' investment
decisions regarding their savings plans).
74. Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 SCIENCE 1338, 1338
(2003).
75. Jean Galbraith, Treaty Options: Towards a Behavioral Understanding of Treaty Design, 53
VA. J. INT'L L. 309, 352 (2013).
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importance of default mechanisms in choice architecture in international
law.76 Thus, a rule can be set up as an opt-out rule or an opt-in rule. An opt-
in rule means that the default is nonadherence to the rule. In an opt-out
scheme, the default is adherence. If people tend not to deviate from default
rules, there is an advantage in setting up opt-out rules, especially where
universality of the application of the rule is critical. Thus, if sources of
international law that provide an opt-out system are used, higher participation
can be expected in comparison to opt-in systems.
CIL can be particularly advantageous as a debiasing mechanism of
international law because CIL is an opt-out system where countries are bound
by such CIL that has developed through the general practice of nations.
Although CIL emerges from the consistent practice of countries, it is not a
consensual mechanism. It does not require that countries agree to or enact the
rule and as such does not represent a deviation from the status quo. The
existence of CIL is based on an understanding that it is a norm of the
international community. This does not necessarily mean, though, that a
given country consents to the norm. Rather, the acceptance of the binding
rule must be felt by countries generally. 77 Critically, to not be bound by the
rule, a country needs to actively object to it.78 As such, CIL is a mechanism
of international cooperation that can promote universal application of the
norm because opt-out rules are expected to increase participation, particularly
on the global level, in the absence of mechanisms to impose regulation
directly on countries' legal systems. It might be harder to ensure universal
application through, for example, treaties, as treaties require an active opt-in.
The fact that CIL requires adherence (or objection) to the rule in its entirety
also promotes integrity in its application.79 Thus, with no room for cherry-
picking, it is more likely that the norm will remain uniform and coherent.
B. CIL: Shifting the Reference Point
Outcomes are perceived as gains or losses usually relative to a reference
point that people denote during the decision-making process, "rather than as
76. See Broude, supra note 13, at 1140-41 (noting how individuals have a tendency to adopt
default rules even when they are inefficient); van Aaken, supra note 13, at 450-52 (explaining how
choice architecture, through default rules' opt-in/opt-out mechanisms, provides a framework
through which to view international law). Choice architecture is the study of how the ways in which
options are presented affect decision-making. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 3 (2009) (defining a choice
architect as someone responsible for organizing the context of decision-making).
77. Andrew T. Guzman, Against Consent, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 747, 776 (2012).
78. The emergence of the persistent objector doctrine, see supra note 30 and accompanying
text, may have been part of an effort to make international law less consensual. Bradley & Gulati,
supra note 22, at 240.
79. Van Aaken, supra note 13, at 452.
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final states of wealth or welfare." 80 The reference point usually corresponds
to the current asset position (status quo) whereby gains/losses are deviations
from the reference point.81 Thus, a negative perception of modified
universalism outcomes is expected particularly where the country's reference
point is a regime generally based on territorialism, namely if the country does
not have an established internationalist approach in its domestic methods for
addressing cross-border insolvency. A modified universalist CIL can, in
addition to applying directly in areas not covered by treaties or other
instruments, also indirectly promote the adoption of instruments (such as the
Model Law) where these instruments reflect modified universalism. A strong
leading norm, elevated from a trend to CIL, may gradually affect the
reference points of countries and implementing institutions and level the
playing field. When recognized as CIL, countries may feel more obliged to
follow modified universalism and, over time, assimilate it into the legal
system. Thus, adherence to instruments that are premised on modified
universalism would less likely be perceived as a change and as a loss.
III. Conceptual Impediments
A. Public and Private International Law as Distinct Disciplines
Notwithstanding the rather widespread adherence to modified
universalism, it has not been invoked or applied as CIL. Modified
universalism is not explicitly embraced in the global instruments for cross-
border insolvency. Courts in common law jurisdictions often apply common
law notions akin to a universalist/cooperative approach, noting that modified
universalism is recognized as a broad principle under common law, or they
apply the notion of comity. Yet, comity entails different interpretations and
is not universal. 82 Modified universalism that could be applied as a universal
and uniform norm has usually been considered a broad concept within the
constraints of domestic, private international law to the extent that if we were
to try identifying it now as CIL, it would be difficult to show consistent
practice that is based on belief in the conformity of the practice with
international law, and therefore CIL might be disproved. The problem could
lie in a narrow perception of cross-border insolvency law as a legal field
addressing procedures and technicalities. Because cross-border insolvency
law primarily regulates the private international law of insolvency, it can be
80. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 13, at 274. Values are attached to changes rather than to
final states, and the perception of changes is also affected by past and present context of experience.
Id. at 274, 277.
81. Id. at 274.
82. It generally refers to the tradition among judges within the common law camp to cooperate
and assist foreign jurisdictions. See FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 17 (contrasting comity with
insularity). But its precise meaning is quite elusive.
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understood as a field disconnected from public international law and public
international law sources. As such, cross-border insolvency law might not be
sufficiently influenced by international laws and might not engage in creating
CIL.
The relation between private and public international law has been a
subject of much debate and considerable theoretical development. 83 In the
early nineteenth century, private international law was perceived as a
category and an integral part of public international law pursuant to the idea
of a unitary international law based on the traditions of Roman jus gentium,
the Statutists, and the natural law; in the latter half of that century, it evolved
and crystallized as a separate field with a distinct role.8 4 Pursuant to this
(modern) traditional separation of roles, public international law governs the
relations between nations, provides a legal framework for organized
international relations, and addresses the rights and obligations of countries
with respect to other countries or individuals. Private international law, on
the other hand, deals with the domestic laws of countries that govern conflicts
between private persons. Against this backdrop, it has been doubted that rules
that are fundamental to private international law (e.g., the rule that rights in
rem as applied to immovable and movable property are governed by the lex
situs, or that form is governed by the lex loci actus) could and have generated
customary (public) international law. 85
Generally, the traditional division between private and public
international law and the evolution of private international law as a domestic
legal order regulating in the domain of private interests contributed to the
gradual isolation of private international law from public international law
and the general exclusion of a role for international sources.86 This model has
resulted in a private international law system that does not contribute much
83. See, e.g., K. LIPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL 63-64 (1981) (examining the influence of public international law on its private
counterpart); Kotuby, supra note 15, at 411-12,433 (2013) (noting the increasingly global discourse
surrounding private international law); Ralf Michaels, Public and Private International Law:
German Views on Global Issues, 4 J. PRIV. INT'L L. 121, 121-22 (2008) (describing scholars'
different perspectives on public and private international law depending on their geographical and
historical context); Ole Spiermann, Twentieth Century Internationalism in Law, 18 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 785, 788-89, 792 (2007) (providing an historical overview of public and private international
law); John R. Stevenson, The Relationship of Private International Law to Public International
Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 564-67 (1952) (analyzing the diverse views of scholars regarding
the proper relationship between public and private international law).
84. See generally Stevenson, supra note 83 (describing the historical relationship between
private and public international law).
85. PAVEL KALENSKY, TRENDS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 17-18 (1971); LIPSTEIN,
supra note 83, at 64-65.
86. See Alex Mills, The Private History of International Law, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 44-45
(2006) ("By defining private international law as part of domestic law, it defines private




to the ordering of international private relations but instead often adds to the
complexity of international transactions-as private international laws of
different systems often conflict or operate with broad exceptions, creating
uncertainty and costs. 87 This division of roles between private and public
international law also arguably constrains the ability to regulate the important
domain of private international interaction in view of the operation of private
power in the global economy. 88
B. Cross-Border Insolvency as a System of Procedural Private
International Law
That cross-border insolvency is a body of specific and narrow rules
concerning insolvency procedures has been a common understanding and
description of this area of the law.89 Often, international insolvency does not
exist as a "systematically elaborated legal framework" and the domestic
private international laws apply.90 Cross-border insolvency has been
generally regarded as "an arcane and rarified area of specialization." 9'
Narrow assumptions concerning the role of cross-border insolvency have
been notable in the practice and observed in the Eighties and early Nineties.
It has been noted that countries have generally presumed that international
insolvency is an aspect of private law.92 Such views resulted in limited
interest of countries in the field of cross-border insolvency where countries
have confined their role to the regulation of procedure concerning
international insolvency. This peripheral interest of governments has also
arguably constrained negotiations on insolvency treaties and could explain
the general failure in concluding treaties in this field. 93
The approach to cross-border insolvency has evolved over time, and
importantly, there has been growing recognition of the difficulty to control
cross-border insolvencies efficiently by relying on the domestic private
international laws of national systems. It has been acknowledged that
domestic private international laws related to insolvency have preserved the
problem of diversity and conflicts between national laws. 94 Consequently,
87. Id. at 45-46.
88. A. Claire Cutler, Artifice, Ideology and Paradox: The Public/Private Distinction in
International Law, 4 REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 261, 279 (1997); Mills, supra note 86, at 46.
89. BOB WESSELS, INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY LAW 1 (4th ed. 2015).
90. Id. at 4.
91. FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 6-7.
92. Id. at 5.
93. Thomas M. Gaa, Harmonization of International Bankruptcy Law and Practice: Is It
Necessary? Is It Possible?, 27 INT'L LAW. 881, 897 (1993); John Honsberger, The Negotiation of a
Bankruptcy Treaty (1985), reprinted in MEREDITH MEMORIAL LECTURES: BANKRUPTCY-
PRESENT PROBLEMS AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 287, 291 (1986).
94. FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 6-7.
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hugely influential uniform frameworks have emerged, notably the Model
Law. Yet, as international instruments that attempt to regulate the specialized
field of cross-border insolvency, they, too, can be understood as merely
providing certain tools to address private international procedures more
efficiently but not as creating general norms that intend to influence
substantive results. 95 The important framework for cross-border insolvency
applicable in Europe (the EIR) has also evolved as an aspect of the European
Community private international law system.96 It has been observed that the
European insolvency framework has not provided a uniform and
comprehensive legal framework. 97 In all, the important advance of cross-
border insolvency regimes has been tempered by a modest approach
concerning the role of cross-border insolvency law and of the frameworks
that are being devised to govern cross-border insolvency cases.
C. Modified Universalism as a Transitory Approach
A tendency to underrate the role of cross-border insolvency is
exacerbated where modified universalism is perceived as an interim solution,
inextricably linked to the aspiration to achieve pure universalism. 9 8 At least
in theory, pure universalism is often considered the ultimate ideal for
regulating cross-border insolvency and modified universalism the best
solution pending movement to true universalism. 99 Modified universalism is
thought to provide a pragmatic transitory approach whilst country laws still
differ and could foster the smoothest transition to true universalism. 1 00
It is inevitable, however, that whilst modified universalism remains
conceptually transitory, its ability to solidify and become CIL is undermined.
CIL must represent settled obligatory practice; 10 1 therefore, a transitory
doctrine would be an oxymoron. True, rules or principles of a temporary
character may stay in such an interim state for a long time and until a new
regime develops. CIL can change, and new CIL can emerge when conduct
inconsistent with it may in relevant circumstances show the appearance of
new rules. CIL does not have to stay still. Yet, for CIL to emerge in the first
place, it should be demonstrated that it is followed consistently based on the
belief about the conformity of the practice with international law. It may be
difficult to form such a type of law, however, where modified universalism
95. See, e.g., Bank of W. Austl. v. David Stewart Henderson [No. 3] [2011] FMCA 840, 43
(Aust.) ("[The Model Law] was promoted as having a procedural effect as opposed to a substantive
effect that might have included automatic recognition and enforcement or effects.").
96. WESSELS, supra note 89, at 6.
97. Id. at 7.
98. For discussion of the proposition that cross-border insolvencies should always be unitary
and universal, see BORK, supra note 3, at 28-29; FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 11.
99. Westbrook, supra note 2, at 2277.
100. Id.
101. See supra subpart I(A).
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is in this midpoint between an interim solution and a fundamental norm and
is conceptually linked to another presumably better approach, thus
representing a transitory stage in the development of more ideal rules.
IV. Reconceptualization: The International Role of Cross-Border
Insolvency
A. Internationalization of Private International Law
Gradually since the twentieth century, and more so in recent decades,
the division between private and public international law has become
uncertain and blurred.102 The traditional separation of roles of the two fields
no longer fits with the current state of globalization or with modern
intervention by countries in terms of regulating private market activities,
adding a public component or public-interest component to private business
law.103 The conceptualization of the relationship between private and public
international law and of the role of private international law is in a state of
evolution, too, because of these changes in world realities. It is becoming
clear that private international law of a narrow character cannot properly
address modern challenges in an increasingly interconnected world.104 It has
been noted that while international disputes in the past were largely limited
to regional relations among close legal systems, the discourse has become
truly global in recent decades.' 05 Therefore, private international law should
not be perceived as a mere system of technical rules regarding the proper
forum, law, and the facilitation of recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments.1 06 Furthermore, private international law should not insulate itself
and attempt to regulate private interactions separately from the broader
international order, as such isolation obscures the operation of private power
in the global political economy.1 07
102. See, e.g., Michaels, supra note 83, at 121-22 (discussing the recent trend toward merging
the fields of private and public international law); Spiermann, supra note 83, at 793-94 ("The
'internationalist' school according to which private international law was part and parcel of public
international law still claimed many followers in early 20th century theory."). See generally ALEX
MILLS, THE CONFLUENCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009) (challenging the
distinction normally drawn between public and private international law by exploring the ways in
which the former shapes, and is given effect by, the latter).
103. See, e.g., Michaels, supra note 83, at 122-23 (discussing how the distinction between
private and public international law has become less clear).
104. Kotuby, supra note 15, at 411-12.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 412 (arguing that private international law should have an interest and a
meaningful role to play in identifying and ensuring compliance with general international principles
regarding the way transnational disputes are resolved).
107. See Cutler, supra note 88, at 279 ("[T]he public/private distinction operates ideologically
to obscure the operation of private power in the global political economy.").
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There are also growing overlaps and intersections of the roles of each
field in practice. Thus, public international law shows a rising interest in
economic relations, and multinational corporations and individuals are no
longer outside its remit.108 It has also been noted that public international law
is becoming domesticated and more technical. 10 9 Importantly, the result of
increasing intersections and overlaps between private and public
international law has been a gradual expansion of the role and scope of
private international law." 0 Thus, many of the tasks of private international
law, for example, its dealing with recent problems of sovereign state
insolvency, might have previously been viewed as belonging to public
international law."'
Movement towards the internationalization of private international law
has been apparent for some time with the conclusion of treaties and other
international instruments in recent years on matters of jurisdiction, choice of
law, and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments."2 This trend has
coincided with the internationalization of national economies and their
increased interdependence. Internationalization can also be seen in the rise of
international commercial law and its development from the early stages of
the Merchant Law to modern legal orders on a transnational scale." 3
International organizations have been playing a significant part. For example,
UNCITRAL has been charged with the task of coordinating global law
reform to support international trade." 4 In this gradual reunification of
private and public international law, private international law is not
108. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90
CALIF. L. REV. 1823, 1826 (2002) (discussing the need for a coherent theory of compliance given
international law's increased pertinence to global economic and business relations).
109. Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International Law Is
Domestic (or, the European Way of Law), 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 327, 327 (2006).
110. Michaels, supra note 83, at 123.
111. Id. at 137.
112. See generally Regulation 2015/848, 2015 O.J. (L 141) 19 (EU) (recognizing that an
international agreement is necessary to effectuate cross-border insolvency proceedings); Council
Regulation 1215/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1, 3 (EU) (promulgating rules and principles for
jurisdictional issues and for the recognition and enforcement of judgments in international civil and
commercial matters); U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-
BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION, U.N. Sales No.
E.14.V.2 (2014) (identifying as its purpose the provision of "effective mechanisms for dealing with
cases of cross-border insolvency"); THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW,
https://www.hcch.net/ [https://perma.cc/7RG9-42PS].
113. Harold J. Berman, The Law of International Commercial Transactions, 2 EMORY J. INT'L
DIsP. RESOL. 235, 243 (1988). For a summary of these developments, see Rosalind Mason, Cross-
Border Insolvency and Legal Transnationalisation, 21 INT'L INSOLV. REV. 105, 108-12 (2012).
114. See G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI), at 8 (Dec. 16, 1966) (directing UNCITRAL to engage in a




swallowed by or fully merged with public international law. Rather, its role
and scope are augmented.1 5
B. Substantive and International Impact of Cross-Border Insolvency
The increased role of private international law and the relevance of
public-international-law sources to the mission of private international law
should be highlighted more in the context of cross-border insolvency. A
broad internationalist approach assigned to private international law is
particularly justified in the field of insolvency where private and public
interests intersect: insolvency law is considered "meta-law.""1 6 Insolvency
principles are closely linked to fundamental public policy and social goals,
and insolvency outcomes can impact the economy and the wider public.1 1 7
Cross-border insolvency law is not merely procedural but also affects
substantive rights, even where it is mainly confined to the harmonization of
private international laws pertaining to insolvency.1 18 Through a cross-border
insolvency framework, it is possible to enforce a collective insolvency
process on the global level, including by requiring the transfer of assets to the
central proceedings and imposing additional duties and requirements
regarding the conduct of such proceedings with the important substantive
result of equitable treatment of creditors wherever located. Cross-border
insolvency can also do more than connect national legal systems. It can
engage in the identification of best practices and in the formulation of
international standards, and it can prevent financial collapse. 119
Cross-border insolvency is of a true international nature, as many cases
of general default involve multinational enterprises with branches and
subsidiaries spanning multiple countries. The way a court or authority in one
country handles international insolvency cases often has significant
implications across borders in numerous jurisdictions, affecting a broad range
of stakeholders. As aforementioned, the administration of cross-border
115. Michaels, supra note 83, at 137-38; see also Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and
Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of Private International Law in an Era of
Globalization, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209, 219-20 (2002) (describing the doctrinal reforms
in private international law).
116. Manfred Balz, The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, 70 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 485, 486 (1996).
117. The claim that insolvency law's role is merely procedural and should be confined to the
respect of pre-acquired rights through orderly distribution of the estate has been strongly rejected
by proponents of the "traditionalist" approach. See generally Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987). Cf Thomas H. Jackson, Translating Assets and Liabilities to the
Bankruptcy Forum, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 73, 75 (1985) (contending that the traditional approach to
bankruptcy distributes assets in a suboptimal way that is different from how a sole owner would
have them distributed).
118. See BORK, supra note 3, at 17-18, 113-14 (setting out the various procedural and
substantive aspects of insolvency law).
119. WESSELS, supra note 89, at 2-3.
1422 [Vol. 96:1403
2018] Modified Universalism as Customary International Law
insolvencies can also have an impact on the public and the economy at
large. 120 Indeed, international insolvencies and, to an even larger extent,
multinational defaults of financial institutions often not only affect the private
business community but might influence wider public interests and even
threaten the economic and political stability of nation-states.12 1 The collapse
of Lehman Brothers and other institutions during the global financial crisis
are notable examples.122 The insolvency of Hanjin Shipping in 2016, as well,
is an example of how the filing of bankruptcy in one jurisdiction can present
paramount global challenges. There, it was a matter of public interest that the
South Korean proceedings be swiftly recognized so that cargo worth millions
of dollars could resume moving to its various destinations.' 23
The international insolvency regime is a critical component of the
international economic framework. The effective resolution of cross-border
insolvency contributes to international trade and investment, as the United
Nations General Assembly acknowledged when initiating the work in this
field.1 24 Cross-border insolvency of banks and other financial institutions is
also an integral aspect of the global financial system and the architecture of
international financial law.'12 Already, and for several decades now,
transnational actors have been engaged in the creation of standards in
insolvency and the development of frameworks for cross-border insolvency.
Against the backdrop of the general evolution of private international law,
120. See Douglass G. Boshkoff, Some Gloomy Thoughts Concerning Cross-Border
Insolvencies, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 931, 935 (1994) (commenting that "[b]ankruptcy law has become
so important to the national economy that reform no longer can be left to a few academics and
insolvency practitioners").
121. Gaa, supra note 93, at 909.
122. The collapse of Lehman Brothers nearly brought down the world's financial system in
2008. Mevorach, supra note 10, at 194.
123. The former General Counsel for Hanjin Shipping America noted:
When Hanjin Shipping, once the seventh largest container carrier in the world and the
fourth largest container carriers in the transpacific (Asia - U.S. & Canada) trade, filed
for bankruptcy, few believed that a 'too big to fail' organization like Hanjin would not
be given a government bail-out. So, naturally, no one really appreciated the kind of
disruption and losses that would subsequently affect the global supply chain.
Wook Chung, Hanjin Shipping: From the Eye of the Storm and Back, MARINE LOG (Mar. 8, 2017),
http://www.marinelog.com/index.php?option=comk2&view=item&id=25323:hanjin-shipping-
from-the-eye-of-the-storm-and-back&Itemid=230 [https://perma.cc/5J2F-S46U].
124. See G.A. Res. 52/158, 6 (Dec. 15, 1997) (resolving that the UN is "convinced that fair
and internationally harmonized legislation on cross-border insolvency that respects the national
procedural and judicial systems and is acceptable to States with different legal, social and economic
systems would contribute to the development of international trade and investment").
125. See CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 233-34, 319-24 (2015) ("Cross-Border bankruptcy has been largely
operationalized as an outgrowth of domestic (national policy).... [and] authorities have begun to




such work on international frameworks for insolvency should continue to
develop within their broader international context.
C. Separation of Modified Universalism from the Pure Theory of
Universalism
In accordance with its international role, the cross-border insolvency
system should strive to transform modified universalism to an established,
binding CIL. Conceptually, this requires that modified universalism is no
longer regarded as a transitory doctrine linked to pure universalism but rather
a standalone norm. Such conceptual separation is also justified where it is
modified universalism that provides concrete rules fitting with business and
legal realities, thus guiding parties in actual cases. Pure universalism offers
the most viable theoretical model for cross-border insolvency when it
envisages a collective process on the global level encompassing all
stakeholders whose interests are implicated and all assets wherever located.
Yet modified universalism translates the model to a practical approach. 126
Would such conceptual separation risk, however, the further spread and
application of universalism? Arguably, formalizing modified universalism
might make participants more reluctant to follow it. It might be that it is this
humility and modesty attached to modified universalism that allowed it to
grow through "incrementalism." 127 It may be conceived that rather than
making explicit proclamations about the intentions of frameworks and
pointing to concrete international laws, it is better to provide tools that
achieve the same intentions without "scaring off' countries from
participating in the regime.
Yet if modified universalism is eventually transformed to CIL, it can
benefit from the additional advantage that it can operate as a debiasing
mechanism: namely, it can, at least to some extent, address countries'
aversions and reluctance to adhere to modified universalist instruments.
Furthermore, by concealing the justificatory basis (the source) of certain
solutions and focusing on technical results, there is a risk that both the
frameworks' design and the application of the rules they prescribe would be
inconsistent. It is also more difficult to fill in gaps in the system in the absence
of a general, settled norm. Finally, it was perhaps the case in the earlier stages
of development of the cross-border insolvency system that some obscurity
regarding its norms was merited so that frameworks could gain the initial
traction and expand. Yet the cross-border insolvency system has gone
126. See MEVORACH, supra note 12, at 1-48, for a discussion of the evolution of modified
universalism from the theory of pure universalism.
127. John A.E. Pottow, Beyond Carve-Outs and Toward Reliance: A Normative Framework
for Cross-Border Insolvency Choice of Law, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 197, 198 (2014)
(suggesting, however, an independent normative theory for choice of law based on modified
universalism); John A.E. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International
Bankruptcy, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 935, 939 (2005).
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through significant development, and the main cross-border insolvency
instrument (the Model Law) has been adopted in a significant number of
countries. It is now, therefore, time to stabilize the system further, including
through greater clarity about its underlying norms and their legal status.
Such separation and the use of CIL as a source for cross-border
insolvency, while requiring that modified universalism is understood and
used as a stand-alone norm, should not cause concern to proponents of
incremental developments in this field. The use of CIL does not preclude
developments. Because it is a source that is flexible and changeable, it can
evolve over time, and it is possible to change or create new CIL to meet the
developing needs of nations.
V. Transformation: Modified Universalism Becoming CIL
A. Evidence of a General Practice Accepted as Law
Modified universalist approaches are already widespread in practice.
Modified universalism seems to have generally guided the key existing
frameworks for cross-border insolvency. These frameworks, in particular the
Model Law, have been applied quite successfully by participating
countries.128 This practice is also not confined to a few specific jurisdictions,
although it is undoubtedly more paramount in certain countries and regions.
It is also not limited to specific entities, though a modified universalist
practice is less established with regard to multinational enterprise groups and
financial institutions.' 29 The usage of cross-border insolvency protocols and
the increased cooperation between courts and between insolvency
representatives in cross-border insolvencies are also demonstrations of a
modified universalist practice.' 3 0
128. See Irit Mevorach, On the Road to Universalism: A Comparative and Empirical Study of
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 12 EUR. BUs. ORG. L. REV. 517, 550
(2011) (showing that the Model Law has been implemented and applied by countries in quite a
universalist manner); see also Jay L. Westbrook, An Empirical Study of the Implementation in the
United States of the Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247, 268 (2013)
(showing the success of the Model Law's application in the United States).
129. See, e.g., Mevorach, supra note 10, at 184 (noting that the Model Law does not specifically
address international financial institutions); see also Barbara C. Matthews, Prospects for
Coordination and Competition in Global Finance, 104 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 289, 291-92
(2010) (identifying some convergence of key rules pertaining to the resolution of banks that may
amount to CIL but also noting the gap in the cross-border resolution system).
130. It was already suggested in the Nineties that cross-border insolvency Concordats and
cross-border insolvency agreements, which aim to create close cooperation and the centralization
of the process in a lead forum, are likely to become evidence of an international customary norm.
David H. Culmer, The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat and Customary International Law: Is It
Ripe Yet?, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 563, 564 (1999); see also Gaa, supra note 93, at 882 (asking whether
developments in the area should continue by way of the evolving international common law of
1425
Texas Law Review
Yet for modified universalism to finally transform from an emerging to
an established CIL, it is crucial that its application by relevant actors is
generally pervasive and consistent. Hesitancy, contradiction, or fluctuation
in invoking and applying the norm can undermine and ultimately negate the
identification of CIL. Furthermore, the norm should be accepted as law.
Thus, CIL might be disproved where it can be shown that participants who
followed modified universalism were not motivated by a legal duty and acted
in the belief that their acts amount to customary law. It has been argued, for
example, regarding the concept of international comity, that "[a]t best, it is
only incidental that some civil-law systems arrive at results comparable to
the decisions of U.S. courts." 131 Regarding cross-border insolvency, it can be
argued that because decisions or actions taken in this field are often either not
explicitly based on modified universalism or are based on modified
universalism as a broad approach linked to independent domestic common
law developments,' 32 its usage is in fact a demonstration of a tradition-but
not of CIL.
To establish modified universalism as autonomous CIL and make the
identification of CIL more plausible, clear pronouncements are needed that
can show a consistent acceptance of modified universalism and the
application of the norm in accordance with international law. Of primary
importance is how countries address cross-border insolvency, especially
influential countries (including emerging cross-border insolvency "hubs"13 3 )
that are more often affected by the norm and have the chance to interact with
other state-actors and shape the norm in the process. State-actors' actions
matter also when they proclaim intentions and act in international fora,
including when deliberating on international instruments or other
mechanisms in the form of hard or soft law, as such actions can demonstrate
a crystallization of CIL. Existing international frameworks for cross-border
bankruptcy or whether states should take the initiative to negotiate treaties identifying the applicable
law).
131. Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 35 (1991). Comity may
be described as "the deference of one nation to the legislative, executive, and judicial acts of
another-not as an obligation, but as a courtesy serving international duty and convenience." David
Farmer, Chapter 15: Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases, 18 HAw. BAR J., Oct. 2015, at 14,
16.
132. See, for example, the restrictive application of modified universalism by the U.K. Supreme
Court in Rubin v. Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46 [16], [2013] 1 AC 236 (appeal taken from Eng.)
("[T]here has been a trend, but only a trend, to what is called universalism .... "), and the Court's
narrow interpretation in Hooley Ltd. v. Victoria Jute Co. [2016] CSOH 141 [36] (Scot.) (holding
that the Scottish court would refuse to defer to India's insolvency process).
133. Notably, Singapore is "a key hub for cross-border restructuring and insolvency." Kannan
Ramesh, Jud. Comm'r, Sup. Ct. of Sing., Speech at the INSOL International Group of 36 Meeting:
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insolvency have been somewhat obscure regarding the approach they are
following, 134 and thus there is room for clearer pronunciations in instruments
of the universal application of modified universalism, intended for general
adherence.
How the key players of cross-border insolvency (bankruptcy courts and
other implementing institutions, especially in countries most influential in
this field) refer to and apply norms of modified universalism is also crucial
and could matter beyond the creation of precedent within the jurisdiction, as
it can influence and form CIL. Such actors when reaching decisions in line
with modified universalism could proclaim the intention of following its
prescribed solutions more explicitly and as a matter of obligation. Especially
where provisions in instruments are insufficient to address all aspects of a
given issue or where the country is not a party to an international framework,
modified universalism norms become most relevant. In such cases, instead
of, for example, solely relying on inherent discretionary powers in the legal
system to assist foreign courts, or grounding decisions on notions such as
comity that are often vague and confined to specific countries,135 courts could
explicitly refer to modified universalism as the guiding international law and,
in the process, establish the acceptance of modified universalism as CIL.
At various times, American courts have reached universalist decisions
based primarily on the Model Law, but also on the principle of international
comity enshrined in chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code (the American
version of the Model Law). In the case of In re Daebo,13 6 for example, the
bankruptcy judge, referring also to In re Atlas Shipping A/S, 137 noted that
"Chapter 15 'contemplates that the court should be guided by principles of
comity and cooperation with foreign courts in deciding whether to grant the
foreign representative additional post-recognition relief."' 138 Relying on the
comity principle, the court then granted certain relief to the foreign Korean
rehabilitation proceedings and vacated attachments pursuant to the Korean
134. For example, the preamble to the Model Law states that its purpose is to "provide effective
mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency," but there is no specific reference to
modified universalism, namely to a regime that aims to provide a global approach to multinational
default, modified to fit business structures. U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL
MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND
INTERPRETATION, U.N. Sales No. E.14.V.2 (2014).
135. See Kevin J. Beckering, United States Cross-Border Corporate Insolvency: The Impact of
Chapter 15 on Comity and the New Legal Environment, 14 LAW & Bus. REV. AM. 281, 281 (2008)
(describing comity as an "impediment" to attaining unification in the area of cross-border
insolvency); John J. Chung, In re Qimonda AG: The Conflict Between Comity and the Public Policy
Exception in Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, 32 B.U. INT'L L.J. 89, 96, 104 (2014) (describing
comity as an "amorphous concept" that courts have struggled to define).
136. In re Daebo Int'l Shipping Co., 543 B.R. 47 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015).
137. 404 B.R. 726 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
138. In re Daebo, 543 B.R. at 53 (quoting In re Atlas, 404 B.R. at 738). Chapter 15 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code refers to the principle of comity in 1507(b) and 1509.
1427
Texas Law Review
stay of actions concerning the company's assets. This decision was in line
with modified universalism norms regarding recognition, cooperation, and
relief, yet modified universalism was not mentioned explicitly as the
applicable norm.
In future cases of this kind, judges could, in addition to applying
domestic concepts of international comity, and especially where technical
statutory rules require reinforcement or a separate justificatory force, refer
explicitly to modified universalist norms that require uniform adherence, thus
contributing to the transformation of them into CIL. The fact that powerful
nations such as the United States have adopted international instruments,
especially the Model Law, should not be a factor working against modified
universalism becoming CIL; rather, this development should be a catalyst for
making the norms that such instruments pursue more widespread. The
inclination could be to just rely on provisions of instruments as adopted
locally and refrain from considering norms beyond the instruments, 13 9 thus
impeding the use of modified universalism as an international norm. Yet by
appreciating the role of key actors as creators of international law and the
potential of modified universalism to become universal, international law that
transcends local differences can help overcome such tendencies.
Decisions of international tribunals could contribute to entrenching
modified universalism as CIL as well, if they pronounce modified
universalism norms more explicitly. In a case that reached the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU), MG Probud Gdynia,'40 for example,
it was not clear whether the German authorities could order enforcement
measures regarding assets of the company situated in Germany (where a
Polish company had a branch), in circumstances where the main proceedings
were taking place in Poland. 14' The CJEU concluded that the German
authorities erred in their attempt to impose such local enforcement
measures. 142 The court noted the universality of the main Polish proceedings
based on the provisions of the EIR. 14 3 It further stated, also citing
Eurofood,14 4 that pursuant to the EIR provisions and recitals, proceedings
opened in a member state must be recognized and be given effect in all other
member states. 14 5 This rule, the court explained, "is based on the principle of
139. See, e.g., In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit, 374 B.R. 122, 132 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff'd, 389 B.R. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that there is no residual common law
discretion under chapter 15).
140. Case C-444/07, 2010 E.C.R. 1-0417.
141. Id. at1 16-20.
142. Id. at 44.
143. Id. at 43.
144. Case C-341/04, 2006 E.C.R. I-3813.
145. Case C-444/07, MG Probud Gdynia, 2010 E.C.R. 1-0417, 27 (citing Case C-341/04,
Eurofood IFSC Ltd., 2006 E.C.R. I-3813).
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mutual trust." 146 Mutual trust is certainly a core notion that facilitated the
establishment of the compulsory cross-border insolvency system within the
EU.1 47 The premise of mutual trust in the administration of justice in the EU
requires giving full faith and credit to courts of other member states.148 Like
comity, however, mutual trust is a vague concept, 14 9 and its justificatory force
is limited." 0 It is also confined in the EIR context to relationships between
states within the region."' Conversely, a reference to modified universalism
could both provide concrete justification for the decision to require that full
effect be given to the foreign main proceedings and contribute to the
transformation of modified universalism to CIL.
The transformation of modified universalism to CIL may not take too
long in view of the already existing widespread practice in this direction and
the extensive traction that norms of modified universalism have gained in
recent years. What is required is not taking a big leap to pure universalism
but settling on the norms of modified universalism. Certainly, to develop the
norms into CIL requires that countries and implementing institutions have
opportunities to interact. Yet cross-border insolvency cases are not a rare
phenomenon. Changes in political powers and shifts of economic centers also
mean that country interaction is likely to spread more, creating a critical mass
and concentration of activity conducive to CIL. It is important to note,
however, the evolutionary nature of CIL and hence the fact that the work on
its transformation and further development is a process: "The customary
process is in fact a continuous one, which does not stop when the rule has
emerged .... Even after the rule has 'emerged,' every act of compliance will
strengthen it, and every violation, if acquiesced in, will help to undermine
it."' 52 Furthermore, the notion of elevating modified universalism to the
status of CIL should not be understood as a replacement of international
146. Id.
147. Regulation 2015/848, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on
Insolvency Proceedings, 2015 O.J. (L 141) 19, 26 (EU) ("The recognition of judgments delivered
by the courts of the Member States should be based on the principle of mutual trust."); Case C-
444/07, MG Probud Gdynia, 2010 E.C.R. I-0417, 28; Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd., 2006
E.C.R. 1-3813, 39.
148. See also Matthias Weller, Mutual Trust: In Search of the Future of European Union
Private International Law, 11 J. OF PRIV. INT'L L. 64, 68 (2015) (referring to mutual trust as a
"rather opaque, yet almost omnipresent buzzword ... ").
149. WESSELS, supra note 89, at 46.
150. Weller, supra note 148, at 101 ("The justificatory force of mutual trust is limited. Using
mutual trust as legal fiction does not work, at least not beyond the point reached in the system.").
151. See Christoph G. Paulus, The ECJ's Understanding of the Universality Principle, 27
INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE 70, 71 (2014) ("[T]he European legislator's power to regulate issues
of insolvency is confined to membership relationships within the EU .... ").
152. Maurice H. Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, in 272 RECUEIL




negotiations and deliberations that attempt to improve the written
instruments. 153 To the contrary, creating and guarding modified universalism
as an international custom should facilitate such negotiations because of the
behavioral force of CIL and its ability to shift the reference point of actors
regarding universalism. Vice versa, the development of regional and
international frameworks can further define and develop the CIL rules.
B. Use of CIL in Future Cross-Border Insolvencies
Modified universalism established as CIL can promote a wider coverage
and a more consistent application of the norms. As noted above, there are still
important gaps in the cross-border insolvency system, including participation
in the main international framework for cross-border insolvency (the Model
Law) and the entities and issues covered by international instruments. 154
Modified universalism, standing on its own two feet, emerging as CIL, can
assist in closing such gaps in the complex international system." The
pervasiveness of CIL as an international legal source is an important
advantage where modified universalism requires universality and full
coverage of the market (market symmetry15 6 ). Once CIL has become
prevalent, countries are bound by it regardless of whether they have codified
the laws domestically or through treaties unless they have actively objected
to it. Thus, while more action through the recognition of the international role
of cross-border insolvency is important, it is enough that modified
universalism is practiced generally and especially by influential economies
and transnational actors. Countries (and their implementing institutions) that
are more averse to change will still become party to a system based on
modified universalism.
In practical terms, this means, for example, that in future cases involving
countries that have not (1) taken action to adopt the Model Law, (2) ensured
that the Model Law, where enacted, actually becomes effective in the
jurisdiction, (3) become a party to any other international instrument that
153. For example, see the ongoing deliberations of UNCITRAL Working Group V on the
design of model laws on recognition and enforcement of insolvency-related judgments and on the
cross-border insolvency of multinational enterprise groups. U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Rep.
of Working Group V (Insolvency Law) on the Work of Its Fifty-Second Session, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/931 (Jan. 15, 2018), http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/workinggroups
/5lnsolvency.html [https://perma.cc/B43H-K2VZ].
154. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
155. Cf Guzman, supra note 17, at 119 n.17 (explaining that, even though bilateral treaties
dominate the foreign investments legal regime, many investments are not covered by these treaties,
yet the legal rules included in the treaties seem to have become CIL and, therefore, are generally
more universally binding).
156. See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 2283 (explaining the importance of market symmetry-
the idea that bankruptcy systems in a legal regime cover all transactions and stakeholders within
that market-to cross-border insolvency).
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follow modified universalism, or (4) enacted rules that otherwise facilitate
global collective insolvencies, such countries will still be expected to follow
modified universalism. It will also be possible to rely on uniform norms of
cross-border insolvency rather than invoke domestic mechanisms when, for
example, recognition, relief, or assistance is sought in a foreign jurisdiction.
Such norms may be invoked by foreign actors15 7 in the court or other body
presiding over the process. If the norms are rejected by the relevant
institution, the rejection may be regarded as a breach of international law.
Provisions in international instruments, too, would apply to countries not
party to the framework to the extent that the framework reflects the rules of
CIL. Thus, even where a framework does not bind certain countries, its
provisions may form part of the global legal order of insolvency.
The use of CIL can overcome outdated notions of comity and reciprocity
and equalize the treatment of foreign proceedings and the approach to foreign
requests-for example, in a country such as South Africa, which has adopted
the Model Law but has not given effect to its provisions. 158 CIL can also assist
when taking actions in cross-border insolvencies in countries such as China,
which has not adopted the Model Law. Recognition and enforcement in
China of foreign insolvency proceedings are conditioned on the existence of
a relevant international treaty, in addition to other requirements such as that
the insolvency proceeding shall not jeopardize the sovereignty and security
of the state or public interests. 15 9 This specific domestic cross-border
insolvency regime that was introduced in China in 2006 was still an obstacle
to the smooth administration of cross-border insolvencies. For example, in
litigation in the context of the cross-border insolvency of Lehman Brothers,
a Chinese court considered that proceedings opened in the UK should not be
given effect in China (with regard to property situated in China) because of
a lack of reciprocity, as China did not have a relevant arrangement with the
UK. 160 Going forward, where modified universalism is applied as CIL,
157. Foreign actors may be state as well as non-state actors. Indeed, both may be subject to the
rights and obligations of international law as the scope of international law has been expanded.
Specifically, CIL is increasingly invoked by non-state actors. For a discussion of the increasing role
of non-state actors in the realm of international law, see Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran,
Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging Armed Groups in the Creation of International
Humanitarian Law, 37 YALE J. INT'L L. 107, 112-25 (2012).
158. South Africa included a reciprocity condition requiring it to designate relevant countries
that could invoke the Model Law's provisions, yet such designation never took place. Cross-Border
Insolvency Act 42 of 2000 2 (S. Afr.); see also RH Zulman, Cross-Border Insolvency in South
African Law, 21 S. AFR. MERCANTILE L.J. 804, 816-17 (2009) (noting that comity and reciprocity
enshrined in the South African version of the Model Law are outmoded and not in conformity with
modern thinking on the subject).
159. Zhong hua ren min gong he guo qi ye po chan fa ( A Q Q)
[Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 27, 2006, effective June 1, 2007), art. 5.
160. Xinyi Gong, To Recognise or Not To Recognise? Comparative Study of Lehman Brothers
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foreign insolvency representatives should be able to invoke it and attempt
recognition and enforcement to promote a collective global approach in the
foreign main forum, including in such circumstances where the relevant
country is not a party to uniform frameworks and so long as it is not a
persistent objector to the CIL regime.
As aforementioned, CIL also plays a role regulating within the gaps of
treaties or other instruments. For example, based on modified universalism's
norm of cooperation, courts and other authorities would have the authority
and the duty to cooperate and communicate, including where the debtor is an
entity that is not explicitly covered under existing instruments. The case of
Lehman Brothers161 is illustrative. In this case, cooperation was achieved
because of the participants' initiative and voluntary will, yet this cooperation
was constrained. 162 The enterprise type and structure (i.e., the fact that
Lehman Brothers was a multinational financial institution/enterprise group)
resulted in aspects of the case falling outside the scope of existing
instruments. 163 Where modified universalism is recognized as CIL,
cooperation would become a universal legal requirement, including for the
purpose of reaching efficient centralized solutions for more complicated
enterprise structures. 164
As modified universalism established as CIL is flexible enough to
accommodate changing conditions, it can also be invoked regarding newer
types of processes and procedures that may not be covered in written
instruments. The shift in the focus of insolvency procedures from formal
Cases in Mainland China and Taiwan, 10 INT'L CORP. RESCUE 240, 241 (2013). The court reached
this conclusion even though the UK has adopted the Model Law and therefore would be required to
recognize foreign insolvencies pursuant to the terms of the instrument. See id. at 242 (asserting that
Article 5 of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law grants outbound universal effect to insolvency
proceedings initiated in China and that this might be recognized in the UK pursuant to the Model
Law, which does not condition recognition by reciprocity).
161. In re Lehman Bros. Int'l (Eur.) [2011] EWHC (Ch) 2022, [2011] All ER 273 (Eng.).
162. See Paul L. Davies, Resolution of Cross-Border Groups, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE BANKING SECTOR 261, 263-64 (Matthias Haentjens & Bob Wessels
eds., 2015) (discussing how both the U.S. and the U.K. took unilateral action in the bailouts of non-
national entities, including Lehman Brothers, in order to protect national interests); James M. Peck,
Cross-Border Observations Derived from My Lehman Judicial Experience, 30 BUTTERWORTHS J.
INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 131, 132 (2015) (explaining that cross-border conflicts and self-interested
behaviors in the context of the Lehman insolvencies were unavoidable).
163. Mevorach, supra note 10, at 191 (explaining that the general cross-border Model Law for
insolvency lacked sufficient measures to address the Lehman insolvency and that no specific
cross-border framework exists for international financial institutions).
164. Since the fall of Lehman Brothers, UNCITRAL has been developing model provisions
concerning enterprise groups (deliberations were ongoing at the time this Article went to print).
U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Working Group V (Insolvency Law), Facilitating the
Cross-Border Insolvency of Multinational Enterprise Groups: Draft Legislative Provisions, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/WG/V/WP.158 (Feb. 26, 2018). Thus, going forward, CIL may address gaps in the
new regime including in terms of its universal application pending wide enactment by countries.
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liquidations to rescue-oriented and various informal processes, including in
the time approaching insolvency where there is likelihood of insolvency or
financial difficulties, is an example of such changes in the practice of
insolvency that instruments may be slow to capture. 165 However, modified
universalism norms can be invoked regarding interim, out-of-court, or pre-
insolvency procedures even where they are not covered within the scope of
cross-border domestic laws or international instruments. An example of such
an approach is the decision of the Singapore court in the Gulf Pacific
Shipping case.166 In this case, the court, based on "internationalist concerns,"
decided to recognize the appointment of liquidators over Hong Kong
shipping company Gulf Pacific and grant the requested assistance, despite
the debtor being in out-of-court proceedings regarding which the domestic
powers of assistance were constrained. 167
Furthermore, to the extent that CIL does not contradict special treaty
law, it can override conflicting laws in civil law countries and will be
considered part and parcel of the public policy in common law jurisdictions
where legislation is to be construed in a manner that would avoid a conflict
with the international norm. Thus, modified universalism understood as CIL
can provide the separate, sui generic basis and justification for the uniform
private international laws based on global collectivity. Any ordinary
domestic private international laws could sit alongside the cross-border
insolvency CIL regime rather than be considered in conflict with it in the
given circumstances. Thus, in future cases with circumstances of the type
arising, for example, in Rubin-where the existing cross-border insolvency
instrument might not provide a clear answer (in that case, regarding the
question of enforcement of insolvency-related judgments of the main
insolvency forum) 168-the foreign insolvency representative would be able
to rely on modified universalism as an international norm. 16 9 Such an
165. See, e.g., Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Preventive Restructuring Frameworks, Second Chance and Measures to Increase the Efficiency of
Restructuring, Insolvency and Discharge Procedures and Amending Directive 2012/30/EU, at 28,
COM (2016) 723 final (Nov. 22, 2016) (attempting to harmonize aspects related to preventive
restructuring proceedings in EU member states).
166. [2016] SGHC 287 at [6] [(HC, S'pore)] (unreported) (recognizing the foreign proceedings
and allowing the liquidators to obtain information regarding a closed bank account of the company).
167. Id. at [10].
168. Rubin v. Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46 [91], [2013] 1 AC 236 (appeal taken from
Eng.).
169. Since Rubin, UNCITRAL has been developing a model law on the enforcement of
insolvency-related judgments (deliberations were ongoing at the time this Article went to print).
U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Rep. on the Work of Working Group V (Insolvency Law) on its
Fifty-Second Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/931, Annex, Draft Model Law on Cross-Border
Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments at 16 (Jan. 15, 2018); U.N.
Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Working Group V (Insolvency Law), Recognition and Enforcement
of Insolvency-Related Judgments: Draft Model Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG/V/WP.156
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outcome was unattainable in the Rubin case, and the request to enforce the
judgment of the central foreign court was denied because modified
universalism was applied as a general principle of common law subject to the
domestic private international law regime. 17 0 In other circumstances, courts
may be asked, for example, to give full effect to a foreign stay on actions
concerning the assets of the enterprise, instead of (as happened in Pan
Ocean171) apply domestic ipso facto rules that allow them to terminate
contracts, thus undermining the collectivity of the cross-border insolvency
process. 172 Similarly, courts could be asked to recognize transactions already
approved by foreign main reorganization proceedings, instead of (as
happened, e.g., in Elpida173 ) applying the domestic rules concerning asset
sales.174 The application of the domestic rule can undeniably delay the
process, as well as provide local creditors an unjustified chance to challenge
the sale, undermining the norm of a global, nondiscriminatory approach
prescribed by modified universalism.
Modified universalism based on CIL could also serve to influence
international instruments. It could reinforce technical rules where the
instrument refers to the rules of CIL. Currently, requirements in cross-border
insolvency frameworks, for example, cooperation "to the maximum extent
possible," 175 could be understood in different ways. They could be interpreted
in a universalist manner, suggesting obligatory cooperation to achieve
universality within the parameters of modified universalism. Yet they could
also be understood as suggesting cooperative territorialism, namely self-
serving cooperation, that promotes local interests in the case at hand while
still allowing, for example, ring-fencing of assets if that appears to be in the
interests of national stakeholders. The lack of clear statements concerning the
level of universalism that should be followed also renders proclamations of
objectives-such as effectiveness, efficiency, or fairness, stated as the aims
of cross-border insolvency systems 176-open to interpretation and variation
(Feb. 19, 2018). Thus, going forward, CIL may assist in closing gaps in the new regime, including
in terms of its universal application pending wide enactment by countries.
170. Rubin v. Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46 [177], [2013] 1 AC 236 (appeal taken from
Eng.).
171. Pan Ocean Co. v. Fibria Celulose S/A [2014] EWHC (Civ) 2124, [2014] All ER 03 (Eng.).
172. Id.
173. In re Elpida Memory, Inc., No. 12-10947, 2012 WL 6090194 (Bankr. D. Del.
Nov. 16, 2012).
174. Id. at *8-9.
175. U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE L., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER
INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION 13, U.N. Sales No. E.14.V.2
(2014).
176. Id. at 3. The Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency promotes several objectives:
Cooperation between the courts and other competent authorities of this State and
foreign States involved in cases of cross-border insolvency; [g]reater legal certainty
for trade and investment; [flair and efficient administration of cross-border
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in the cross-border context. Thus, fairness and efficiency may be viewed
from a vested-rights, territorial perspective or from a global, universalist
perspective. Going forward, CIL can be used to ensure a consistent
application of objectives and requirements enshrined in frameworks in line
with modified universalism. Modified universalism based on CIL can also
provide specific substance to requirements to interpret instruments by having
regard to their "international origin.""177
Conclusion
Lessons from international law, as well as insights from cognitive
psychology of decision-making, highlight the advantages that can be gained
from modified universalism conceptualized and formed as CIL. Modified
universalism recognized as CIL could fill gaps and promote consistency in
the application of regional and international frameworks. Furthermore, a
modified universalist CIL can assist in the areas where biases impede
movement to more optimal solutions. If the rules of modified universalism
are generally conceived as CIL, modified universalism will be the default
universal rule, embraced as an opt-out regime, and adherence to it would not
require positive action from all participants. Such use of legislative framing
can affect the consequences of inaction and can result in higher participation,
with greater universality and integrity, in the application of modified
universalism. In this respect, it is important that the role of cross-border
insolvency is reinforced. Indeed, as a private international law system, it has
international objectives to pursue. Private international law generally is
increasingly being reunited with the international law system, and its role is
augmenting. The international nature of cross-border insolvency and the fact
that insolvency addresses both private and public interests further justify the
solidification of its international role. Thus, cross-border insolvency law
should engage in international norm creation and, in that regard, could rely
on modified universalism where it provides concrete and practical rules that
can be followed consistently. Key actors, importantly courts and other
authorities presiding over cross-border insolvency cases-as well as
regulators, policy makers, and international organizations engaged in
international insolvency law making-should be less context-dependent and
insolvencies that protects the interests of all creditors and other interested persons,
including the debtor; [p]rotection and maximization of the value of the debtor's assets;
and [f]acilitation of the rescue of financially troubled businesses, thereby protecting
investment and preserving employment.
Id.
177. See, e.g., id. at 5 ("[R]egard is to be had to [this law's] international origin and to the need
to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith."); see also Jay L.
Westbrook, Interpretation Internationale, 87 TEMP. L. REv. 739, 750-51 (2015) (arguing that
"system" texts that establish an international framework require an international rather than an
insular interpretation).
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should perceive their roles more broadly, considering public international law
sources and mechanisms for creating and enhancing international
obligations.
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A New Approach to Executory Contracts
John A.E. Pottow*
I. Introduction and Summary
Few topics have bedeviled the bankruptcy community as much as the
proper treatment of executory contracts under 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.'
The case law is "hopelessly convoluted" and a "bramble-filled thicket." 2
While many have struggled in the bootless task of providing coherence to the
unwieldy corpus of case law and commentary, all would agree Jay Westbrook
has been at the modern vanguard of this Sisyphean task.3 (I assign Westbrook
to the "modern" forefront, thereby relegating Vern Countryman, whose
legacy in this domain rightly persists, to the annals of history, choosing as
my perhaps arbitrary dividing line the adoption of the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code.) 4
Why have executory contracts proved so nettlesome? Under the Code,
a large part of the damage is self-inflicted, resulting from unfortunate drafting
that begat an ever-accumulating snowball of confused jurisprudence.5 But
there is also a salience bias (vividness bias, really) at work of
disproportionate focus on the striking plight of the contractual counterparty
who is aggrieved when a debtor deploys executory-contract rights under
365-rights that accord the debtor certain powers in dealing with executory
contracts otherwise unavailable at state law. (This bias underestimates the
baseline unhappiness that bankruptcy inflicts upon all creditors equally and
fairly.) Westbrook has relatedly noted that courts in their struggle to do equity
under the Code sometimes resist these executory-contract powers.6 In doing
* The author thanks Conor McNamara, Michigan JD class of 2018, for research assistance. He also
thanks Asher Steinberg, as well as all participants in the symposium (too many of whom to list here
generously gave me specific comments).
1. 11 U.S.C. 365 (2012).
2. Cohen v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc.),
138 B.R. 687, 690 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citations omitted).
3. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A FunctionalAnalysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN.
L. REV. 227, 239 (1989).
4. 11 U.S.C. 101 (2012). See generally Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 442-44 (1973) [hereinafter Countryman I] (propounding
a seminal test).
5. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
6. Jay Lawrence Westbrook & Kelsi Stayart White, The Demystification of Contracts in
Bankruptcy, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 481, 510-11 (2017) ("The problem with wild cards is that
chance-sometimes found under the mask of equity-can favor either player.").
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so, they gravitate to the textual restriction of 365 to "executory" contracts.7
Skeptical courts frequently conclude that a contract is not "executory"-and
therefore cannot fall under 365-to deny relief that strikes these courts as
unseemly. Indeed, a judicial cottage industry in bankruptcy has developed on
the definition of "executoriness" and concomitant scope of access to 365.8
Countryman gets first credit for tackling the definitional challenge of
what it means for a contract to be "executory" under the prior Bankruptcy
Act. His eponymous test for executoriness is well cited in many opinions and
is otherwise known as the "material breach" test. 9 Westbrook, albeit with
characteristic gentility, upended that doctrinal framework by advocating an
abolition of the concept of executoriness from the Code altogether and
replacing it by (or subsuming it within) a "functional" analysis focused on
debtor economic benefit. 10 His executoriness discussion, started three
decades ago, and especially his back-and-forth on the topic with Michael
Andrew, is canonical bankruptcy scholarship."
The challenges of defining executoriness persist through today. The
recent American Bankruptcy Institute's Commission on the Reform of
Chapter 11 tasked a specific Expert Group to examine the Code's treatment
of executory contracts.12 The Group's first recommendation was to abolish
the requirement of executoriness as a restriction on 365.13 (Yes, Westbrook
was front and center on the group.) The Commission, however, stunned the
insolvency community by not only rejecting the Group's recommendation,
albeit in an apparently divided decision, but doubling down on executoriness:
7. 11 U.S.C. 365(a) (2012) (referencing "executory" contracts).
8. See, e.g., AM. BANKR. INST., COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, 112
(2014) [hereinafter ABI REPORT] ("[C]ourt[s] on a case-by-case basis determine[] whether a
particular contract is executory."); Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 494-95 (noting that "courts
continued to expand the application" of multiple executoriness tests "to more and more kinds of
contracts").
9. Countryman I, supra note 4, at 460.
10. Westbrook, supra note 3, at 230.
11. See generally Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding
"Rejection ", 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845, 849 (1988) [hereinafter Andrew, Rejection] (characterizing
"the election to 'assume or reject' [as] the election to assume or not assume"); Michael T. Andrew,
Executory Contracts Revisited: A Reply to Professor Westbrook, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991)
[hereinafter Andrew, Reply to Westbrook] (noting "contrary views on specific elements
of Westbrook's analysis").
12. See generally ABI REPORT, supra note 8 (outlining "Recommended Principles" for the
treatment of executory contracts in bankruptcy).
13. ADVISORY COMM. ON EXECUTORY CONTRACTS AND LEASES, ABI COMMISSION TO
STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY REGARDING SECTION 365 ISSUES 1
(2013) [hereinafter ABI ADVISORY COMMITTEE] ("The Advisory Committee recommends
eliminating the term 'executory' in favor of adopting the Functional Test which allows the trustee
or debtor in possession. . . to keep beneficial contracts and reject burdensome ones based solely
upon benefit/harm to the estate."), http://commission.abi.org/sites/default/files/ABI-365-Comm-
Overview-Summary_(WEST_34307609_3).DOCX [https://perma.cc/2PH7-GCHJ].
[Vol. 96:14371438
A New Approach to Executory Contracts
it advocated its retention in the Code and the codification of the Countryman
material breach test for definition." In doing so, the Commission noted-
without an apparent whiff of irony-that this decision would allow reliance
on "well developed" case law." To describe the executory-contracts
precedents in bankruptcy as "well developed" (or even "vaguely helpful")
skirts credulity. 16 Were the Commission's recommendations in any danger of
attracting congressional attention, this linguistic legerdemain might be
worrisome, but thankfully the dysfunction of our modern Congress has
ridden to the rescue. Thus, the debate over the role (and very definition) of
"executoriness" in bankruptcy law has not only been rekindled, but appears
to be here to stay.
Acknowledging that the thrust of commentary heeds Westbrook's call
to abolish executoriness as a gatekeeper to the 365 powers,' 7 I want to offer
a novel approach and argue against that grain. Specifically, in this Article I
will suggest not only that the fight should be called off, but that defeat should
be conceded. Executoriness, for better or worse (mostly worse), is here to
stay in the Code. My resignation may seem like Westbrook heresy, but there
is a method to my madness. Here is my key contention: the impulse behind
the resistance to the abolition of executoriness, reflected most recently by the
ABI Commission's intransigence, is at root a reluctance (perhaps conscious,
perhaps not) by elite lawyers to relinquish what they feel is a legal arbitrage
opportunity to combat debtor power. 18 Namely, counterparties believe that
the doctrinal fluidity of the concept of executoriness allows them wide
latitude to argue a contract is executory when such a classification will accord
them legal advantage over the debtor but in the next case argue that a similar
contract is not executory when that contrary label will accord the leg up.1 9 As
such, executoriness's confusion and uncertainty is a feature rather than a bug.
Principled commentators like Westbrook decry this sneakiness,
bemoaning the deadweight litigation loss. A clear, sensible rule defining
executoriness should be established with a defensible normative foundation.
14. ABI REPORT, supra note 8, at 112.
15. Id. at 112, 115 (describing case law as a "valuable resource").
16. See Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 497 ("[T]here was no thorough explanation of the
majority recommendation or how it addresses the courts' frustration with executoriness analysis and
their divergent conclusions.").
17. As far back as 1997, The National Bankruptcy Review Commission recommended deleting
"executory" from 365 to end the executoriness debates. NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N,
BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 454 (1997).
18. Economically, the ambiguity creates more of an option value than an arbitrage because there
are not, of course, two separate markets, but I use arbitrage because I think it better captures the
two-facedness of the evil presented.
19. Beyond the scope of this Article is a formal model of the role of risk aversion addressing
why lawyers do not equally foresee enjoying the benefits of being the debtor's counsel with the
offsetting 365 power they so fear. Loss aversion is likely interacting with the vividness bias.
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Countryman offered one; Westbrook had another.20 My approach sidesteps
this skirmish. Rather than fight on what the definition of executoriness should
be in an effort to wipe out the grey zone, my tack is to blunt the arbitrage
impulse ab initio. The way to do so is by taking seriously how the Code
should treat a non-executory contract, the presumable residual category of a
contract flunking the executoriness test (whatever test is selected). The
treatment of non-executory contracts is woefully undertheorized in
bankruptcy literature, and so I try to fill this unwelcome void. 21 Indeed, cases
where executoriness is litigated simply end after a declaration of non-
executoriness without any rigorous working-through of the consequences. 22
This is regrettable. Treating the structure and policies of the Bankruptcy Code
holistically, I will try to show what should happen to a non-executory
contract in bankruptcy, entirely outside the domain of 365. My conclusion
is that while non-executory contracts may be treated as formally distinct from
executory contracts, their functional outcomes will mimic those of executory
contracts by synthetic replication through other Code provisions. If my
analysis holds and non-executory contracts, while different, garner largely
similar treatment to executory contracts, then the pernicious opportunity for
arbitrage from the executoriness game will collapse.
This Article will proceed as follows. First, it will offer an abbreviated
explanation of the treatment of executory contracts under the Code,
chronicling the development of the concept of executoriness and the
subsequent challenges of its effects. Second, it will explain a new approach
that embraces and makes its peace with executoriness by focusing on the
proper treatment of non-executory contracts. Third, it will address some of
the anticipated counterarguments to the new approach. Finally, it will offer a
quick road test to demonstrate how the new approach would have more easily
resolved a major litigated precedent in this field.
II. The Problem of Executoriness and the Traditional Approach(es)
A. The Genesis of Executoriness and 365
1. The Historical Problem of Provability.-Insolvency systems have
been wrestling with executory-contract rights for quite some time. For
20. Compare infra note 63 and accompanying text (Countryman), with infra note 73 and
accompanying text (Westbrook).
21. "[O]ne rule that could be considered 'well-settled' is that once a contract has been
determined to be 'non-executory,' there are no rules." Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 498.
Even Countryman, whose treatment of executory contracts is encyclopedic, at most indirectly
intimated at the proper treatment of non-executory contracts. See id. at 519 (characterizing
charitably Countryman's treatment of the issue as "implicit").
22. See, e.g., In re Drake, 136 B.R. 325, 328 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992) ("[T]he [a]greement cannot
be deemed executory."); see also Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 499 (collecting cases).
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example, the 1898 Bankruptcy Act sometimes respected so-called ipsofacto
clauses that terminate contracts automatically (ipso facto) upon the
insolvency of a party, 23 an outcome now banned under 365.24 But the origin
of the problems of modern executory contracts has to do with statutory
drafting that addressed a different issue-the now-abolished concept of
provability. Under the Act, only some financial grievances against an
insolvent debtor were "provable," 25 which functioned as a sort of bankruptcy
version of ripeness. Consider, for example, a debtor who ran over someone's
foot. The victim might claim money is owing; the debtor-driver might deny
liability. If no lawsuit had yet been commenced, let alone concluded with a
monetary judgment of a debt owing, then the claim was not provable in the
debtor's bankruptcy proceeding. 26 This could be a mixed blessing. It was
initially bad for the creditors, because they could not participate in the
division of the debtor's assets, but it was sometimes good as well, because if
the debtor survived after bankruptcy (e.g., the debtor was an individual or a
reorganized corporation), then the unprovable claim survived as well,
continuing to haunt the debtor post-discharge. 27 But if the debtor were a
corporation in liquidation, the provability bar was all bad news for the
creditor.
What about contracts? To understand the impact of provability, we first
need to understand what trustees did with contracts, and to understand that,
we need to understand what they did with leases. As remains the case today,
trustees were entitled to all the debtor's property (some would say, "vest in
title," some would say, "control as a mere custodian"), 28 but they were also
23. See, e.g., Irving Tr. Co. v. A.W. Perry, Inc., 293 U.S. 307, 311 (1934) (holding enforceable
a provision that provided the "filing of the petition in bankruptcy was ... a breach of the lease").
Even the old cases bristled at this doctrine and so cabined its reach at every turn. See, e.g., Gazlay
v. Williams, 210 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1908) (holding the ipso facto provision ineffective); see also Vern
Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part II, 58 MINN. L. REV. 479, 522 (1974)
[hereinafter Countryman II] (noting the old Act's "forfeiture provisions . . . are by their terms
confined to leases"). I am leaving aside in this historical discussion the bizarre, now largely buried
doctrine of "anticipatory breach" by bankruptcy. See Cent. Tr. Co. v. Chi. Auditorium Ass'n, 240
U.S. 581, 592 (1916) ("We conclude that proceedings, whether voluntary or involuntary, resulting
in an adjudication of bankruptcy, are the equivalent of an anticipatory breach of an executory
agreement.").
24. 11 U.S.C. 365(e) (2012).
25. See, e.g., Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U.S. 625, 632 (1913) ("[O]nly provable debts are
discharged.").
26. See, e.g., Brown & Adams v. United Button Co., 149 F. 48, 53 (3d Cir. 1906) (holding that
a claim for unliquidated damages that results from the injured property of another is not provable in
bankruptcy).
27. See Countryman I, supra note 4, at 443 ("[U]nder 17a of the Bankruptcy Act only provable
debts are discharged.").
28. 11 U.S.C. 541(a) (2012). While assignees under the Acts vested in the debtor's property
outright, equity receivers (who preceded modern reorganizations) merely controlled debtor property
as custodians. Quincy, Mo. & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Humphreys, 145 U.S. 82, 97 (1892) ("[The equity
2018] 1441
Texas Law Review
free to abandon uneconomical assets.29 The abandonment doctrine applied to
leases of real property as well.30 If the debtor had an ongoing ("unexpired")
lease that was financially burdensome, the trustee could abandon it. Now,
that raised a provability problem, especially when traditional real-property
remedies are considered." Under many states' property law, the rent
covenant stemmed from the realty itself, and so dispossession terminated the
prospective obligation to pay rent. 32 (The separate contractual promise to pay
the rent prospectively, which the trustee might have breached by rejecting the
lease, was a separate problem.) 33 In other words, while the bankruptcy system
could get its head around a claim for unpaid back rent quite well (a debt
owing to the creditor/landlord), it struggled with whether a claim for unpaid
future rent triggered by the trustee's abandonment of an uneconomical long-
term lease was provable, especially when the landlord had possession of the
land returned by the debtor's vacating the premises.
Related uncertainty befell contracts. If the debtor were current on any
invoices, would abandonment ("rejection") of the contract trigger a provable
claim for breach of future expectation loss?34 Case law initially struggled,
much wanting to find that it should.35 Congress tried to clarify the matter,
beginning in 1933, to allow for more widespread provability. Starting with
railroad receivership cases in 77 of the Act (amended two years later), it
allowed for a rejection counterparty to be "deemed. . . a creditor. .. to the
extent of the actual damage or injury." 36 Section 77 begat 77B (extending the
application beyond railroad reorganizations to corporations), which in turn
begat Chapter X in 1938's Chandler Act's more general corporate
reorganization "chapter" provisions. 37
receivers] were ministerial officers, . . . mere custodians.").
29. See Am. File Co. v. Garrett, 110 U.S. 288, 295 (1884) (recognizing the principle based on
historical English practice).
30. See, e.g., Quincy, Mo., 145 U.S. at 102 (applying the abandonment doctrine to a long-term
lease).
31. The provability problem extended to leases of personalty as well. See Countryman I, supra
note 4, at 449-50 n.50 (collecting cases).
32. E.g., William Filene's Sons Co. v. Weed, 245 U.S. 597, 601 (1918) ("Rent issues from the
land.").
33. See Miller v. Irving Tr. Co., 296 U.S. 256, 258 (1935) ("Under the clause in question, it
was, at the time the petition in bankruptcy was filed, uncertain, a mere matter of speculation,
whether any liability ever would arise under it.").
34. The older Acts were more forgiving of contract provability than "pure tort." For example.,
63a(8) allowed for provability of "contingent contractual liabilities," but not tort claims, Schall v.
Comers, 251 U.S. 239, 248-49, 253 (1920), absent reduction to judgment (or implied assumpsit),
Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 331 (1934).
35. See, e.g., Irving Tr. Co. v. A.W. Perry, Inc., 293 U.S. 307, 310-11 (1934) (holding an ipso
facto clause effective to terminate a lease and trigger a provable claim).
36. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 774, 77, 49 Stat. 911, 914 (1935); see also Bankruptcy Act, ch. 204,
77, 47 Stat. 1467, 1474 (1933) (allowing creditors of a railroad to file a petition).
37. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 424, 77B, 48 Stat. 911, 915 (1934) (including "claims under
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Similarly, in the liquidation context, 1934 amendments to the Act's
63a(7) allowed for "claims for damages respecting executory contracts
including future rents," which was rewritten in the Chandler Act for "claims
for anticipatory breach of contracts, executory in whole or in part, including
unexpired leases of real or personal property." 38 These amendments also
resolved what was implicit from the abandonment doctrine: that the trustee
could never be forced to take unwanted property; it was the trustee's election
whether to assume or reject an unexpired lease,3 9 and so Congress provided
that affirmative acknowledgment was required to assume a lease, with the
default in liquidation being deemed rejection after a period of time.
Specifically, "[w]ithin sixty days after the adjudication, the trustee shall
assume or reject any executory contract, including unexpired leases of real
property.... Any such contract or lease not assumed or rejected within such
time ... shall be deemed to be rejected." 40 This explicit treatment of lease
claims under 63a(7) and contract claims under 63a(9), albeit with slightly
different language, solved the provability conundrum of postpetition
repudiation ("rejection") damages for these unfinished transactions; they
were henceforth all provable claims. This statutory introduction of the term
"executory" made sense, of course, because only if a contract is executory
(i.e., not completely "executed") can there be a claim for anticipatory
repudiation upon the trustee's disclamation. 4 1 If the contract is fully
performed, by contrast, there are no future obligations over which to fight
about provability, only unpaid matured debts to be filed as claims.42
Similarly, a lease needs to be unexpired for there to be a potential breach
claim for unpaid future rents. An expired lease may have some back rent
owing but again raises no provability issues; fully concluded transactions are
unremarkable for provability. Thus, "executory" entered the U.S. bankruptcy
executory contracts, whether or not such claims would otherwise constitute provable claims under
this Act").
38. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 424, 63a(7), 48 Stat. 911, 924 (1934) (emphasis added); Bankruptcy
Act, ch. 575, 63a(9), 52 Stat. 840, 873 (1938) (emphasis added).
39. See United States Tr. Co. v. Wabash W. Ry. Co., 150 U.S. 287, 299-300 (1893) ("The
general rule ... is undisputed that an assignee or receiver is not bound to adopt the contracts, accept
the leases, or otherwise step into the shoes of his assignor, if in his opinion it would be unprofitable
or undesirable to do so; and he is entitled to a reasonable time to elect whether to adopt or repudiate
such contracts.").
40. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 575, 70b, 52 Stat. 840, 880-81 (1938). Countryman chronicles how
the judicially created doctrine of abandonment carried forth the English practice that "[i]t has long
been a recognized principle of the bankrupt [sic] laws that the assignees were not bound to accept
property of an onerous or unprofitable character." Countryman I, supra note 4, at 440 (quoting Am.
File Co. v. Garrett, 110 U.S. 288, 295 (1884)).
41. See Andrew, Reply to Westbrook, supra note 11, at 34 n.155 (noting that under the
equivalent U.K. Insolvency Act, a trustee may "disclaim" "any unprofitable contract," which has
the effect of its exclusion from the estate) (citations omitted).
42. 11 U.S.C. 502 (2012).
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statutory lexicon through these Depression-era provisions that were designed
to clarify the provability status of claims for unfulfilled future obligations
triggered by a bankruptcy trustee's abandonment of financial detritus.
2. Provability's Solution and the Introduction of Executoriness (and
365).-As part of Congress's bankruptcy overhaul resulting in the 1978
Code, the concept of provability was finally abolished with a wide definition
of "claim" that covered all conceivable monetary obligations, such as
contingent, unmatured, and unliquidated claims, like the tort cause of action
above.43 Everything was now a "claim" and hence both provable and
dischargeable in a bankruptcy proceeding (no more haunting the discharged
debtor with the financial sins of the past). With everything becoming
provable, the very need for that term was eliminated. 44 Congress's intent in
so doing was to corral every possible financial beef with a debtor into one
forum and compel resolution with comprehensive finality. 45 This neater
solution was widely praised and, had Congress just thought of it back in 1938,
would have obviated the requirement for 63a and the language of
"executory" contracts. 46 Congress also consolidated the prior Chandler Act
provisions into 365, which now covers the estate's treatment of executory
contracts and unexpired leases. 47 Section 365(a) provides: "[T]he trustee,
subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any executory contract
or unexpired lease of the debtor." 4 8
Note that 365(a) codified the court's oversight role in the assumption
43. Id. 101(5); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 180 (1977) ("H.R. 8200[, the Bankruptcy Code,]
abolishes the concept of provability in bankruptcy cases."). (Source text is entirely capitalized.).
44. Well, nearly everything. A painful strand of cases has emerged finding that executory
contracts (usually leases) neither assumed nor rejected in a chapter 11 simply "ride through,"
saddling the debtor with an ongoing lease and the counterparty with an unprovable claim. E.g., In
re Bos. Post Rd. Ltd. P'ship, 21 F.3d 477, 484 (2d Cir. 1994) ("A debtor in Chapter 11 must either
assume or reject its leases with third parties .... If the debtor does neither, the leases continue in
effect and the lessees have no provable claim against the bankruptcy estate.").
45. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 309 ("By this broadest possible definition [of claim] ... the
Bill contemplates that all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will
be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case.") (Source text is entirely capitalized.); S. REP. No.
95-989, at 21-22 (1978) (using the same language); H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 2, at 154-55 nn.l-
5 (1973) (containing the proposed text).
46. See, e.g., Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 494 (describing the "Code['s] eliminat[ion
of] the concept of 'provability"' as an "important change"); see also In re M.A.S. Realty Corp., 318
B.R. 234, 237 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2004) (describing the revision that eliminated provability as "a
distinction of critical importance"); Cohen v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc. (In re Drexel
Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc.), 138 B.R. 687, 706-07 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (describing the Code's
abolishment of provability as a "structural innovation[]").
47. See Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 492 ("These [statutory] origins are important
because they reveal that Congress intended the statutory predecessor to section 365 to ensure that
counterparties holding rejected contracts, including leases, would be paid and discharged.").
48. 11 U.S.C. 365(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
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or rejection of contracts, too, which in turn spawned jurisprudence over the
standard by which the court ought to assess the debtor's decision (with a
majority approach settling on a business judgment rule level of deference). 4 9
But even more important than 365(a) was the power conferred on trustees
and debtors under 365(b). Unhelpfully phrased as a restriction on
assumption, 365(b)'s true import is to confer a power upon the debtor to
cure contractual defaults.
If there has been a default in an executory contract or unexpired lease
of the debtor, the trustee may not assume such contract or lease unless,
at the time of assumption of such contract or lease, the trustee-(A)
cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly
cure, such default.50
This flex of preemptive federal law trumps general state contract law,
because a material breach of contract ordinarily allows the aggrieved
counterparty the self-help remedy of termination.51 Section 365(b) overrides
this and says notwithstanding the (material) breach of an executory contract,
if the breach is cured pursuant to 365(b), the debtor in federal bankruptcy
may assume the contract and carry on under its benefits. The counterparty's
self-help remedy of termination is scuttled.52 This cure-and-assume power
irritates contractual counterparties tremendously, of course, because the
contracts those parties most want to terminate are bad deals that they made,
which are by zero-sum game reasoning precisely the sorts of good deals that
the debtor/trustee is anxious to assume. But for 365(b), the debtor would
be unable to do this in the face of a material breach at common law.
Counterparties equally hate a debtor's rejection of an executory contract
containing a good deal for the counterparty by the same logic.
Section 365's power is even worse for the counterparty, because it
cannot even be "contracted around." For example, the parties' decision to say
that a filing for bankruptcy ipso facto terminates the contract is explicitly
invalidated.53 And even seemingly impossible-to-cure breaches are, in some
contexts, excused under 365.54 In sum, 365 provides a powerful arrow in
the debtor's quiver, according the debtor the option to "reshape" the
49. Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal Finishers,
Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1046 (4th Cir. 1985) ("[The] question [of acceptance or rejection] must start
with ... deference mandated by the sound business judgment rule .... ").
50. 11 U.S.C. 365(b)(1) (2012).
51. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 237 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
52. See, e.g., In re Circle K Corp., 190 B.R. 370, 376 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) (noting how
365(b) overruled such pre-Code cases as In re Schokbeton Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 171 (5th Cir.
1972), which held that breach precludes assumption and bankruptcy accords no power to cure).
53. 11 U.S.C. 365(e)(1) (2012).
54. Id. 365(b)(1)(A) (rescuing certain lease defaults).
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bankruptcy estate with an option to assume valuable contractual rights,55
either for performance by the debtor itself or for assignment to a third party
for a price, notwithstanding the existence of a breach. 56
B. Executoriness as a Restraint on 365: The Creation of New Problems
Counterparty hostility to 365 drives the annals of case law of litigants
seeking to avoid its reach. And the key to their stratagem is textual seizure
upon the statutory qualifier that only "executory" contracts are subject to
365 and all her debtor powers. Aggrieved counterparties often insist that
the debtor's contract is not an executory contract and hence cannot "enter"
365. Important for explaining the chaotic case law in this area, the litigious
counterparties are what might be called "equal opportunity executoriness
critics." When the debtor had a good contract (and hence a bad one for the
counterparty) it sought to assume, the counterparty would claim the contract
was not executory and, therefore, could not avail itself of the cure and
assumption powers of 365.57 But in cases in which the contract was
burdensome for the debtor (and hence good for the counterparty), the
counterparty would then argue that the contract was not executory and,
therefore, could not be rejected. 58 Note the bizarre logic under this reasoning,
as some courts blithely pronounced: if "the contract is not executory, . . . [it
is] neither assumable nor capable of rejection." 59 A contract that neither can
be assumed nor rejected creates an existential legal crisis, which some have
described as "zombie" contracts that leave the debtor in a "legal limbo."6 0
Many a court caught in the middle of an executoriness fight would make the
initial decision, whether the contract was indeed executory or not, and then
55. ELIZABETH WARREN, JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, KATHERINE PORTER & JOHN A.E.
POTTOW, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 453-54 (7th ed. 2014).
56. Lest the uninitiated reader worry Congress went wild with 365, she should be assuaged
by the provisions that incorporate common law bars on assignment, such as an inability to assign
"personal" contracts. See 11 U.S.C. 365(c)(1) (2012).
57. Post v. Sigel & Co., Ltd. (In re Sigel & Co., Ltd.), 923 F.2d 142, 145-46 (9th Cir. 1991)
(rejecting counterparty's argument that contract's non-executoriness precluded debtor assumption
under 365).
58. E.g., Lycoming Engines v. Superior Air Parts, Inc. (In re Superior Air Parts), 486 B.R. 728,
738 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2012) ("[W]hen a contract is non-executory, the debtor remains bound to its
obligations."); In re Spectrum Info. Techs., Inc., 193 B.R. 400,403 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting
creditor's objection that the "[a]greement is not an 'executory contract' ... and, therefore, not
subject to rejection").
59. In re Hawker Beechcraft, Inc., 486 B.R. 264, 276 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013). These cases are
legion: "This Court has already ruled that the Settlement Agreement is not executory, and therefore
the Debtor could not reject it. Likewise, since it is not an executory contract, the Debtor cannot
assume it." In re Airwest Int'l, Inc., No. 86-00145, 1988 WL 113101, at *3 (Bankr. D. Haw.
Oct. 12, 1988).
60. See Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 482 ("We propose an end to zombie contracts and
the obsolete notions that keep them upright by abolishing the 'material breach' rule."); Westbrook,
supra note 3, at 239.
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simply hide from the consequence of a finding of non-executoriness,
presumably hoping the parties would just sort out amongst themselves what
to do next in this limbo. 61 Court after court, right up to the circuit level, has
continued to struggle.62 And debtors, too, flounder over just what they can do
in a world of uncertain executoriness. 63
"Executoriness," a little textual throwaway from the Chandler Act era's
amendments clarifying archaic provability issues, has now become the hook
of one of bankruptcy law's most intractable (and pointless) sources of
jurisprudential confusion-What is an "executory" contract in bankruptcy
that the debtor can subject to 365?64
C. Traditional Responses to Executoriness's Problems
1. Defining Executoriness: Countryman and the Material Breach
Test.-This brings us back to Vern Countryman. Neither the Act nor the Code
defined "executory," perhaps thinking it too obvious. 65 An important
academic figure in the development of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code,
Countryman propounded a widespread test that now bears his name for
whether a contract is executory. Under Countryman's definition, a contract
is executory if both parties have sufficient unperformed obligations so that
either's discontinuance would constitute a material breach, hence the label
"material breach" test.66 Courts loved the test's seeming simplicity, although
only a few openly recognized that it just pushed litigation onto the
"materiality" prong.67
The material breach test does indeed work well for many simple
61. E.g., In re Interstate Bakeries Corp., 751 F.3d 955, 964 (8th Cir. 2014) (limiting itself to
declaration of non-executoriness); In re S.A. Holding Co., LLC, 357 B.R. 51, 59 (Bankr. D.N.J.
2006) (same).
62. "Because 365 applies only to executory contracts, a debtor-in-possession does not have
the option of rejecting or assuming non-executory contracts and remains bound by the debtor's
obligations under those contracts after the bankruptcy filing." Stewart Foods, Inc. v. Broecker (In
re Stewart Foods, Inc.), 64 F.3d 141, 145 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting elsewhere in its opinion that the
consequence of deemed continuation is the same as assumption).
63. E.g., In re Sudbury, Inc., 153 B.R. 776, 776 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993) (seeking to avoid
unwelcome contract by arguing in the alternative either it was executory and would be rejected or
it was non-executory and therefore incapable of assumption).
64. An interesting, but ultimately unhelpful, Supreme Court foray into this riddle is Central
Tablet Mfg. Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 673 (1974), which attempted to distinguish "executory"
from "executed." Id. at 684-85, n.7.
65. In the adoption of the Code in 1978, Congress candidly admitted it had no definition of
"executory." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 347 (1977) ("Though there is no precise definition of what
contracts are executory, it generally includes contracts on which performance remains due to some
extent on both sides.") (Source text is entirely capitalized.).
66. Countryman I, supra note 4, at 460.
67. See Chattanooga Mem'l Park v. Still (In re Jolly), 547 F.2d 349, 350-51 (6th Cir. 1978)
(noting that material breach test does "not resolve this [executoriness] problem"). The zenith of
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contracts, but problems arise with more nuanced arrangements. Take, for
example, option contracts, where the debtor merely holds a valuable option
to purchase Blackacre for a favorable price. Lacking an obligation ever to
exercise the option, the debtor could scarcely be said to commit a "material
breach" (or any breach) should she decline to exercise it. Under the
Countryman test, this option contract would not be executory and hence
could not fall under 365 with its power to assume. 6 8 Counterparty-optioners
who made bad deals were quick to make this argument in their debtor's
bankruptcy cases, convincing courts accepting the Countryman test that the
debtor simply could not assume the option as it could not fall under
365(a).69 Other problematic examples abound, including the chimerical
rights hanging over a departed employee with a noncompete clause in her
(erstwhile) employment contract. Clearly the employer had no remaining
obligations that could be materially breached, even though the employee
clearly did. The Countryman test said the noncompete was no longer an
executory contract, and thus the debtor could not reject it under 365,
meaning the debtor-employee remained somehow permanently saddled with
a de facto nondischargeable obligation.70 And so on. Indeed, courts often
resorted to "analytical gymnast[ics]" to find contracts executory (or not) in
order to bring them under (or outside) 365's scope to achieve just results.7 1
2. Backlash: Westbrook's Call for Abolition.-The seminal scholar to
confront the problems of the executoriness doctrine and the Countryman test
was Westbrook, who advocated the simplest solution: abolishing the
confusion over "materiality" of remaining obligations-and hence the make-or-break point on
executoriness-likely arises in the intellectual property cases with licensing agreements. Westbrook
and White assemble a considerable footnote showing the demoralizing conflict in case law over
materiality in this domain. See Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 508 n.141, 504 n.125.
68. E.g., Travelodge Int'l, Inc. v. Cont'l Props., Inc. (In re Cont'l Props., Inc.), 15 B.R. 732,
736 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1981) ("Since the Agreement is an option contract and not an executory
contract, it cannot be assumed.").
69. E.g., Intermet Realty P'ship v. First Pa. Bank (In re Intermet Realty P'ship), 26 B.R. 383,
388 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) ("There is no interest which could be termed an executory contract and
assumed by the debtor.").
70. See, e.g., In re Spooner, No. 11-31525, 2012 WL 909515, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 16,
2012) (finding a noncompete contract not executory and hence un-rejectable).
71. Bronner v. Chenoweth-Massie P'ship (In re Nat'l Fin. Realty Tr.), 226 B.R. 586, 589
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1998). Compare In re Ichiban, Case No. 06-10316-RGM, 2014 WL 2937088, at
* 1-2 (Bankr. E.D. Va. June 30, 2014) (finding that seemingly trivial notice and appraisal provisions,
while contingent, are sufficiently material for remaining ongoing obligations to render LLC
agreement executory), with In re Knowles, No. 6:1 1-bk-l 1717-KSJ, 2013 WL 152434, at *4
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2013) (contending that similar provisions are too remote to be material
remaining obligations and so contract is non-executory). In In re Drake, 136 B.R. 325, 325 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1992), the trustee argued in the alternative that the employee-debtor's noncompete
agreement was either non-executory and, therefore, could not be rejected or executory and,
therefore, could be assumed and assigned!
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executoriness requirement altogether and refocusing attention on the 365(a)
question whether the debtor's business decision to assume or reject a contract
should survive judicial scrutiny. 72 For what one assumes was branding
purposes, Westbrook felt compelled to style his abolitionist argument a
"functionalist" approach to defining executoriness, even going so far as
suggesting courts could fit his approach into existing case law.7 3 More
specifically, Westbrook initially said the test of whether a contract is
executory is whether there is an economic benefit to assuming or rejecting it
for the estate. 74 He then clarified in subsequent writing that the assumed
precondition of the definition of executory is the historical common law
definition-i.e., whether there was literally any performance, by any party,
anywhere, left under the contract that still had to be done. 75 Stripped bare,
Westbrook's position was not really an interpretation of executoriness at all;
it was a compelling normative argument to purge the executoriness
requirement.76 Some courts bit,77 but for many, it was a bridge too far.78
3. Doubling Down: The ABI Commission's Retrenchment.-Despite
some enthusiastic takers, Westbrook's alternative never gained the traction
of the Countryman test. True, the recent ABI Commission's Expert Group
right out of the gates took Westbrook's abolitionist argument as its first
recommendation for improvements to the Code on the topic of executory
contracts.79 The Commission, however, rejected this suggestion, preferring
instead the "well developed" case law on executoriness, because it provides
guidance to parties and courts.80 In fact, the Commission recommended
codifying the Countryman test into law, cheerfully burying the vexing
questions of options, noncompetes, and other difficult contract cases into an
72. Westbrook, supra note 3, at 230 (advocating "abolishing the requirement of executoriness
altogether").
73. See id. at 327 ("[T]he functional approach fits neatly within the existing structure and the
detailed provisions of the Code.").
74. Id. at 253 (delineating "Net Value" calculus in bankruptcy).
75. 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 1:19 (4th ed. 2007)
(observing that courts identify an executory contract as "a contract, the obligation of which relates
to the future, or a contract under which the parties have bound themselves to future activity that is
not yet completed or performed.").
76. He eventually came clean. Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 484 n.16 ("Functional
Analysis was not an approach to determining executoriness, but a proposal to abandon executoriness
all together as a threshold test.").
77. See, e.g., In re Bayou Shores SNF, LLC, 525 B.R. 160, 168 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014)
(finding the contract executory under the functional approach and Countryman test).
78. See, e.g., Butler v. Resident Care Innovation Corp., 241 B.R. 37, 44 (D.R.I. 1999)
(criticizing functional analysis as "ignor[ing] the statutory mandate that the contract be executory").
79. See ABI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 13.
80. See ABI REPORT, supra note 8.
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encyclopedic footnote to its report,81 vying for the 2014 Understatement of
the Year Award in admitting that courts "struggled" and the test produced
inconsistencies. 82 But the decision was not just motivated by pedigree. Lying
just beneath, or even at the surface, was a naked distributive concern: that
365 accords too much power to the debtor, and so the executoriness wrinkle
serves a "gating feature" function that allows some counterparties to win
arguments on executoriness grounds that prevent a debtor from gaining
access to 365 and taking action that the counterparty dreads. 83
Even leaving aside the vividness bias of the Commission's concern-
focusing on the highly visible plight of the counterparty succumbing to the
debtor's power under 365 to the ignorance of the more diffuse benefit to all
other stakeholders of the estate aided by that debtor's adroit treatment of a
contract-the primary objection to the retention of executoriness as a
"gating" valve is that the concept lacks normative coherence or principle.
(Westbrook himself witheringly agrees.) 84 Similar gatekeeping could arise by
saying the judge gets to flip a coin and each time it's heads the debtor can't
use 365. That, too, would reduce the power of the debtor, but not in a way
that any well-designed legal system would consider tolerable. A principled
way to reduce debtor leverage would be to accord greater discretion to the
judge under 365(a), perhaps tacking on an ability to deny rejection or
assumption if it would be inequitable under the circumstances, but that's a
topic for another day.85 Nonetheless, the Commission has doubled down on
executoriness, suggesting it should stay in the Code as a beacon for litigious
contractual counterparties. 86
III. A Better Approach to Executoriness: Taking Non-Executoriness
Seriously
A. Sharpening the Debate
To find a way out of this mess, we need a new approach. Let us consider
the two archetypal contracts for which the debtor is likely to face an
executoriness challenge. As mnemonic, we can use aviary labels: first, the
unwanted "albatross" that the debtor wants to drop like a hot potato but the
counterparty seeks to cast as non-executory, hoping that doing so will stymie
81. Id. at 113 n.416.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 115 (bemoaning the "unfair[ness]" abolition of executoriness would visit on
counterparties).
84. The Commission retained executoriness as a safety valve on debtor abuse "at the sacrifice
of logic and, more importantly, predictable commercial results." Westbrook & White, supra note 6,
at 486-87.
85. Westbrook and White would seem to agree. Id. at 486.
86. ABI REPORT, supra note 8, at 114 (noting litigation experience of some ABI
Commissioners).
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the debtor's rejection efforts by barring access to 365 (and its rejection
powers); and second, the coveted "golden goose" that the debtor is desperate
to keep but the counterparty also seeks to cast as non-executory to similarly
stymie the debtor's assumption by foreclosing 365 (and its assumption
powers). Think of a hot realty option to scoop up Blackacre for a song: it's a
golden goose for the option holder; it's an albatross for the option granter.
1. The Easy Case: The Non-Executory Golden Goose (Without
Default).-Let's start with the golden goose contract that the debtor wishes
to keep, which, for even further simplicity, we'll assume is not in default.
Suppose the counterparty challenges executoriness. If the debtor wins on the
executoriness argument, the contract is assumed under 365. If the debtor
loses, the contract cannot be assumed under 365. But what does that mean?
The non-executory contract is still property-best thought of as a chose in
action to sue for the debtor's rights under the contract.8 7 More accurately, it
is hybrid property conjoining the debtor's right to enforce the contract
benefits with the deleterious obligations to perform that the counterparty can
translate into a claim if breached under 502.88 Thus, formally, the contract-
qua-hybrid property passes to the estate under 541's capacious reach to "all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property." 89 This allows the debtor
to enjoy its economic benefit as property of the estate.9 0 All this is done
irrespective of 365. Thus, at least in the absence of default, whether the
contract is executory or not has no effect on the debtor's exploitation of the
economic rights; 365, and afortiori "executoriness," is irrelevant. 91
2. The Harder Case: The Non-Executory Albatross.-The albatross is
where things start to get complicated. If the debtor wants to reject an
unwanted contract, but the counterparty launches an executoriness challenge,
the debtor faces more of a hurdle. Again, if the debtor wins, no problem and
the contract is rejected under 365(a). But if the counterparty succeeds in
arguing the contract is non-executory and hence cannot be rejected under
365, what happens? In a thoughtful historical discussion, Michael Andrew
noted that under prior American and English practice, the undesirable
87. The Act provided for "rights of action arising upon contracts," 30 Stat. 565 (1898), amended
by 66 Stat. 429 (1952), 11 U.S.C. 110(a)(5) (1958), and "property, including rights of action," id.,
as property of the estate.
88. Technically, the acceleration of all claims, 11 U.S.C. 101(5) (2012), means that the
liabilities crystallize as well so as to permit comprehensive discharge. But that is of no moment
when the debtor wishes to assume.
89. Id. 541(a)(1).
90. Countryman indirectly accepted this reasoning. Countryman I, supra note 4, at 458-59.
91. See, e.g., Warner v. Warner (In re Warner), 480 B.R. 641, 652, 655 (Bankr. N.D.W. Va.
2012) (LLC agreement that was not executory still entered the bankruptcy estate under 541);
Ehmann v. Fiesta Inv., LLC (In re Ehmann), 319 B.R. 200, 206 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005) (same).
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contract never entered into the bankruptcy estate in the first place-it was
"excluded," because unless and until a receiver or an assignee accepted
debtor property under the Act, the historical abandonment doctrine left the
estate unscathed. 92 Whatever the historical accuracy of his argument (and it
does appear accurate), 93 Andrew's "exclusionary" approach now seems
outdated given the 1978 Code's intentional inclusivity through the expanded
definition of claim, where everything is included in the estate to enable
comprehensive resolution of financial distress.
Many courts struggle with the non-executory albatross, assuming that it
nevertheless persists if it is unable to be rejected under 365(a). 94 Yet a
contract is still a contract, and even if it cannot be rejected under 365, it can
still be repudiated. Moreover, bankruptcy courts do not generally order
specific performance against the trustee (due to the innocence of the other
creditors from the debtor's prior acts). 95 Thus, for most contracts, the only
real remedy for the counterparty from debtor repudiation is a breach claim
for damages. 96
Now, under formal rejection of an executory contract via 365, the
Code specifies that the counterparty has a provable unsecured damages claim
relating back to the petition date.97 But if the contract is non-executory and
the debtor wants to repudiate, courts become flummoxed, most apparently
implying (hoping?) that the debtor has to perform.9 8 Andrew, of course,
solves this problem by having the albatross never enter the estate in the first
92. See Andrew, Rejection, supra note 11, at 881 (noting that courts "excluded 'executory'
contract and lease assets from the bankruptcy estate ... absent an election by the trustee to accept
them").
93. E.g., Copeland v. Stephens (1818), 106 Eng. Rep. 218, 222 (KB) (holding title to leases and
contracts does not pass to estate unless "accepted").
94. E.g., In re Capital Acquisitions & Mgmt. Corp., 341 B.R. 632, 637 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006)
(finding LLC operating agreement non-executory and thus "enforceable" in bankruptcy).
95. See, e.g., In re Pina, 363 B.R. 314, 333-35 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (refusing to enforce
prepetition injunctive judgment where it would harm unsecured creditors by diminishing size of
bankruptcy estate); ABI REPORT, supra note 8, at 119 ("[R]ejection of an executory contract or
unexpired lease should not ... entitle the nonbreaching, nondebtor party to a right of specific
performance.").
96. For simplicity, this Article will assume all breach claims are reducible to damages to avoid
the sidebar of can-be-compelled-to-accept-monetary-judgment issues. 11 U.S.C. 101(5)(B)
(2012). Critically for bankruptcy, these damages will never be compensatory for the counterparty if
paid with the general unsecured dividend. Thus, in an idealized contract world of frictionless
damages awards, a counterparty would be economically indifferent to performance or breach-
remedied-by-full-expectation damages. Not so in bankruptcy, where any damage award (absent
priority) will be paid out for pennies on the dollar. Westbrook, supra note 3, at 253 (labeling, one
feels gleefully, the discounted bankruptcy dividend as "little tiny Bankruptcy Dollars").
97. 11 U.S.C. 365(g)(1) (2012).
98. E.g., In re KBAR, Inc., 96 B.R. 158, 159-60 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1988) (holding Hardee's
franchise agreement to be no longer executory and hence its covenants could not be rejected in
bankruptcy but rather remained in full force).
1452 [Vol. 96:1437
A New Approach to Executory Contracts
place and so not be a problem for the trustee (but then presumably also being
not provable, taking us back to the unhappy, old days). Yet, there is a
plausible argument that cannot be ignored: if the debtor demurs performance
of such a contract, the breach claim becomes an administrative charge against
the estate entitled to priority repayment.99
The argument for priority status of a non-executory contract's
abandonment damages goes something like this. Everyone agrees that if the
debtor assumes an executory contract under 365 and then subsequently
breaches, the breach damages are administrative expenses of running the
estate; that's in the Code. 100 Just as the trustee has to pay utility bills
postpetition, if the trustee enters into a contract postpetition, so too does that
business expense become a cost of running the estate that is entitled to
administrative priority. 10 1 An assumed executory contract is no different from
a new contract entered into postpetition: it's a cost of running the show that
the trustee willingly incurs on the calculus that the benefits outweigh the
burdens (the same way most trustees find paying the electric bill worth it to
keep the lights on).
Following my formalism on the golden goose above, however, if the
contract is somehow non-executory, it still has to go somewhere, under the
doctrine of Conservation of Contractual Mass. It must, therefore, enter the
estate under 541 automatically. Thus, the trustee must dispose of it as estate
property to get rid of it (in this case, repudiate the contract and give rise to a
concomitant breach claim). Since this abandonment occurs postpetition, it
must be another cost of running the estate (think of it as paying the garbage
collector to haul off unwanted debris). Ergo, the breach damages are also an
administrative expense, just as with an executory contract the trustee assumes
but later breaches.' 02 The only difference here from 365 is that this de facto
assumption prior to rejection is purely involuntary and never approved by the
bankruptcy court.' 03 This prospect of favored priority helps explain why a
counterparty to an albatross seeks a declaration of non-executoriness. The
first best position, of course, is to trick the court into thinking that exclusion
from 365 simply ends the discussion and the debtor is just out of luck and
must go on performing forever; but the nearly as attractive fallback position
99. See 11 U.S.C. 507(a)(2) (2012) (priority repayment status for administrative claims); id.
365(g)(2) (conferring administrative status on post-assumption breach claims).
100. Id. 365(g)(2).
101. Id. 503(b)(1).
102. The counterparty tried this tack in In re Airwest Int'l, Inc., No. 86-00145, 1988 WL
113101 (Bankr. D. Haw. Oct. 12, 1988), but the court held it was "premature" to adjudicate the
priority claim pending assessment whether postpetition conduct by the debtor was tortious. Id. at
*3.
103. Compare 11 U.S.C. 541(a)(1) (no approval required for automatic vesting of the estate
with all the debtor's property), with id. 365(a) (requiring court approval for assumption).
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is to say that if such a non-executory contract is rejected, the breach damages
must be treated as administrative claims entitled to first priority payout.10 4
3. The Hardest Case: Non-Executory Golden Goose (with Default).-
Finally, let us return to the golden goose, which we discovered is easy for the
debtor to retain when we assume the absence of default. But if we relax that
assumption and put the debtor in default, then we see the incentive to fight
over executoriness. The power to cure defaults effectively neutralizes the
state law contract rights of the counterparty to respond to a material breach
with the self-help remedy of termination by forcing the counterparty to accept
the debtor's cure and keep the contract alive. 105 This allows, by federal
preemptive power of the Code, a debtor to resurrect a slain golden goose (or
more precisely, resuscitate a mortally wounded one). If the contract is non-
executory, however, and simply sitting in the debtor's lap under 541, then
unless we find a power elsewhere in the Code, there is no cure power of
365(b) to preserve that contract's innate value to the debtor. Thus, we can
encapsulate the golden goose problem as one of no express power to cure.
And indeed, we can fret further by noting an ipso facto clause-providing for
the contract to terminate automatically upon filing for bankruptcy-would
also escape 365(e)'s invalidation provision if the contract falls outside that
subsection's scope as non-executory.
To summarize, there seemto be both primary and secondary
counterparty advantages incentivizing executoriness challenges. For
albatrosses, which the counterparty says are non-rejectable, the primary
advantage is to trick a debtor or court into requiring performance, period,
while the secondary advantage is priority status payment for breach damages
in the event of non-performance/rejection/abandonment/repudiation-
whatever we want to call it. The primary advantage to the counterparty for
golden geese in arguing they are non-assumable is tricking the debtor into
just giving up on the contract, while the secondary advantage is to block the
cure power of 365(b). I now seek to demonstrate through a proper
understanding of the Code's text and structure that these claimed advantages
are not just theoretically repugnant to the Code but doctrinally unsupportable
(or at the very least, are not doctrinally preordained).
104. Note that absent recognized property rights, they will not prevail in an action against the
debtor for specific performance in a bankruptcy court. For a good property rights analysis case, see
In re Walter Energy, Inc., No. 15-02741-TOM11, 2015 WL 9487718, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
Dec. 28, 2015). See also In re Plascencia, 354 B.R. 774, 780 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006) (holding that
a recorded realty option created a non-rejectable property interest).
105. The muscular cure power of 365(b) can be contrasted with the limited cases where cure
is allowed at state law. See, e.g., U.C.C. 2-508 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N
2014) (explaining the limited power to cure in sale-of-goods contracts if "circumstances" justify).
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B. Entering the Debate: Working Through the Code on Non-
Executoriness
We have above identified the three paradigmatic cases of non-executory
contracts in ascending order of legal complexity and now turn to what I
contend is their proper treatment under the Code if we take the concept of a
non-executory contract seriously (i.e., not as a show-stopper whose
declaration magically truncates further discussion).
As previously discussed, the first scenario is easy: a golden goose not in
default. Consider, for example, a valuable unexpired option held by the
debtor that the optioner wishes to evade. The optioner argues that the option
cannot possibly be an "executory" contract due to its flunking the
Countryman test (as there would be no material breach if the debtor did
nothing until the end of time). The optioner then drops the second shoe and
argues that because it is not executory, the option cannot fall under 365 and,
therefore, cannot be assumed under 365(a). Poof! It disappears as a debtor
asset. Commentators have struggled to shoehorn the option into the
Countryman test, 10 6 but the simpler solution, contra Westbrook, is to concede
that it is not an executory contract. As discussed above, however, it cannot
just vanish. The unexpired option still exists as inchoate "property of the
estate" under 541,107 just as a lien is an inchoate twig in the bundle of rights.
As such, the debtor need do nothing with regards to this property. If the
optioner ever asks the debtor whether the option is "assumed," the debtor can
just respond she no more needs to assume the option than she needs to assume
the drill press in the factory: it's all valuable property of the estate to be
deployed in due course. 108
106. Andrew, Reply to Westbrook, supra note 11, at 32-34. This is a frequent problem with
insurance cases, in which the prepaid premium seems to discharge the insured's obligations, and so
when the unexpired policy needs to be assumed, the debtor-insured will point to all the purportedly
executory remaining duties to cooperate, i.e., to assure executoriness. See, e.g., Pester Ref. Co. v.
Ins. Co. N. Am. (In re Pester Ref. Co.), 58 B.R. 189, 191 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1985) (finding the
contract to be executory).
107. See, e.g., BNY, Capital Funding LLC v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 345 B.R. 549, 556 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 2006) ("As an unexercised option, the LOI was property of U.S. Airways's bankruptcy
estate.").
108. Unlike 365(a), 541's automatic vesting of the non-executory golden goose will not
give the counterparty definitive notice of its legal obligations-a policy some argue is an important
bankruptcy one. See, e.g., Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 518 (asserting that notice to
counterparties is necessary to promote fairness). But so what? What notice is needed for a happy
counterparty whose contract is not in default-that the contract is continuing to be performed
uneventfully as it has been all along? Let that tree fall in the forest! Accordingly, IJam unsympathetic
to the optioner in Bronner v. Chenoweth-Massie P'ship (In re Nat'l Fin. Realty Tr.), 226 B.R. 586
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1998). That optioner was left uncertain whether an option had been assumed or
rejected after broken-off negotiations, mistakenly assuming/hoping it was rejected only to be
surprised two years later when a third party exercised the option. Id. at 588-90. If the clear default
rule is that contracts pass to the estate and remain there unless and until rejected under 365 or
abandoned under 554, then the counterparty has legal certainty and knows it has a duty to pester.
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1. Abandoning the Albatross.
a. The Power.-What about the converse situation of a burdensome
contract that the debtor wants to run screaming from? Here, we might flip the
debtor to be the optioner in the prior example, or consider an erstwhile
employee-debtor laboring under a noncompete clause. The counterparty/
option holder now argues that the contract flunks Countryman, so it cannot
be rejected pursuant to 365(a), because of course it doesn't fall under
365's purview. Noncompete cases are notorious for accepting this view
(probably because the court thinks the debtor is trying to pull a fast one by
weaseling out of a noncompete clause), and so these cases simply say that the
clause somehow "remains valid."'09 But the proper answer, doctrinally, lies
again in remembering that, formally, the wart-laden contract is the property
of the estate under 541-but that the trustee can abandon the property under
554, which provides that "[a]fter notice and a hearing, the trustee may
abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate.""0 To be
sure, a contract is a curious hybrid form of property conjoining an asset (the
chose in action to compel the benefit of the bargain) with a liability (a claim
for the consideration the debtor owes). Abandonment of the property on the
asset side of the ledger does not "vaporize[]" the counterparty's claim on the
liability side,"' of course, but that truism does not undermine the debtor's
absolute power under 554 to abandon the albatross. Once again, 365 is
never needed.112 Courts seem to underappreciate the role of 554 in this
109. Jenson v. Cont'l Fin. Corp., 591 F.2d 477, 482 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding that "the security
agreement is not executory," and thus it "remains valid"); see also, e.g., Meiburger v. Endeka
Enters. (In re Tsiaoushis), 383 B.R. 616, 621 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007) (concluding that an operating
agreement was not executory and thus its sections remained "valid and fully enforceable"); Ready
Prod., Inc. v. Jarvis (In re Jarvis), No. 04-10806-JMD, 2005 WL 758805, at *5 (Bankr. D.N.H.
Mar. 28, 2005) (finding the noncompete agreement non-executory and non-rejectable in granting
employer-plaintiff injunctive relief against employee-debtor).
110. 11 U.S.C. 554(a) (2012).
111. Sunbeam Prods. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 2012).
112. I leave to one side the concern of seasoned practitioners of "inadvertent" assumption. True,
automatic vesting under 541 does not require an overt act, as does 365, to check mistaken
albatross acquisition, but neither does deemed rejection under 365(d) protect against inadvertent
rejection. In other words, there is no intrinsically "safe" default rule. The choice is between a default
rule, with the attendant risks of carelessness, see Ebert v. DeVries Family Farm, LLC (In re
DeVries), No. 12-04015-DML, 2014 WL 4294540, at *14 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2014)
(finding that because trustee never assumed, 365(d) deemed executory contract rejected), or the
ambiguous quagmire of no default specification, see Phx. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint
Venture (In re Greystone III Joint Venture), 995 F.2d 1274, 1281 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
chapter 11 debtor's leases continue-and the lessees have no provable claim against the bankruptcy
estate-when the debtor neither assumes nor rejects its leases with third parties).
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context.l13 Even courts that get to the right result do not seem to understand
how they are getting there." 4
b. The Claim.-Thus, the debtor can happily abandon a non-
executory contract under 554, without need to address 365 and its
executoriness gate at all. This, of course, is a breach (formally an anticipatory
repudiation, but the result is the same). But that conclusion avoids the harder
question of what befalls the counterparty's claim that is engendered by such
a breach.115 There are three possibilities: the counterparty has no claim; the
counterparty has a general unsecured claim; or the counterparty has an
administrative priority claim. The first possibility arises from the Swiftian
reasoning that if 365 does not apply, then presumably 365(g)(1)'s
conferral of the unsecured claim upon the aggrieved counterparty cannot kick
in. One doubts the executoriness-denying counterparties intend this to be the
logical consequence of their executoriness victory. Nor is it a plausible
outcome because it would require de-coupling the contract's liabilities from
its assets, a result unseemly to bankruptcy jurisprudence and common
sense. 1
Therefore, there must be some form of damages claim filable by the
aggrieved counterparty for the rejection breach. But what sort of claim?
Recall that if this were an executory contract breach claim, the Code's clear
text of 365(g)(1) designates it as a general unsecured one." Why a
113. For example, In re FBIDistribution Corp. simply declares that the postpetition breach of
a non-executory contract gives rise to an unsecured prepetition claim, a result I find congenial, but
with no reference to 554. Mason v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re FBI Distrib.
Corp.), 330 F.3d 36, 48 (1st Cir. 2003).
114. Discussion of 554 is frequently lacking in these cases. See, e.g., In re Majestic Capital,
Ltd., 463 B.R. 289, 301-02 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (using non-executoriness to prevent priority
treatment of burdensome severance package, yet nonetheless "grant[ing] the motion to reject");
In re Exide Techs., 378 B.R. 762, 766 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (using non-executoriness to prevent
debtor from having inadvertently assumed expensive retirement agreement). Andrew, in defending
his exclusionary approach, embraces the abandonment power. See Andrew, Rejection, supra note
11, at 863 (noting that rejection and abandonment both result in "exclusion of an asset from the
estate"). And in a footnote, he seems to agree with the core of my analysis. Id. at 890 n.165.
115. Andrew's "exclusionary" approach led to the cumbersome conclusion that such contracts
would revert to the debtor (not estate) and plausibly give a claim against the debtor for breach that
might not be discharged by the debtor's bankruptcy. Andrew, Rejection, supra note 11, at 863.
116. See Century Indem. Co. v. Nat'l Gypsum Co. Settlement Tr. (In re Nat'l Gypsum), 208
F.3d 498, 506 (5th Cir. 2000) ("Where the debtor assumes an executory contract, it must assume
the entire contract, cum onere-the debtor accepts both the obligations and the benefits of the
executory contract.").
117. 11 U.S.C. 365(g)(1) (2012). What's interesting about 365(g)(1) is that its retroactive
designation of the claim as occurring prepetition, id. 502(g), appears to be textually necessary to
render the counterparty an estate "creditor." Id. 101(10)(A). Would the non-executory breach
counterparty, unable to rely on these relation-back provisions, not be able to be a "creditor"?
Although little seems to ride on it for the debtor (as the counterparty still holds a dischargeable
"claim," id. 524(a)(2), 1141(d)(1)(A)), the counterparty may face some grief under 726. But it
2018] 1457
Texas Law Review
different result for a non-executory contract? Recall further the reasoning
above that deems the breach as if the contract had been assumed and then
rejected by the estate. Everyone agrees that that is a priority claim (a stance
codified in 365(g)(2))."1 8 If, however, we accept the logic from the golden
goose scenario above that a non-executory contract vests in the estate
automatically by 541 without need to resort to 365 at all, then we are
faced with the necessary sauce for the gander that to abandon it the debtor
must abandon property of the estate-hybrid property that carries an
appurtenant claim for damages. Thus, since the estate is doing the
abandoning that gives rise to the breach claim, the breach claim should be a
cost of the estate's doing business, and hence entitled to administrative
priority. 1 19 Viewed this way, 365(g)(1) is not so much the conferral of
provability (that it historically was) but a dispensation withdrawing the
presumptive administrative priority of an estate breach claim. Closing the
textual circle on this reasoning, because 365(g)(1) demotes the breach
claim to "mere" unsecured status for executory contracts, the lack of a similar
demotion clause elsewhere in the Code for non-executory contracts means,
just as Andrew feared, that the breach claim against the estate could be
deemed to trigger administrative expense priority. 120
Textual checkmate? Hardly. The solution lies in fighting text with text.
And here I have the advantage of the Code's actual language, which
Countryman did not have in 1973. The incursion of expenses postpetition is
a necessary condition for administrative expenses under 503(b) of the
Code.12 1 But postpetition timing, while necessary, is not sufficient. Rather,
we must take cognizance of the Code's insistence of administrative expenses
being "actual" and "necessary," 12 2 and as textually inclined courts inform us:
appears to be of little moment: courts routinely consider the non-executory breach counterparty to
have a claim under 502 and seem to muddle through just fine. See, e.g., In re FBI Distrib. Corp.,
supra note 113, at 48 (holding the postpetition breach of non-executory contract triggered the
prepetition claim as a "contingent claim ... [even though] the right to payment arises during the
reorganization when the contingency occurs"); Stewart Foods, Inc. v. Broecker (In re Stewart
Foods, Inc.), 64 F.3d 141, 143, 145 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding counterparty had prepetition claim for
postpetition breach of stipulated non-executory contract).
118. Congress either caps this intrinsically beneficial claim or deems it administrative
notwithstanding its lack of benefit (depending on one's perspective) for certain leases. 11 U.S.C.
503(b)(7) (2012).
119. Andrew noted that the historic Copeland case may have been animated (wrongly, in his
view) by this very concern. Andrew, Rejection, supra note 11, at 859-63 ("[The Copeland
concept's] premise, that the estate would become liable merely by succeeding to a contract or lease,
was not clearly correct.").
120. Id. at 860 ("The courts in these pre-statutory cases thus identified contracts and leases as
assets having the perceived potential of imposing administrative liabilities upon the estate by virtue
of its succession to the debtor's ownership.").
121. Section 503(b) deals with expenses of the estate, which are given priority under
507(a)(2). 11 U.S.C. 503(b), 507(a)(2) (2012).
122. Id. (b)(1)(A). See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Dobbins, 35 F.3d 860, 866-68 (4th Cir. 1994)
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The modifiers "actual" and "necessary" must be observed with
scrupulous care[,] because [o]ne of the goals of Chapter 11 is to keep
administrative costs to a minimum in order to preserve the debtor's
scarce resources and thus encourage rehabilitation. In keeping with
this goal, 503(b)(1)(A) was not intended to saddle debtors with
special postpetition obligations lightly or give preferential treatment
to certain select creditors by creating a broad category of
administrative expenses. 123
Here, the trustee/DIP as fiduciary of the estate has no desire for the
counterparty's services. They are not an insurance premium that preserves
valuable property the estate wishes to realize. Nor are they taxes, that
necessary evil levied on that valuable property, which are also explicitly
provided for in 503.124 Rather, they are the dead hand of the past, clamoring
for a leg up on other creditors, offending bankruptcy's policy of equality.12 5
But what is even more important is that the estate never receives any benefit
from the rejected contract and its related breach claim. This observation is
critical to contrast the situation from that where the debtor affirmatively
assumes an executory contract (thus enjoying some benefit from it) and then
subsequently breaches it. There, the estate has, however fleetingly, enjoyed
some "actual" and "necessary" usage of the contract and must pay the piper
for its attendant costs in the event of breach. 126 With this non-executory
(holding that "actual and necessary" costs must stem from affirmative use, as opposed to mere
passive possession, of estate property by the debtor and such use must provide concrete, as opposed
to merely potential, benefit to the estate).
123. Dobbins, 35 F.3d at 866 (alterations in original) (internal citations and quotations omitted)
(quoting General Amer. Transp. Corp. v. Martin (In re Mid Region Petroleum, Inc.), 1 F.3d 1130,
1134 (10th Cir. 1993)).
124. 11 U.S.C. 503(b)(1)(B) (2012).
125. See Dobbins, 35 F.3d at 865 (quoting In re James B. Downing & Co., 94 B.R. 515, 519
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) ("The presumption in bankruptcy cases is that the debtor's limited resources
will be equally distributed among the creditors. Thus, statutory priorities must be narrowly
construed.")). A strand of jurisprudence has evolved involving environmental liabilities for
burdensome property the debtor abandons postpetition under 554. Some courts have not allowed
administrative priority precisely because of the lack of benefit to the estate. See, e.g., In re H.F.
Radandt, Inc., 160 B.R. 323, 327 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1993) (Section 503 "mandate[s] that
[administrative priority] be granted where necessary to 'preserve' the estate," and "preservation
[would not] be accomplished by granting [administrative priority to environmental cleanup]"). But
many have tagged the debtor with cleanup costs as an administrative priority. See, e.g., United States
v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1009-10 (2d Cir. 1991) ("If property on
which toxic substances pose a significant hazard to public health cannot be abandoned, it must
follow ... that expenses to remove the threat posed by such substances are necessary to preserve
the estate."). The complex issues of federal environmental policy and the interaction between
CERCLA and the Code require caution with generalization from these cases.
126. Dobbins, 35 F.3d at 867 (collecting authority), focuses on the mere possession of creditor
property versus affirmative use or conscious exploitation of resources. Id. (citations omitted) (noting
that "a benefit to the estate results only from use of the . . . property" and "[t]hat which is actually
utilized by a Trustee in the operation of a debtor's business is a necessary cost"). Dobbins and its
ancestors/progeny have enjoyed more citations vigor than the Supreme Court's odd tort case of
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contract, by contrast, the unwanted property automatically vested into the
estate over the debtor's howling, and the debtor abandoned it at the first
possible moment.1 27 Accordingly, the seeming analogy between the
assumed-and-subsequently-rejected (executory) contract and the
automatically-vested-but-never-wanted-and-quickly-abandoned (non-
executory) contract falls apart.128 The simple conclusion is that because
unwanted non-executory contracts never confer any benefit, ever, upon the
estate, their breach damages upon rejection cannot find the textual anchor to
avail themselves of 503(b).1 29 They are neither an "actual" nor "necessary"
cost of "preserving" the estate. As such, the concern of presumed priority
status collapses, permitting the debtor to abandon property of a contractual
albatross under 554.130 Ample case law supports this proposition.' 3'
2. Assuming the Golden Goose.-Previously, I have contended that a
debtor need do nothing to "assume" an advantageous non-executory contract;
it automatically vests its way into the estate through 541. But for simplicity,
that prior discussion assumed the contract was not in default. If we relax that
assumption, the debtor faces a harder task. Recall both that (1) general state
contract law permits a contract party facing material breach to walk away
Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968), which established the proposition, largely on policy
grounds, that a postpetition tort damages claim should enjoy administrative priority. Id. at 485.
Nearly all subsequent cases have cabined Brown to torts. See, e.g., In re Lazar, 207 B.R. 668, 681
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997) ("From Reading arose the general rule that the postpetition tort liabilities
of a business that continues to operate in bankruptcy qualify for administrative expense priority as
actual and necessary expenses for preservation of the estate.").
127. I have no problem with the debtor paying administrative priority expenses for intra-
bankruptcy usage under the contract.
128. We might also draw indirect support from the Supreme Court's recent musings in
Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 985 (2017) that priority provisions can be treated
more flexibly in the context of reorganization when value is created for all creditors but less so in
the context of final liquidation where claimed priority must be scrutinized especially rigorously.
129. The court in Mason v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re FBI Distribution
Corp.), 330 F.3d 36, 48-49 (1st Cir. 2003) embraced this logic. It disagreed that the breach claim
on a non-executory contract should get administrative claim priority, because even though the
contract was breached postpetition, and even though as a non-executory contract, it apparently was
unrejectable and saddled the estate in perpetuity, it nonetheless did not confer any benefit on the
debtor postpetition. Id. Accordingly, the breach claim was held to be a general unsecured claim
(mimicking the outcome of 365(g)(1) as if the contract had been executory and rejected),
following my proposed analysis.
130. At least one court has adopted my approach of treating the "rejected" non-executory
contract the same as if rejected under 365. See In re Hawker Beechcraft, Inc., 486 B.R. 264, 277
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (awarding prepetition breach claim for damages for non-executory contract
rejected by debtor); see also In re Majestic Capital, Ltd., 463 B.R. 289, 299 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(allowing the debtor to reject COO's employment contract even though "the contract was not
executory" and denying administrative priority).
131. See, e.g., Dobbins, 35 F.3d at 868 ("[I]t ... strikes us as inequitable to tax unsecured
creditors for a decline in the value of collateral when the decline does not result from a use that
actually benefits the estate.").
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from the contract in self-help and (2) bankruptcy law tries, absent a
countervailing federal bankruptcy policy interest, to respect state law
entitlements (such as contract remedies) to the maximum extent possible. 132
Thus, we start from an orientation that a contract in material default should
be cancelable by the counterparty and not subject to any resuscitation in
bankruptcy absent some special Code power.
Section 365, however, accords just such special power. Section 365(b)'s
condition on assumption that requires cure necessarily implies a power to
cure. The precise scope of the 365 cure power is not free from textual doubt
and warrants its own painful statutory exegesis, 13 3 but it would be absurd to
suggest there is no power to cure implicit in 365(b). Case closed for
executory contracts. For non-executory contracts, which by definition cannot
avail themselves of 365(b) and its cure power, the power to cure must come
from elsewhere.
a. Reorganization.-Fortunately for reorganization cases, the Code
expressly confers a power to cure defaults in a plan of reorganization.' 34
Thus, statutorily, there is no important difference between the power to cure
executory contracts and non-executory contracts in reorganization cases. 135
132. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55, 57 (1979) (holding that state law should
presumptively determine rights and obligations of debtors and creditors absent a countervailing
federal bankruptcy policy evidenced by structure, text, and history of the Code).
133. Compare In re Claremont Acquisition Corp., Inc., 113 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding debtors may not assume or reject a contract that is impossible to cure), with In re Vitanza,
No. 98-19611lDWS, 1998 WL 808629, at *20, *24 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 1998) (allowing
assumption despite impossible-to-cure default). See also In re Bankvest Capital Corp., 270 B.R.
541, 543 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) ("[P]enalty rate obligation and a nonmonetary default are two
separate types of breaches which a debtor is not required to cure prior to assumption of a contract.").
Congress tried to fix these provisions with BAPCPA, but it's unclear if it did. Risa Lynn Wolf-
Smith, Bankruptcy Reform and Nonmonetary Defaults-What Have They Done Now?, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., Aug. 2005, at 6, 35. ("[C]hanges made in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 left
practitioners unsure about whether debtors' obligations to cure non-monetary defaults had been
eliminated. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) has finally
answered some of the questions, though the language is murky.").
134. 11 U.S.C. 1 123(a)(5)(G), 1322(c)(1) (2012).
135. There are discrepancies at the margin. For example, the general power to cure in
1123(a)(1)(G) does not excuse penalties of the sort expressly excused from cure for executory
contracts under 365(b)(2)(D), but it is hard to imagine this wrinkle ever becoming a driver of
future executoriness litigation. (A strand of case law unnecessary to resolve here struggles to
reconcile 365(b)(2) and 1123(d). See, e.g., In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., Bankr. Appeals, 512
B.R. 296, 306-313 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (attempting to harmonize 365(b)(2) with 1123(d)), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part and remanded sub nom. In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., Fed. Appx. 864 (11th Cir.
2015); In re Phx. Bus. Park Ltd. P'ship, 257 B.R. 517, 520-21 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2001) (relying on
365(b)(2) in addressing 1123(d) and the 1994 amendments).) Of course, not everyone wants to
cure in reorganization. In one unusual case, Meilburger v. Endeka Enterprises LLC (In re
Tsiaoushis), the reorganizing debtor wanted to ipso facto dissolve an LLC agreement and so argued
that the LLC agreement was non-executory to avoid 365(e)'s invalidation clause. 383 B.R. 616,
616-17 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007) (noting chapter 11 trustee's opposition to the LLC property
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The harder problem, then, is in liquidation cases under chapter 7, where the
non-executory contract finds no succor analogous to 365, 1123, or 1322.
And, indeed, there might be an inverse textual implication that the absence
of these explicit textual cure provisions should be read to forbid it
"interstitially" for chapter 7 debtors.
b. Liquidation.-The question of the chapter 7 debtor seeking to
assume a defaulted non-executory golden goose is admittedly the thorniest
for this analysis. I flag at the outset that this subset is a rare one. Most
executoriness fights Westbrook and White unearthed in their comprehensive
empirical study were in reorganization cases, and of the subset of liquidation
cases, not one involved an assumption battle.' 36 Nonetheless, abundant
caution counsels that we press on to see if such a power can be found. And
to tackle this question, we can initially divide the liquidation universe of
contractual defaults into "Ipso Facto" Breaches and "Everything Else"
Breaches.
i. Ipso Facto.-Consider first ipso facto defaults, where the sole
breach of the contract is the very occurrence of bankruptcy. Does the Code
permit the debtor to cure?1 37 I think the answer is probably "yes" given
541(c)(1).138 That provision of the Code invalidates ipso facto clauses that
would terminate a contract and thus prevent it from becoming property of the
estate. So the federal hostility to ipso facto clauses is clearly established.' 39
The Code also invalidates ipso facto clauses and excuses them from the
cure requirements of 365(b).14 Should this be taken as a textual signal that
541 cannot be relied upon to do all the work of rescue from ipso facto
manager's motion contending that the operating agreement was executory). This case's odd posture
makes it of limited helpfulness, alas, but still fun.
136. See Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 536-61 app. (analyzing thirty-three cases in an
appendix-only two of which involved liquidations, and none involved a debtor attempting to
assume an executory contract where the counterparty objected on non-executoriness grounds).
137. Perhaps "ignore" is better than "cure," because what would "cure" even mean in this
context-voluntarily dismissing the petition?
138. See 11 U.S.C. 541(c)(1) (2012) ("[A]n interest of the debtor in property becomes
property of the estate ... notwithstanding any provision in an agreement ... or applicable
nonbankruptcy law- ... (B) that is conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the
debtor.").
139. Note the historical contrast from earlier bankruptcy laws where ipso facto clauses were
honored; perhaps Congress over time bristled at the destruction of value. Countryman has an
excellent historical discussion on courts' reluctance to give effect to ipso facto clauses, with
fundamental disagreement over (a) whether the Act's respect of them with regard to unexpired
leases should be cabined to leases or extended to all executory contracts, and (b) whether they could
be respected only in straight bankruptcy (versus chapter reorganization) cases under the Act.
Countryman II, supra note 23, at 521-27.
140. 11 U.S.C. 365(b)(2) (2012) (excusing ipso facto default cure); 365(e)(1) (invalidating
ipso facto default clauses).
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clauses? I don't think so. Even leaving aside the permissibility of Congress
using some belt and suspenders to avoid negative implications (perhaps
having some overlap between 541(c)(2) and 365(b)(2)), if we really
wanted to get down into the textual weeds, we could point to 365(b)(2)'s
nominally broader scope than 541(c)(1)'s. For example, 365(b)(2)
expands the denigration of ipso facto terms to those triggered by postpetition
finances. 141
More importantly, if we step back from the text to consider the structure
and purpose of the Code, it makes little sense to invalidate an ipso facto
clause in an executory contract for purposes of getting the contract into the
bankruptcy estate only to find that, but for 365(b)(2), the same contract
would be unassumable. What would the purpose of its entry into the estate
have even been-to await inevitable rejection? But of course, if we take
seriously the concept of a non-executory contract, then we immediately recall
365 is of no moment because such a contract vests into the estate
automatically by virtue of 541, and it is quite clear that 541(c)(1)
invalidates the ipso facto clause at the vesting stage. 142Accordingly, even for
the chapter 7 debtor, who is accorded no textually explicit power to cure
defaults, it seems uncontentious to claim that defaults on account of ipso
facto clauses may be ignored and the federal bankruptcy policy of hostility
toward them may comfortably preempt the state law contract right of
automatic termination.143
ii. Everything Else.-The harder question, then, is the Everything
Else world of defaults. Can they be cured for the chapter 7 debtor? After all,
if a non-executory contract is a discrete "thing" that enters the estate
irrespective of 365, then that "thing" is a contract already in default.
Assuming no stay violation,144 presumably the counterparty has the right to
141. Id. 365(b)(2).
142. This is the approach taken by In re Denman, 513 B.R. 720, 725, 727 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
2014) and Movitz v. Fiesta Inv., LLC (In re Ehmann), 319 B.R. 200, 206 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005).
143. A strand of LLC cases has tried to revivify state laws providing for ipso facto termination
of contracts through the back door of 365(c)(1), which bars assumption of contracts if assignment
is prohibited by applicable non-bankruptcy law. 11 U.S.C. 365(c)(1). These cases sneakily say
that while the contract is not ipso facto terminated (per 365(e)), it can never be assumed (per
365(c)(1)), leading to the same result: killing the contract for the debtor. This proposition is
contentious. Compare, e.g., Nw. Wholesale, Inc. v. PAC Organic Fruit, LLC, 357 P.3d 650, 662-
63 (Wash. 2015) (holding 365(e)(1)'s prohibition against ipso facto clauses to be inapplicable),
with, e.g., Horizons A Far, LLC v. Webber (In re Soderstrom), 484 B.R. 874, 880 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2013) (holding 365 applies if the contract is executory).
144. It is readily possible that a declaration of breach could be shown as an attempt to punish
the debtor for stiffing the counterparty. See, e.g., Pester Ref. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am. (In re Pester
Ref. Co.), 58 B.R. 189, 191 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1985) ("Even if the insurance contract was not treated
as an executory contract, the unilateral act of INA to cancel the policy would be barred by the
automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. 362(a).").
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exercise the termination right for self-help. Can the bankruptcy debtor,
nonetheless, ram cure down the counterparty's throat? Here, I concede a need
to resort to weaker textual footing, but I take solace in the Code's Last Refuge
of the Textually Damned, 105.145
Let's consider the situation in which it may arise. A debtor in liquidation
is in default on a valuable contract the trustee wishes to assume, say, an LLC
operating agreement, but the counterparty has successfully argued the
contract is non-executory because remaining performance is only due on one
side. The trustee promptly offers to cure, noting that the counterparty has
incurred no financial harm on account of the default. Nonetheless, the
counterparty recalcitrantly insists on its rights to terminate the contract,
seizing upon the technical right of the default as an escape route from the
unfavorable bargain. Just to close the loop, state law has no equitable
doctrines of excuse that the hapless debtor can point out to stave off this
churlish termination.' 4 6 At wit's end, the trustee comes to the bankruptcy
court and says, "Look, this contract has value for the creditors, it's no skin
off the counterparty's nose because all defaults have been cured, and so I
would like an injunction under 105 preventing him from exercising his self-
help remedy of termination." Could the bankruptcy court issue such relief?
This hypothetical presents sympathetic facts for just such a
countervailing federal policy-the preservation of value for creditors with no
offsetting harm to the counterparty (other than being made to live with the
bad deal it made)-that warrants preempting the counterparty's state law
self-termination rights.147 Well before Timbers,14 8 the Supreme Court
accorded great latitude to bankruptcy courts to enjoin difficult creditors
whose actions would imperil a bankruptcy proceeding's success.14 9 And, of
course, since the contract is being ratified by the estate, any subsequent
breach damages would be entitled to administrative priority as a backstop,
145. 11 U.S.C. 105(a) (2012) ("The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.").
146. Cf, e.g., 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 229 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(establishing that a non-occurrence of a condition can be excused if the non-occurrence would result
in disproportionate forfeiture).
147. Westbrook offers some initial insights into what fundamental bankruptcy policies might
be (at least with respect to contracts), listing four basic policies. Westbrook & White, supra note 6,
at 515-17. I accept these at face value and note that maximization of creditor value appears front
and center on this policy list.
148. See United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365,
372, 377-78 (1988) (upholding the restriction of secured creditors' compensation for lost time value
of their collateral).
149. The canonical case for this proposition is Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Chi. R.I. & P.
Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 678-79 (1935), although there was some debate over that holding's
application to straight bankruptcy liquidation cases. Id. at 671-72. See also Countryman II, supra
note 23, at 517 (discussing case law).
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according the counterparty even more comfort.150 As a final kicker, the debtor
would note that under chapter 11, this surly creditor would be deemed to have
supported the plan as unimpaired.'5 1 Indeed, on these facts, I would think the
case for injunctive relief would be presumptively attractive; albeit requiring
some hoops to jump through, cure would be allowed, by hook or by 105
crook. If that is so, then even the hardest case of a non-executory contract-
the non-ipso facto default of a chapter 7 debtor's contract-still can be cured
under a properly purposive reading of the Code. It's not as textually
straightforward as 365(b), but the cure power is still there.
3. Summary.-Note what a thorough working through of the Code's
application to a non-executory contract reveals: far from relying on 365,
the debtor or trustee has ample opportunity under the Code, perhaps with
some creativity but surely on solid textual footing, to cure an attractive
contract's default and thereby retain a golden goose. This means, crucially,
that the power to cure actually requires no recourse to 365(b) and thus no
concomitant need to demonstrate executoriness: executory and non-
executory contracts alike can be cured. And if that is correct, then I have
succeeded in my underlying mission of eliminating the main functional
difference in the treatment of executory versus non-executory contracts under
the Code. Indeed, I am too modest. Not only have I collapsed the difference
between executory and non-executory contracts under the Code regarding the
ability to assume a golden goose, but I have also similarly collapsed the
distinction regarding the rejection of an albatross, by dispatching the concern
of priority repayment of 554 abandonment damages. My mission
accomplished, the counterparty has lost the primary foundation for the
arbitrage opportunity, which means the ex ante incentives to litigate
executoriness will dry up. Executoriness remains but it has lost all its sting. 152
As such, I no longer care about the definition of executoriness, and, more
importantly, nor will anyone else. 153 This is perhaps a radical approach to
150. 11 U.S.C. 365(g)(2) (2012).
151. Id. 1124(2).
152. At worst, I have created a new boilerplate duty to tack on a footnote to every 365 motion
that says, "in the event this contract is found to be non-executory, the debtor retains its rights under
541 and moves to abandon under 554." (This is a trivial evil compared to Stern v. Marshall, 564
U.S. 462 (2011), this generation's fount of bankruptcy litigation.)
153. If pushed for my own definitional preference, I would revert to Williston's: "[A] contract,
the obligation of which relates to the future, or a contract under which the parties have bound
themselves to future activity that is not yet completed or performed." 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 1:19 (4th ed. 2007). See also 3A WILLIAM COLLIER,
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 63.33, at 1935 (14th ed. 1940) ("All contracts to a greater or less extent
are executory. When they cease to be so, they cease to be contracts.") (citing Williston). This
approach has a pedigree in the legislative history to the Code, see In re Norquist, 43 B.R. 224, 225,
228 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1984) (citing Williston and stating "the Supreme Court in citing the
legislative history appears to have agreed with the expression of Congress that a precise definition
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executory contracts, but its elimination of senseless litigation should make it
normatively attractive.
IV. Counterarguments
I anticipate several respectable counterarguments to this new approach,
and so I offer this preemptive rebuttal.
A. Reading "Executory" Out of the Code?
This is a trick objection, because many, like Westbrook, want to read it
out of the Code, so would see this as praise rather than criticism to my
approach of taking the idea of a non-executory contract seriously. But I can
see a deeply committed textualist bemoaning that I have rendered
"executory" redundant, effectively redrafting 365 as if the word had been
deleted.' 54
This critique misses the mark. My treatment of non-executory contracts
merely mimics the treatment of executory contracts under 365, but does so
through a distinct doctrinal route that respects the formal categorical
difference. Now, whether this synthetic replication upsets the "structure" of
the Code's "implicit policies" by creating near-redundancy is a separate
attack, but as soon as we move into the structure and policies of the Code, I
gain the theoretical high ground by pointing to the absolute absence of
justification found anywhere in the Code (or anywhere else) to treat non-
executory contracts differently from executory contracts.'55
B. Evading 365's Burdens?
My response to the prior criticism unfortunately runs right into the snare
of this correlative complaint: if non-executory contracts merely mimic 365
treatment, but don't exactly run through the 365 gauntlet, then that means
the burdensome provisions of 365 (e.g., the adequate assurances of future
performance as a precondition to assumption under 365(b)(1)(C)), are
simply excused for non-executory contracts. If so, I've turned executoriness
of an executory contract is inadvisable"), and Westbrook, too, finds it congenial. Westbrook &
White, supra note 6, at 520 (explaining that "executory" should be understood in light of common
law). Thus, I do not care about "truly" non-executory contracts in the sense of discussing sunsets
after dark, Westbrook, supra note 3, at 243, just those contracts that flunk the Countryman test but
still have unperformed aspects.
154. Similar angst enraged the district court in Stewart, which objected to the treatment of a
non-executory contract's breach as a claim under 502, because to do so would treat the contract
as rejected under 365(b), which was not allowed in its view-a holding that was promptly reversed
on appeal. See Stewart Foods, Inc. v. Broecker (In re Stewart Foods, Inc.), 64 F.3d 141, 144-45
(4th Cir. 1995).
155. See In re ZRM-Oklahoma P'ship, 156 B.R. 67, 70-71 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1993)
(emphasizing the importance of interpreting the Code in a "coherent and consistent" manner).
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on its head by creating a reverse arbitrage where the debtors will now try to
argue their contracts aren't executory to evade such requirements!I 56
This concern, while logically articulable, is overstated for two
interrelated reasons. First, to a considerable extent, the requirements of
365(b)(1)(C) (and (b)(1)(B) for that matter) are largely redundant to
contract rights under state law. 151 Consider by way of example the ubiquitous
Uniform Commercial Code's sales provisions in Article 2. There, the
insolvency of the buyer is listed as a categorical example of objective grounds
for insecurity, and insecurity gives rise to the right to demand adequate
assurance of future performance. 158 Second, recall that the foundation of the
statutory power to allow nonconsensual cure (outside the reorganization
context) is likely injunctive relief through 105, and so, in fashioning that
relief, a bankruptcy court would be loath to give the debtor a "freebie" of not
having to provide assurances that her executory-contract-holding peer would,
especially when such assurances are likely the required baseline at state law.
(There certainly are no countervailing federal policies requiring Butner
156. This appears to have happened in the cryptic Bronner v. Chenoweth-Massie P'ship (In re
Nat'l Fin. Realty Tr.), 226 B.R. 586, 587-88 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1998), in which the receiver wrote
a sloppy plan forgetting to assume a valuable option in chapter 11. Id. When the counterparty caught
him and demanded evidence of assumption, he pivoted to say the contract was non-executory and
so had not been presumptively rejected (as all executory contracts had been) under the plan. Id. The
court agreed and the option, deemed non-executory, survived the plan, saving the receiver's bacon.
Id. The counterparty's unsuccessful argument had sounded in notice, implying that absent such
evidence of assumption the counterparty was right to infer deemed rejection and enjoy repose
accordingly. Id. The counterparty's problem, however, is really in the Code's lack of default rules
for executory contracts in non-chapter 7 cases. Westbrook and White imply that the option should
have been deemed rejected under 365(d), but I don't see how that's the case, unless this was a
chapter 7 case, which it did not appear to be. See Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 524.
Section 365(d)(2) merely sets a deadline for the assumption/rejection decision, but, unlike
365(d)(1), it does not specify the consequences of the failure to act. This results in a case law
quagmire. See, e.g., Phx. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone III Joint
Venture), 995 F.2d 1274, 1281 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that a lease neither assumed nor rejected
before a chapter 11 plan confirmation just rides through with the debtor still bound and with the
creditor without a provable claim). Note 365(p), which does provide a default rule in the case of
inaction, interestingly does not textually restrict its application to unexpired leases. 11 U.S.C.
365(p) (2012). Indeed, this is not the only provision of 365 that does not apply on its face to
executory contracts: 365(o) would appear to apply only to non-executory contracts-and this is a
subsection of 365! See id. 365(o):
[T]he trustee shall be deemed to have assumed ... and shall immediately cure any
deficit under, any commitment by the debtor to a Federal depository institutions
regulatory agency.. . to maintain the capital of an insured depository institution, and
any claim for a subsequent breach of the obligations thereunder shall be entitled to
priority under section 507.
157. See 11 U.S.C. 365(b)(1)(B) (2012) (requiring compensation for breach damages before
assumption); id. 365(b)(1)(C) (requiring adequate assurance of future performance before
assumption).
158. U.C.C. 2-609 cmt. 3 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2002) ("[A] buyer who




divergence from state law that spring to mind.) In short, I am not denying the
risk, 159 but I think it likely the concern of seeking a declaration of non-
executoriness as a bypass around 365's conditions on assumptions will
arise infrequently.
Finally, I should mention the cognate idea of "evading" judicial review
under 365(a).16 0 Recall that the assumption-or rejection-of an executory
contract requires court approval. 16 1 If non-executory contracts do not run
through 365, are non-debtor stakeholders stripped of their judicial oversight
protection? Again, I think this concern is overstated, even leaving aside the
implicitly heroic assumptions about the judicial role in a corporate decision
largely governed by the business judgment rule. First, a non-executory
contract that is rejected is abandoned under 554, and that does require a
court hearing even if it does not explicitly require "approval." 16 2 Few debtors
will abandon a valuable contract for nefarious reasons, fess up to it in open
court, and then sit back and stare a judge in the eyes and coolly sneer,
"Nothing you can do about it because it isn't even your decision to approve!"
No litigant has that much political capital to squander, and every judge has
heard of 105 and can trot out decisions intoning that bankruptcy courts are
courts of equity. 16 3 Second, a non-executory contract in default that is
assumed will require court blessing as well, either through the discretionary
159. One case where this has popped up is BNY, Capital Funding LLC v. U.S. Airways, Inc.,
345 B.R. 549 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006). There, the debtor was able to retain a contract to make a
financial accommodation, despite the bar of 365(c)(2), by successfully persuading the court that
the contract was non-executory and hence fell outside 365 and 365(c)(2). Id. at 553, 555.
Westbrook and White see this as an outrage, where U.S. Airways got out of 365(c)(2) jail free,
Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 525, but I'm more ambivalent. Even leaving aside the court's
point that the debtor had onerous financial conditions precedent to meet before exercise (not least
of which was keeping current on the aircraft leases to the optioner), 345 B.R. at 555, I am not sure
how much divergence from state law evasion of 365(c)(2) would entail. If, as the U.S. Airways
court conceded, the option was a contract (albeit a non-executory one), then the traditional contract
defenses and excuses spring into action. Certainly it is an open question whether insolvency of the
counterparty would discharge performance, either on grounds of material mistake, 1 RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 152 (AM. LAW INST. 1981), or frustration of purpose, id. 265-68,
especially if the subject matter of the contract was to make a loan. At a minimum, adequate
assurances would be demandable as a condition to continuation. For a good background discussion
of Congress' intent behind 365(c)(2), see In re Teligent, 268 B.R. 723, 737 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2001).
160. Section 365(a)'s requirement of court approval stems from a long history of courts
inserting themselves into an oversight role under the Act. See Countryman II, supra note 23, at 556.
161. See Allegheny Ctr. Assocs. v. Appliance Store, Inc. (In re Appliance Store, Inc.), 148 B.R.
226, 232 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that 365(a) superseded prior case law allowing
assumption without court approval).
162. The 554 hearing will also give notice to the counterparty definitively clarifying its
contractual rights.
163. Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial Lawmaking in
a Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 1 (2006) ("A basic tenet of bankruptcy practice is that
'the bankruptcy court is a court of equity."') (citations omitted).
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power to confirm the plan of reorganization or the discretionary power to
order the cure injunctively in liquidation. So all roads lead to court
involvement; no wool will be pulled over judicial eyes.
C. Forfeiting 365's Benefits?
Conversely, there is the reverse concern: that, other than the power to
cure, there are other benefits to the debtor in 365 that the non-executory-
contract-holding debtor will not be able to access. Does my synthetic
replication of 365 through other provisions of the Code cover these benefits
as well? Here, I think I have met my Waterloo and have to concede not. But
it is a trivial Waterloo. The principal benefit in 365, beyond the general
power to cure addressed previously, is the excuse of an impossible-to-cure
default for some forms of unexpired leases.1 6 4
Section 365(b)(1)(A)'s text is a mess, but it appears to excuse
impossible-to-cure defaults of real property leases (and add on some extra
requirements for what to do if that lease is non-residential).165 The
implication of the most likely reading of the drafting is that a debtor with an
impossible-to-cure default on a personal property lease is just out of luck: the
impossibility precludes cure, and non-cure precludes assumption. Here, I am
forced to concede an apparent benefit unique to 365; the debtor outside
365 has no similar salvation. That said, the problem appears trivial when
we, for the first time, confront 365's application both to unexpired leases
and to executory contracts. While "executoriness" has generated a litigation
minefield, "unexpired" has not. Parties (and courts) are less likely to disagree
whether a lease is over or not; one anticipates an empty set of litigants
fighting over whether and how the debtor can cure the defaults of an expired
lease. 166
164. There is the boondoggle damage claim under 507(a)(2) and 502(b)(7) for certain
nonresidential real property leases, 11 U.S.C. 507(a)(2), 502(b)(7) (2012), but leases interest me
less than contracts for the reasons given in the text. If pressed, I could parse the debtor's power to
sidestep "cure[]" with "provid[ing] adequate assurance" of "prompt[]" cure as a possible benefit
accorded by the Code unavailable at state contract law, but that's too fine a pinhead upon which to
dance. Id. 365(b)(1)(A).
165. A plausible reading is that 365(b) does the opposite and declares that impossible-to-cure
defaults on real property leases are just lethal, period, for the debtor seeking assumption, but that
nonresidential leases are saved from the fire if the specified conditions are met. This interpretation
requires ascribing to Congress an intent to render residential leases harder for debtors to assume
than nonresidential ones, a reading of 365(b) that skirts absurdity.
166. Although, they do fight the timing of when the defibrillators have to come off. See 11
U.S.C. 541(b)(2) (2012) (excluding from estate nonresidential real property leases that expire
under their own timing provisions).
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D. Inapplicability of Other 365 Provisions?
There are surely other differences that would arise from whether or not
a contract falls under 365, but it is difficult to say ex ante which way they
cut, let alone predict whether they will birth a new fount of arbitrage. For
example, the sixty-day deemed rejection rule is clearly one that would only
apply to executory contracts under 365,167 but it's hard to say with any
confidence whether this will cause many executoriness fights. It surely does
sometimes, 16 8 but it seems likely that whatever incentive effect it has is
dwarfed by the status quo's preoccupation with the make-or-break
excutoriness question of power to assume/reject vel non. 16 9
The two most significant wild cards are the special rules within 365
for real estate contracts and intellectual property agreements. 17 0 The real
estate rules are easier: the special property-like remedy accorded by
365(i)(2) likely maps many states' real property rules for vendees in
possession. 171 (Somewhat ironically, a vendee who has moved into full
possession is likely to have tendered full payment and may not be in an
executory contract at all.) And because it is such a rarely litigated provision
of the Code, it is unclear whether 365(j)'s rules for vendees not-yet-in-
possession intend to strip property rights if state law grants an equitable
property remedy under a conversion doctrine. Accordingly, it is difficult to
assess whether there is a material (or any) inside-versus-outside 365
difference here, let alone whether executoriness fights will be prevalent as a
consequence. 172
The hardest prediction pertains to the intellectual property rules of
365(n). It is difficult to score 365(n)'s ancillary provisions. 173 Even
Westbrook throws up his hands and concedes they largely (if not identically)
167. Id. 365(d)(1).
168. It came up in Ebert v. De Vries Family Farm, LLC (In re Devries), No. 11-43165-DML-7,
2014 WL 4294540, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2014) (trustee who missed sixty-day deadline
to assume tried to argue that the LLC operating agreement was non-executory so it would not be
deemed rejected).
169. See, e.g., Foothills Tex., Inc. v. MTGLQ Inv'rs, L.P. (In re Foothills Tex., Inc.), 476 B.R.
143, 155 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (conceiving the debtor's entire adversary proceeding to turn on
whether the contract was executory).
170. 11 U.S.C. 365(i)(2) (2012) (special counterparty remedies for vendees in possession);
id. 365(j) (vendees out of possession); id. 365(n)(1) (intellectual property licensees).
171. See, e.g., Nickels Midway Pier, LLC v. Wild Waves, LLC (In re Nickels Midway Pier,
LLC), 341 B.R. 486, 496-97 (D. N.J. 2006) (relying on state law to determine that 365(i) was
inapplicable).
172. The closest case I could find to mentioning this issue was In re Nickels Midway Pier, LLC,
which mused in dicta on the preemptive scope of 365 and its interaction with state law specific
performance remedies (and more specifically, the separate provision of the Code defining "claim").
Id. at 498-99.
173. 11 U.S.C. 365(n)(1)(B) (2012) (allowing some licensees to retain rights to licensed IP
or supplementary agreements in return for continued royalty payments).
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track preexisting non-bankruptcy contract rights.174 Review of the case law
involving 365(n) where executoriness is disputed shows an unsurprising
focus on the rejection vel non question (i.e., can the license be rejected or
not).17 5 There do not appear to be many secondary disputes over attempts to
avoid perceived burdens of these ancillary provisions. 176 Moreover, there are
a host of other intellectual property disputes (e.g., trademarks) that do not
even fall under this subsection's scope. 17 7 In sum, loath as I am to end on an
equivocal note, in all honesty I cannot say whether these residual issues will
drive ongoing executoriness disputes; I can just share empirical skepticism
that they are likely to be meaningful. 178
V. A (Very Quick) Road Test Case Study
In closing, let us take a brief road test to see how the new approach
would have better served a famous bankruptcy case, Exide.179 In Exide, the
bankruptcy court (affirmed by the district court) held the debtor's
burdensome trademark assignment contract to be executory and allowed its
rejection as a key step of the reorganization plan. 18 0 The counterparty
appealed all the way up to the Third Circuit, which reversed and said the
debtor's contract was not executory under the Countryman test and hence
could not be rejected.1 81 The poor bankruptcy court was left with a
reorganized debtor that was now saddled with a trademark license that it
thought had been cancelled but was now apparently binding.' 82 Under the
174. Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 532, 533 n.246. Westbrook indeed brands any
divergence from state law in 365(n) (and cognate subsections) "congressional mistakes."
Westbrook, supra note 3, at 331 n.434.
175. See, e.g., Lewis Bros. Bakeries Inc. v. Interstate Brands Corp. (In re Interstate Bakeries
Corp.), 751 F.3d 955, 961-64 (8th Cir. 2014) (applying the Countryman test to uphold the objection
that the license could not be rejected as it was non-executory). This case presents the wonderful
surreality of the debtor's attempt first to reject the contract, and then subsequent withdrawal of that
motion and substitution of a motion to assume it. Id. at 959. Nonetheless, the counterparty's
resistance persisted in both postures! Id. at 964.
176. One example is Szilagyi v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC (In re Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Co.), 459
B.R. 306 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011), in which the parties fought over the scope of the waiver provisions
of 365(n)(2)(C). Id. at 341. But there was no challenge to executoriness in that case, which was
conceded. Id. at 342.
177. 11 U.S.C. 101(35A) (2012).
178. Cf Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 511 (noting that the focus of executoriness fights
is whether debtors can assume/reject the contract).
179. In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957 (3d Cir. 2010).
180. Id. at 961.
181. Id. at 964 ("Because the Agreement is not an executory contract, Exide cannot reject it.").
182. The debtor's backup argument that the contract had nonetheless been dealt with under the
plan as a claim was rejected by an angry remand court that invoked judicial estoppel, finding the
debtor's conduct end-runny. Exide Techs. v. Enersys Del., Inc. (In re Exide Techs.), Bankr. No. 02-
11125 (KJC), Adv. No. 10-52766 (KJC), 2013 WL 85193, at *1, *7-8 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 8, 2013)
(noting that the complaint was filed "in an attempt to circumvent" the Third Circuit ruling).
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functional approach, of course, it could have been rejected. Executoriness's
definition was not just fatal, but unclear in its application to the various courts
that faced the issue. Under my approach, the debtor would not have cared.
What the debtor could have done as soon as it realized it was in dodgy
executoriness terrain, which it did,18 3 was simply tack a footnote onto its
365 rejection motion saying that in the alternative, the motion was to
abandon burdensome property of the estate under 554 to which it would not
accord any damages priority status. As such, either by 365(g)(1) or by
502, the debtor would have paid off a monetary claim to the licensee and
moved on, as it hoped, with its reorganized life. All this would have been
independent of whether the Third Circuit adhered to Countryman, decided to
overrule it in favor of Westbrook, or took some new path (of which there is
no shortage of options). 184
VI. Conclusion
The ABI Commission has made clear that executoriness is here to stay.
Since it is, we should stifle its arbitrage-inducing tendencies by
demonstrating how 365's key functional outcomes can be replicated by
carefully applying other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to non-executory
contracts, the residual category of agreements that flunk whatever test of
executoriness is governing circuit law. This new approach will redirect the
executoriness litigation energy to more productive fields. This path does not
follow Westbrook directly. It does better: it honors him for having shown us
the right way.
183. Id. at *4.
184. See, e.g., In re Riodizio, Inc., 204 B.R. 417,424 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (following neither
Countryman nor Westbrook).
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Global Insolvency Proceedings for a Global Market:
The Universalist System and the Choice of a
Central Court
Jay L. Westbrook*
In this time of relative prosperity, large multinational companies are
filing insolvency proceedings all over the world. 1 Restructuring is now part
of the daily routine of global business-back then a bit more, at the moment
a bit less, but always a stream of needed repairs. The overall challenge is to
manage damaged enterprises across borders in a world governed by nation-
states. In this Article, I suggest that we should enlarge our perspective to
embrace not only the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (Model Law), 2
but also the larger system of modified universalism that it both presupposes
and anticipates.
* Benno C. Schmidt Chair of Business Law, The University of Texas School of Law. I am grateful
to David Stevenson and Yanan Zhao, both Texas Law '18, for excellent research for this Article. It
is based on a lecture given at the National University of Singapore, August 17, 2017, Distinguished
Visitor Lecture Series, the Centre for Banking & Finance Law (CBFL). I am especially grateful to
Professor Hans Tjio, Co-Director of the CBFL, for the opportunity to learn so much about
developments in insolvency law in Singapore. Some of the same themes were part of a keynote
address I gave at a Chicago-Kent College of Law conference, Comparative and Cross-Border Issues
in Insolvency Law, November 30, 2017, admirably organized by Professor Adrian Walters.
1. At the time of writing, recent filings have included In re Premium Point Master Mortg. Credit
Fund, Ltd., No. 1:18-BK-10586 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 1, 2018); In re PT Bakrie Telecom
Tbk, No. 1:18-BK-10200 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 29, 2018); In re RCR Int'l Inc. and RCR Int'l
Inc., No. 1:18-BK-10112 (Bankr. D. Del. filed Jan. 18, 2018); In re Bibby Offshore Servs. Plc,
No. 1:17-BK-13588 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 20, 2017); In re CGG Holding (U.S.) Inc., No.
1:17-BK-11637 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed June 14, 2017); In re Toys "R" Us, Inc., No. 3:17-BK-34665
(Bankr. E.D. Va. filed Sept. 19, 2017); In re Zetta Jet USA, Inc., No. 2:17-BK-21386-SK (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 15, 2017); In re Seadrill Ltd., No. 6:17-BK-60079 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. filed
Sept. 12, 2017); In re Takata Americas, No. 1:17-BK-11372 (Bankr. D. Del. filed June 25, 2017)
(seeking chapter 15 relief in aid of a Japanese proceeding); In re Ultra Petroleum Corp., 575 B.R.
361 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2017); see also Michael O'Boyle & Michael Perry, Mexico's ICA Says Filed
Pre-packaged Bankruptcy Plan, REUTERS (Aug. 26, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us
-mexico-ica/mexicos-ica-says-filed-pre-packaged-bankruptcy-plan-idUSKCN1B604S
[https://perma.cc/8NDV-VLLU].
2. U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL), UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION, U.N. Sales
No. E. 14.V.2 (2014) [hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL LAW].
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I. Background
As explained just below, I have argued that the text of the Model Law
should be interpreted as a "systems" text consistent with its intended purpose
as a major part of that international system. I expand the argument here to
say that the needs of the system of modified universalism embodied in the
Model Law should govern judicial action over an expanding pool of issues
touching international insolvency. Those jurisdictions that have adopted texts
or judicial principles similar to the Model Law should embrace a similar
understanding, even if they do not adopt the Model Law itself. 3
This Article discusses these key elements of the Model Law system:
1. At the heart of the system of modified universalism is the choice of
a central court to coordinate a multinational case, so the discussion
includes an analysis of the general rule for choosing the central court
and important exceptions to that rule;
2. The "center of the debtor's main interests" (COMI) test best
identifies the central court because the court's relationship to the
debtor legitimates its actions as the jurisdiction with the strongest
interest in the case;
3. Certain situations create exceptions to the COMI test or require
supplementation of that test; and
4. Every multinational case requires real-time coordination and
cooperation among jurisdictions, which in turn require an active
judicial role in guiding professionals toward international
communication and cooperation.
A. "Systems" Texts
When a binding legal text is adopted that has a purpose or rationale only
if applied as part of a system, the courts should be active to resolve issues it
does not squarely cover in a way that facilitates that system. To retain old
doctrines or refuse to consider new issues may amount to obstruction of the
system that the lawgiver meant to adopt. 4 In this Article, my central objective
3. A number of countries that have not adopted the Model Law nonetheless follow similar
principles under the doctrine of "comity" or international cooperation. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 713, 721 & nn.50-53 (2005) (discussing
German and Spanish bankruptcy law).
4. This Article is not the place to launch an extensive discussion of textualism, so I will merely
note my disagreement with any doctrine that permits the courts to announce they will not move an
inch beyond what a legal text requires even to further the policy that is reflected in the text. I must
observe, however, that allegiance to such doctrines seems often to turn on judicial views about the
underlying policy. For a juxtaposition of the ever-narrowing scope of "extraterritorial" effects of
Congressional enactments with the constantly expanding boundaries of the Federal Arbitration Act
in the United States, compare In re Ampal-Am. Isr. Corp., 562 B.R. 601 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017)
(refusing to apply provisions of the Bankruptcy Code extraterritorially absent clear statutory intent),
with Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013) (holding that the FAA does not
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is to describe the needs of the global insolvency system as represented by the
Model Law. As one consequence, I hope to advance our understanding of the
Model Law as a systems law that should be interpreted in ways that advance
the needs of the system. In a recent article, I outlined the systems analysis:
One useful distinction that I have not found in the literature is the
difference between a standards text and a system text. It seems
plausible to divide international instruments into two broad categories:
those that seek to establish international (or universal) standards and
those that seek to establish an international system....
As a general proposition, it would seem that the international rule
for the standards texts would usually be focused almost entirely on
uniformity, so that states and individual actors could conform their
conduct ... to those international norms, and nations could be
consistent in applying those norms. By contrast, uniformity would be
an important but subsidiary goal for a system text. There the
overriding need is for decisions that enable the international system to
function as designed. Uniformity would certainly contribute to that
goal, but would hardly be enough by itself. 5
I concluded by proposing that "courts should determine if an
international text establishes a system rather than standards; if so, it should
adopt whatever [rule] best enables that system to achieve its intended ends."6
In that analysis, the Model Law is a systems (institutional) text, while a text
devoted to international rules (for example, about priority in insolvency
distributions) would be a "standards" text. While any legal text must be
applied as written, most texts require interpretation and occasionally the
filling of an unintended gap that impedes the text's intended function.
Understanding the needs of the global insolvency system helps both in
applying the Model Law and in achieving the demands of modified
universalism where the Model Law does not apply. 7 This Article starts with
that understanding and proceeds from there.
B. Goals of Global Insolvency Law
In that context, we begin with the fundamental goals of insolvency law
that are common to all of us: maximizing value for all stakeholders and
permit courts to invalidate a contractual waiver of class arbitration on the ground that the plaintiff's
cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery), and AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (invalidating a law that conditioned the enforcement
of arbitration on the availability of class procedures because that law interfered with fundamental
attributes of arbitration).
5. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Interpretation Internationale, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 739, 750-53
(2015).
6. Id. at 750-51.
7. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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satisfying public policy in a fair allocation of that value. 8 Nations still differ
substantially in defining the classes of stakeholders in an insolvency
proceeding and in the allocation of value to each class, 9 but we are united in
seeking to obtain as much value as possible and to achieve socially desirable
ends in a fair and orderly process.
Neither of these goals can be fully realized unless a single collective
insolvency proceeding extends over an entire market. Only in a single
proceeding can all assets be assembled to be sold or recapitalized free of prior
claims and value allocated fairly to all stakeholders.1 0 Only a unified
approach can produce predictable results that enhance the efficiency of
market transactions based on a common understanding of the effects of
insolvency." For that very reason, the founders of the United States, in
8. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Systemic Corporate Distress: A Legal Perspective, in
RESOLUTION OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE DESIGN OF
BANKRUPTCY LAWS 47, 55 (Stijn Claessens et al. eds., 2001) ("General agreement exists on the
central purposes of insolvency law: maximizing asset values, providing equality of treatment for
creditors and other parties with similar legal rights, preventing and undoing fraud, and providing
commercially predictable results and transparent legal procedures.").
9. See, e.g., JANIS P. SARRA, EMPLOYEE AND PENSION CLAIMS DURING COMPANY
INSOLVENCY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SIXTY-TWO JURISDICTIONS 9, 13 (2008) (finding that
some nations use a priority system for employees, who are viewed as "particularly vulnerable
claimants," and that many of those countries institute caps on the amounts of claims that are given
priority).
10. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 2276, 2292-93 (2000) (explaining that a single bankruptcy proceeding can provide a unified
approach to assembly and sales of assets, increase the possibility of reorganization, and ensure
equality for stakeholders with similar legal rights around the world).
11. Id. at 2293 ("A single court would maximize asset values ... by providing a unified
approach to assembly and sale of assets as a whole. If it commanded a worldwide stay, it could most
effectively protect those assets prior to sale."). See also Cambridge Gas Transp. Co. v. Official
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors [2006] UKPC 26, [2007] 1 AC 508 (appeal taken from the Isle of
Man) (reaffirming the universalist tradition of the English common law and recognizing pragmatism
and realism that are integral features of the notion of "modified universalism"); McGrath v. Riddell
(in re HIH Cas. & Gen. Ins. Ltd.) [2008] UKHL 21, [2008] 1WLR 852, [6]-[7], [30], [36] (appeal
taken from Eng.) (advocating for the principle of universalism); World Bank Group [WBG],
Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes, at 20 (2016),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/518861467086038847/pdf/106399-WP-REVISED
-PUBLIC-ICR-Principle-Final-Hyperlinks-revised-Latest.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WWQ-GDZW]
(discussing the objectives of effective insolvency systems); TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY:
GLOBAL PRINCIPLES FOR COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY CASES princ. 1-2 (AM.
LAW INST. & INT'L INSOLVENCY INST. 2012) (outlining the objectives and aim of the Global
Principles) [https://perma.cc/T7MS-CJV7] [hereinafter ALI-III GLOBAL PRINCIPLES]; Todd Kraft
& Allison Aranson, Transnational Bankruptcies: Section 304 and Beyond, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 329, 364 (1993) ("A system that brings together all the creditors, and all the debtors' property,
for a single distribution is the most efficient and equitable system possible."); John Lowell, Conflict
of Laws as Applied to Assignments for Creditors, 1 HARV. L. REV. 259, 264 (1888) ("[I]t would be
better in nine cases out of ten that all settlements of insolvent debtors with their creditors should be
made in a single proceeding, and generally at a single place[.]"); Jay Lawrence Westbrook,
Multinational Financial Distress: The Last Hurrah of Territorialism, 41 TEX. INT'L L.J. 321, 324-
25 (2006) ("To function effectively, bankruptcy law must have a reach co-extensive with the market
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seeking to create a single national market, realized that one of the few specific
powers that must be given to the new national government was the authority
to make uniform national laws on the subject of bankruptcy.'2 Similarly,
older writers asserted the "universalism" of insolvency law.13
It follows that the globalized marketplace of the twenty-first century
requires a global insolvency proceeding. That should be our goal. However,
because insolvency laws differ considerably around the world, and it is a
technical and difficult area of law, that ideal will not be achieved for some
time.'4 In light of that, an increasing number of courts and academics have
come to accept a standard that I have suggested-"modified universalism"-
which is universalism adapted to the political realities of differing laws in a
world in which law is administered by nation-states." The objective is to
in which it operates. It is for that reason that most bankruptcy laws are national in scope, even in
countries like the United States where much commercial and property law is regional.").
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, 8. See Dan J. Schulman, The Constitution, Interest Groups, and the
Requirements of Uniformity: The United States Trustee and the Bankruptcy Administrator
Programs, 74 NEB. L. REV. 91, 99-105 (1995) (discussing the original intent behind the bankruptcy
power); Westbrook, supra note 10, at 2286-87 (noting that the Founders gave the national
government the power to govern general defaults while reserving the commercial law-making
power to states).
13. See, e.g., J.H. DALHUISEN, 1 DALHUISEN ON INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY AND
BANKRUPTCY 3-3, 3-11 (7th ed. 1986) (indicating that the need for coordination was becoming
more widely recognized among nations and asserting that "full faith and credit" treaties have
forwarded coordination in bankruptcy); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 7-8 (Morton J. Horwitz et al., eds., Arno Press Inc. 1972) (1834) (proposing that the public
welfare may necessitate exceptions to the general rule that the laws of one country are limited to
that country); Lowell, supra note 11, at 264; Kurt Nadelmann, Legal Treatment of Foreign and
Domestic Creditors, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 696, 709-10 (1946); Jay Lawrence Westbrook,
Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 457, 458 (1991); see also FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION OF STATUTES: A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICTS OF
LAWS 257-64 (William Guthrie trans., 2d ed. 1880) (discussing the peculiar nature of bankruptcy
and its implications on the conflict of laws); John D. Honsberger, Conflict of Laws and the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 631, 675 (1980) (discussing the trend
toward harmonization between the bankruptcy systems of the United States and Canada); Stefan A.
Riesenfeld, The Evolution of Modern Bankruptcy Law, 31 MINN. L. REV. 401, 415 & nn.95-97
(1947) (surveying classic leading scholarships in international insolvency law and theory of
universality); Barbara K. Unger, United States Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies, 19 INT'L L.
1153, 1183 (1985) (observing the U.S. courts' increasing recognition of foreign proceedings, which
demonstrates a more cooperative universality view).
14. See JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, CHARLES D. BOOTH, CHRISTOPH G. PAULUS & HARRY
RAJAK, A GLOBAL VIEW OF BUSINESS INSOLVENCY SYSTEMS 232 & n. 19 (2010) (discussing the
practical obstacles faced by a unitary approach as a result of the disparities in the laws of various
countries) [hereinafter WESTBROOK ET AL., A GLOBAL VIEW]; Westbrook, supra note 10, at 2299
(recognizing that to realize a universalist approach requires international consensus and would take
a long time).
15. See Cambridge Gas [2006] UKPC 26 [16]-[20] (appeal taken from Isle of Man)
(recognizing that English common law has traditionally believed the importance of universality in
international insolvency proceedings and that the underlying principle of universality requires
foreign courts' recognition and assistance); Rubin v. Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46 [51] (appeal
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produce results as close as possible to those that would emerge from a single
global proceeding.
Modified universalism lies at the heart of the Model Law.'6 The
traditional concept of "territorialism," or the "grab rule," has been largely
abandoned." Unlike territorialism, modified universalism requires a
"central" proceeding that serves a coordinating role, as well as a
sophisticated, policy-sensitive approach for choice of law.'8 The most
important task of a system of modified universalism is to identify the
jurisdiction that should host the central proceeding.
Under the Model Law, the "main" insolvency proceeding is the one
opened at the debtor's center of main interests, or COMI.1 9 The preferred
result under the Model Law is that the main proceeding should be the central
one that coordinates the global insolvency process. This Article discusses
circumstances in which that might not be true or might not be entirely true.
II. A Moratorium with Global Effect
The purposes of insolvency law cannot be vindicated without court
control of the affairs of a debtor. 20 To apply insolvency law properly to a
taken from Eng.) (accepting the "general principle of private international law. .. that bankruptcy
(whether personal or corporate) should be unitary and universal." (quoting In re HIH [2008] UKHL
21, [6]-[7] (appeal taken from Austl.))); ALI-ILL GLOBAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, princ. 10;
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
499, 517 (1991) ("[Modified universalism] accepts the central premise of universalism, that assets
should be collected and distributed on a worldwide basis, but reserves to local courts discretion to
evaluate the fairness of the home-country procedures and to protect the interests of local creditors.").
16. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Global and Out of Control?, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 79, 82-83,
86 (2005) (summarizing the history behind the promulgation of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which
incorporated the universalists' "home country" concept); see generally UNCITRAL MODEL LAW,
supra note 2.
17. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Universalism and Choice of Law, 23 PA. ST. INT'L L. REV.
625, 625 (2005) (noting that these traditional approaches have been replaced by modified
universalism).
18. See id. at 631-32 (explaining that, under the modified universalism approach, courts should
consider the usual choice of law factors like place of contracting, the parties' choice of law, principal
place of business, principal location of assets, location of most creditors, and the like); see also
WESTBROOK ET AL., A GLOBAL VIEW, supra note 14, at 238 (discussing how the degree of
adaptability of insolvency laws in different jurisdictions affects modern universalism and choice of
law).
19. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 2, art. 17(2)(a); see also WESTBROOK ET AL., A
GLOBAL VIEW, supra note 14, at 236 ("Under the lead of the European Union Regulation and the
UNCITRAL Model Law it becomes nowadays increasingly accepted that the correct place for
opening the main proceeding should be the center of the debtor's main interests.") (internal citations
omitted); Susan Block-Lieb, The UK and EU Cross-Border Insolvency Recognition: From Empire
to Europe to "Going It Alone ", 40 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1373, 1395-1400 (2017) (explaining the
application of the COMI test to British and European laws); Lynn M. LoPucki, Universalism
Unravels, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 143, 143 (2005) (describing the universalism approach under the
Model Law as applying the COMI country's law to control a company's worldwide bankruptcy).
20. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEAS L.
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global market requires the power to halt collection efforts all over the world
as quickly as possible to prevent the great loss of value that would result from
a mad scramble for assets by creditors. Control is also necessary to ensure
the allocation of that value in an orderly and fair way. The Model Law
provides for an automatic moratorium or injunction upon recognition of a
main proceeding by another jurisdiction. 21 The injunction provides the
necessary cooperation by enjoining seizures by creditors, thus giving the
courts control of the relevant assets in both the main and recognizing
jurisdictions. The Model Law also permits interim injunctive relief prior to
recognition.22 However, the scope of this recognition injunction is not
explicitly global and is subject to the constraints and limitations imposed
under the law of the recognizing state,2 3 so it is not a complete protection
against creditor or debtor activity inconsistent with the necessary court
control. That protection is also limited insofar as it may require some time to
obtain relief in other jurisdictions after the filing of the main proceeding.
A better solution would be a worldwide injunction, or "stay" (in some
countries a "moratorium"). No country in the world claims the power to
impose a stay everywhere on the planet. But its closest approximation is what
I would call an "indirect global stay," which is a stay that applies to any
person (or legal entity) subject to the personal jurisdiction of a court and
forbids that person from acting anywhere in the world in a way inconsistent
with the court's insolvency moratorium.24 Such a stay is limited because it
applies only to persons subject to the court's personal jurisdiction, but it is
global insofar as it restricts such persons' activities everywhere in the
world.25 While such a stay does not bind an actor not subject to personal
jurisdiction in the country issuing the stay, it can block a large amount of
debtor and creditor activity globally if the issuing court has personal
REV. 795, 823 (2004) (discussing the importance of control in enforcing the collective process of
bankruptcy); Oscar Couwenberg & Stephen J. Lubben, Corporate Bankruptcy Tourists, 70 Bus.
LAw. 719, 742 (2015) (noting that the global stay available in U.S. bankruptcy proceedings provides
better protection of debtors' assets and therefore was one of the reasons foreign corporations were
attracted to the idea of filing bankruptcy in the United States).
21. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 2, art. 20(l)(a).
22. See id. art. 19(1) (allowing courts to grant urgent relief upon application for recognition of
a foreign proceeding).
23. See id. art. 29 (noting that the Model Law does not necessarily import the consequences of
the foreign law into the insolvency system of the enacting state but that the relief granted may be
aligned with a comparable proceeding commenced under the law of the enacting state).
24. I offer this phrase because I have not seen a term used to describe this sort of effect that a
national court may give to an insolvency moratorium.
25. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Multinational Insolvency: A First Analysis of Unilateral
Jurisdiction, in NORTON ANNUAL REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY 11, 17-18 (2009)
(explaining the personal jurisdiction requirement for the U.S. Bankruptcy Court to exercise control
over bankruptcy proceedings, and the court's power to have effects on debtors' assets and actions
outside of the United States).
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jurisdiction over major creditors of a given debtor. For example, such a stay
issued in Manhattan as to Debtor Corporation would bind JPMorgan Chase,
which is undoubtedly subject to the orders of the bankruptcy court in that
place. Because U.S. law says the order constrains that bank everywhere in
the world,26 the stay may prevent a large amount of activity against Debtor
Corporation's assets in which that very large lender might otherwise engage.
III. Control Countries
Because it depends on personal jurisdiction, a stay has its greatest effect
when the issuing court is located in a country in which a number of major
international creditors do substantial business and therefore are subject to the
personal jurisdiction of that court.27 A court in a country that is an economic
backwater might not have personal jurisdiction over many important
creditors in a given case, but a country located in a financial center may have
great indirect power to constrain creditor activity everywhere. 2 8 The
bankruptcy courts in Manhattan are a good example, given that a substantial
percentage of the world's financial institutions do business there. I will call
countries whose courts are in that position "control countries." Three of the
26. See, e.g., U.S. Lines, Inc. v. GAC Marine Fuels Ltd. (In re McLean Indus.), 76 B.R. 291,
295-96 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding creditors subject to the U.S. court's jurisdiction and
enforcing as to property in Hong Kong and Singapore a worldwide automatic stay). Bankruptcy is
not the only area in which the United States sometimes issues injunctions that include conduct
outside its borders. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 410 (1965)
(affirming the imposition of a temporary injunction in an action by the United States for foreclosure
of a tax lien as against a Uruguayan corporation); see also Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling
Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1482 (9th Cir. 1992) (contempt sanctions issued against a Chinese party
for non-compliance with discovery order); In re Grand Jury Proceedings Bank of Nova Scotia, 740
F.2d 817, 829 (11th Cir. 1984) (contempt sanction issued against a Cayman Island party for non-
compliance with discovery order); Rogers v. Webster, No. 84-1096, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 13968,
at *9-10 (6th Cir. Oct. 22, 1985) (ordering delivery of stock certificates located in Canada to
Michigan); In re Gaming Lottery Sec. Litig., 96 Civ. 5567 (RPP), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1204, at
*18-19 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2001) (ordering delivery of bank accounts in Scotland to New York);
Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 12 N.Y.3d 533, 541 (2009) (ordering delivery of stock certificates
located in Bermuda to New York). Many other countries do the same. See, e.g., David Capper,
Worldwide Mareva Injunctions, 54 MOD. L. REv. 328, 329-30 (1991) (U.K. Mareva injunctions).
27. See, e.g., Sec. Inv'r Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 474 B.R. 76, 81
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (upholding bankruptcy court's extraterritorial application of the automatic stay,
rendering a creditor's action in the Cayman courts void); In re Nortel Networks Inc., No. 09-10138-
KG, 2011 WL 1154225, at *1 (D. Del. Mar. 29, 2011) (affirming bankruptcy court's order enjoining
administrative proceedings against the debtor in the United Kingdom in a multinational company's
bankruptcy proceeding); In re McLean Indus., Inc., 76 B.R. at 295-96. For a current sweeping
example, see Order Restating and Enforcing the Worldwide Automatic Stay, In re Seadrill Ltd.,
No. 6:17-BK-60079 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2017), ECF No. 91.
28. See Westbrook, supra note 25, at 17-18 ("[T]he effect of the automatic stay maybe to block
collection efforts anywhere in the world by any creditor that does business in the U.S., including
most of the major international lenders, underwriters, and investors.").
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countries that will often be in that position are the United Kingdom, the
United States, 29 and now Singapore. 3 0
While control countries may well serve as home to central proceedings
for multinational insolvencies-that is, might host the central proceeding for
a given case-their final insolvency judgments may be of limited value
unless they are recognized and enforced in countries that have territorial
control of the debtor's assets. The specific requirements for market-wide
recognition are discharge (or nonenforcement) of prior debts and recognition
of changes in title to property.3 1 After a reorganization plan has been
approved by a court with proper jurisdiction, only the debts recognized in the
plan should be enforceable in any country. 32 Following either a
reorganization or a liquidation, there must also be global acceptance of the
effect of the proceeding on title to property, especially as to the results of
sales. 33 If an insolvency-court judgment encounters substantial local
29. There may be some question about the extent of personal jurisdiction in such matters. See
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (sharp limitation on general jurisdiction); Walden v.
Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014) (limiting specific jurisdiction). This line of cases may suggest
difficulty in obtaining jurisdiction over foreign entities in bankruptcy proceedings, but the Supreme
Court has told us repeatedly that bankruptcy is an exceptional sort of legal procedure with special
rules. In the area of the Tenth Amendment, for example, the Court has found that states may be
subject to federal judgments in a way not possible in other sorts of federal lawsuits. See Cent. Va.
Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 362 (2006) ("Bankruptcy jurisdiction, at its core, is in rem.");
Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 447 (2004) ("The discharge of a debt by a
bankruptcy court is similarly an in rem proceeding."). See also Jay Lawrence Westbrook,
Interpretation Internationale, 87 Temple L. R. 739 at nn.37-39 (2015). The "in rem" analysis of
those cases is especially applicable to the automatic stay.
30. See Companies (Amendment) Act 2017, 211B(1)(d) (Sing.) (allowing Singapore courts
to issue an order "restraining the commencement, continuation or levying of any execution, distress
or other legal process against any property of the company"). This provision was added in the recent
reform in which the Model Law was adopted. NAT'L ARCHIVES OF SINGAPORE, FACT SHEET ON
THE COMPANIES (AMENDMENT) BILL 2017 AND LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS
(AMENDMENT) BILL 2017, http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/20170310004
/Factsheet%20on%2OCA%20and%20LLP%2OAct%20amendmentsmedia.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3F23-HXHG].
31. See ALI-III GLOBAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, princ. 27.1 (requiring each administrator
in parallel international insolvency proceedings to obtain court approval of any action affecting
assets or operations in a particular jurisdiction if approval is required under the laws of that
jurisdiction). As to discharge, a control country would be able to bind a number of creditors by a
discharge injunction like that arising from a chapter 11 plan in the United States, but there would
likely be many smaller local creditors and property owners who would not be bound. The result
would be highly inefficient and litigious. The same thing would be true of property-rights rulings
including the validity of sales. Of course, it may be possible in a given case to buy out all such
creditors and owners at a reasonable cost. There might remain problems of public policy and judicial
conflict, especially at the COMI.
32. See, e.g., id. princ. 37 & cmt. (recognizing a plan of reorganization adopted by a main
proceeding under stated conditions, including notice).
33. See id. princ. 29, 36, 37 & comts. (demanding that each state assist and recognize the sales
that generate maximum value for debtor's assets, and designating the reorganization plan adopted
by a main proceeding as final and binding upon the debtor and every creditor when the issuing state
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resistance to recognition and enforcement, the reorganization or sale may be
a fiasco.
The need for a consensus on the standard for choosing a central court is
actually increased as countries adopt an indirect global stay because its
adoption will itself create a greater possibility of conflict among jurisdictions,
especially control countries. Thus, a court who claims the role of the central
court as to a debtor should seek to adopt standards that will encourage other
courts to accept that court's jurisdiction as legitimate and to enforce the
results obtained in the central court. Where that is true, efficient and effective
coordination of international insolvency proceedings can be achieved.
IV. Choice of Central Court
A. Incorporation versus COMI
Some courts continue to look to the traditional notion that the central
court should be the one presiding where a debtor company is incorporated.34
A recent Scottish decision has strikingly highlighted the anomalies in the
registration approach as applied in a globalizing world. 35 It adopted the
common law idea that the law of the jurisdiction of incorporation controls the
affairs of the corporation to apply Scotland's law to a thoroughly Indian
company. In so doing, it stated that it was following the Privy Council in the
Singularis case but ignored the Model Law, which applied in Scotland as it
did not in Singularis.36
The Pacific Andes bankruptcy, discussed below, further illustrates the
defects of the incorporation approach: diffusing control of a multinational
insolvency and adding to expense and difficulty. It increases the likelihood
of wasteful expense and inefficient results. It is noteworthy that in the recent
court has international jurisdiction over the debtor and there is no pending parallel proceeding).
34. See, e.g., Singularis Holdings Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers [2014] UKPC 36, [12]
(appeal taken from Berm.) (elaborating on the common law rule of comity that recognizes the
vesting of a company's assets under the law of its incorporation); Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFCS
Ltd. v. Bank of Am. (in re Eurofood IFCS), N.A., 2006 E.C.R. 1-3813, 1-3844-45 (finding the center
of the debtor's main interests in the country of its incorporation instead of the country of its
administration). Some courts have reached that result only because they did not proceed beyond the
presumption in the Model Law. Cf infra note 40. For more detailed discussion, see Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, Locating the Eye of the Financial Storm, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1019, 1028-30 (2007).
35. In re Hooley Ltd. [2016] CSOH 141 (Scot.).
36. See In re Hooley Ltd. [2016] CSOH 141 [33]-[36] (Scot.) (finding foreign proceedings in
India as ancillary to insolvency proceedings in Scotland because Scotland is the debtor's place of
incorporation). In reaching its decision, the court cited Singularis, a case involving countries that
had not adopted the Model Law and therefore applied common law principles. Singularis, UKPC
36, [1], [9].
1482 [Vol. 96:1473
2018] Global Insolvency Proceedings for a Global Market
Opti-Medix37 case the Singapore court focused on COMI-type factors for
choosing a central court rather than the old incorporation doctrine.3 8
COMI (the- location of the "main" proceeding) is the central-court
concept generally accepted in the United States, the European Union, and
elsewhere. 39 In the Model Law, the place of incorporation remains as an
initial presumption about the center of the debtor's affairs,40 but ease of
manipulation and lack of connection to economic reality have made that
standard subject to challenge in contentious insolvency cases.4 1 On the other
hand, the empirical work that I and others have done in the United States has
shown that COMI is rarely subject to serious dispute in U.S. cases under the
Model Law. 42 In turn, the finding of COMI in a jurisdiction provides a strong,
legitimate basis for recognition of that jurisdiction's proceeding as central
and promotes deference to its rulings to the maximum extent possible under
local laws.43
B. Non-COMI Central Court
Nonetheless, there are circumstances in which it may be plausible to
argue for a central court other than the COMI court:
1. Where the case cannot be filed in the COMI court;4 4
37. Re Opti-Medix Ltd. [2016] SGHC 108 (Sing.).
38. See id. at [24]-[25] (using the COMI test and recognizing the main insolvency proceedings
in Japan, where the debtor's principle businesses were carried out).
39. 11 U.S.C. 1502(4) (2012); Regulation 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 20 May 2015 on Insolvency Proceedings (Recast), 2015 O.J. (L 141) 19, 21-22;
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 2, art. 2(b); Block-Lieb, supra note 19, at 1395-1400.
40. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 2, at 8 ("In the absence of proof to the contrary, the
debtor's registered office, or habitual residence in the case of an individual, is presumed to be the
centre of the debtor's main interests.").
41. See, e.g., In re Bear Steams High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd.,
374 B.R. 122, 129 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (refusing to recognize Cayman Islands proceedings
despite Cayman Islands being the place of the debtor's incorporation); In re BRAC Rent-A-Car Int'l
Inc. [2003] EWHC (Ch) 128 [1], [4]-[5] (Eng.) (finding English court's jurisdiction to make an
administration order over debtor company, which is incorporated in Delaware, United States,
because debtor's center of main interest is in England and it had no employees in the United States);
MG Rover [2005] EWHC 874 (Ch) (Eng.) (finding MC Rover France's center of principal interest
located in England despite the company registration in France).
42. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, An Empirical Study of the Implementation in the United
States of the Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247, 261-62 (2013)
(reporting that the COMI-based objection was raised only in 64 out of 573 chapter 15 cases in the
study, and the argument was seriously litigated in only 7% of the overall cases).
43. Westbrook, supra note 34, at 1032-33. Sometimes local laws will not permit a grant of all
of the relief that the central court has prescribed. For example, in a few countries it may not be
possible to do anything that affects the rights of a secured creditor.
44. See Stipulation as to Republic of Marshall Islands Law, In re Ocean Rig UDW, Inc., 570




2. Where the insolvency system in place in the COMI jurisdiction is
simply unable to properly manage a multinational case, so that a
filing in a control court would better serve all or virtually all the
debtor's stakeholders; and
3. Where it is claimed that there is consent to the non-COMI court as
the central court.
The first case is self-explanatory.
The most common situation under the second heading may be where the
laws of the COMI country do not permit invocation of an indirect global stay
and the debtor cannot be efficiently reorganized or liquidated on a global
basis without such a stay. As long as the debtor company has a significant
connection with a control court, it may be in the best interests of all concerned
to permit that court to take over the case and manage it on a worldwide basis.
On the other hand, the control court might still defer to the COMI court,
providing the stay as assistance to that court, something that happened
between the United States and Japan some years ago.4 5 Another example is a
debtor whose COMI jurisdiction lacks any reorganization proceeding in its
laws, while the debtor is a solvent company with a cash-flow problem such
that virtually all of its stakeholders would benefit from a reorganization under
a modern statute.
A recent case of a corporate group, Pacific Andes Resources
Development Limited, includes some elements of both examples. Pacific
Andes had subsidiaries in Peru that were in insolvency proceedings there,
while its parent holding company filed in Singapore, which may have been
its COMI. 46 It appears that neither Peru nor Singapore was able at that time
to impose an indirect global stay, 47 so some of its lenders proceeded to file
full insolvency proceedings and take other actions in several other
jurisdictions. The debtor group responded by filing several of its affiliates in
a chapter 11 proceeding in New York, where the bankruptcy court had
personal jurisdiction over the key creditors and thus could enforce an indirect
global stay. 48
The case illustrates some of the serious issues that can arise when a
potential control country (here, the United States) assumes jurisdiction. First,
45. Arnold M. Quittner, Cross-Border Insolvencies - Ancillary and Full Cases: The
Concurrent Japanese and United States Cases ofMaruko Inc., 4 INT'L INSOLVENCY REV. 171, 181
(1995).
46. See In re Pac. Andes Res. Dev. Ltd. [2016] SGHC 210, [4] (Sing.) (noting that PARD was
listed on the Singapore Exchange and carried out business activity in Singapore). "China Fisheries"
is another common name for this case.
47. See id. at [53] (denying a global stay).
48. See In re China Fishery Grp. Ltd. (Cayman), No. 16-11895 (JLG), 2016 WL 6875903, at
*1-3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2016) (granting creditors' motion for the appointment of a
chapter II1 trustee).
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the United States had no substantial connection with the corporate group or
any of its affiliates.49 American jurisdiction was founded on a fictional
connection arising from the deposit of money with the group's law firm in
New York.50 If one believed action by the U.S. court was justified
nonetheless because of the absence of an alternative jurisdiction able to
impose the necessary multinational stay, the court could have deferred to the
Singaporean or Peruvian courts, using its control-country power in aid of
coordination by the central court. Instead, it chose to take over the case and
appoint a trustee to seek a solution on a worldwide basis.5 ' While I am not
involved in the case and do not know the details, I cannot believe that a U.S.
court should take a central role absent a substantial connection with the
debtor or the debtor group.52
Another separate insolvency proceeding was filed after the U.S. court
acted, this time in the British Virgin Islands (BVI) where some of the Pacific
Andes group affiliates were incorporated. 53 Lack of perceived legitimacy of
the U.S. proceeding may have been part of the reason for this additional
filing. Overall there have been proceedings in four or five jurisdictions and a
great need for international coordination.
Pacific Andes would have been a quite different case if the debtor had
had substantial assets or operations in the United States. That fact combined
with the special position of the United States as a control country might have
justified the United States acting as the central court and the COMI court
might have agreed. If the COMI court did not agree, the courts, directly or
49. See id. at *2 (recognizing that the Debtors China Fishery Group comprise a small part of
the Pacific Andes Group of companies and have no assets in the United States apart from retainers
pre-paid to advisors).
50. See id.
51. See id. at *20 (asserting that a trustee would be able to review and address Debtors' balances
and investigate accounting irregularities without conflicts of interest, facilitate between hostile
parties in the proposal, and evaluate the optimal way to maximize and realize the value of the
Peruvian business; it should be said that the trustee has apparently been doing all that pretty well).
It remains to be seen if the prestige of the American courts can overcome the fictional nature of this
jurisdictional assertion.
52. Cf In re Patriot Coal Corp., 482 B.R. 718, 747 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (referring to
domestic venue, explaining that a forum like Manhattan would always trump many other fora if
only efficiency mattered). In that case, Judge Chapman also noted that the location of key corporate
functions matters more when the company is seeking to reorganize. Id. at 753-54. See generally
Gregory W. Fox, Patriot Coal: Interest of Justice Trumps Convenience of the Parties, 32 AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2013, at 20. The larger point, for another day, is that bankruptcy implicates
many public interests that should be considered by the courts most closely connected with the debtor
company by real economic ties.
53. See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Pac. Andes Enter. (BVI) Ltd. (In re Pac. Andes Enter. (BVI)
Ltd.), BVIHC (COM) 132 (2016), at https://www.eccourts.org/bank-america-n-v-pacific-andes
-enterprises-bvi-limited-et-al/ [https://perma.cc/T2QN-3MY8] (allowing the Debtors' corporate




through the professionals, could seek a middle ground in negotiations, as
discussed below.54 In that situation, at least three courts important to the
result-Singapore, the BVI, and the United States-would be adherents to
the Model Law and thus required by statute to communicate and cooperate. 55
A closely related point is the claim in some cases that a court other than
the COMI court has "better law" and should therefore take the central role.5 6
In a broad sense, that is the basis for a court to exercise the role of a central
court in the cases discussed above where the COMI court cannot enforce an
indirect global stay effectively or where that jurisdiction lacks a
reorganization law and a reorganization is clearly best for all concerned.
However, this justification blurs in a more nuanced circumstance where a
COMI country has the necessary legal tools, but its laws will not permit the
relief that some or all of the parties would like to see.
A leading example of this last situation in the United States involved a
foreign airline that had regular flights to New York, along with many other
destinations. 57 It presumably had assets of the usual sort associated with
regular airline activities in the United States, but its COMI was clearly in
another country. 58 Despite recently enacted modern legislation in the COMI
country, the U.S. bankruptcy court found that the United States had "better
law" for the case because of the favorable treatment that U.S. bankruptcy law
provided to airplane lessees.59 It is hard to see just why the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code necessarily represented better choices than the decisions the legislators
in the COMI country had made for their companies in their recent
enactment-especially as applied to their national airline. This example
illustrates why the "better law" ground may be subject to serious challenge
as to the legitimacy of a non-COMI court's assumption of the role of central
54. See infra text accompanying notes 87-90.
55. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 2, at 95 (explaining that articles 25 and 26
mandate cross-border cooperation by providing that the court and the insolvency representative
"shall cooperate to the maximum extent possible"). Note that the statutory language is not precatory.
For more discussion of Model Law communication requirements, see generally Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, The Duty to Seek Cooperation in Multinational Insolvency Cases, in THE CHALLENGES
OF INSOLVENCY LAW REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY 361 (Henry Peter et al., eds., 2006), reprinted
in ANNUAL REVIEW OF INSOLVENCY LAW 187 (Janis P. Sarra ed., 2004).
56. See Westbrook, supra note 54, at 23-28 (explaining the "better law" arguments). See also
In re Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia S.A. Avianca, 303 B.R. 1, 10-11 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(pointing out that both the creditors and debtors had benefitted from application of U.S. law and
that applicable Colombian bankruptcy law was relatively new and untested); In re Monitor Single
Lift I, Ltd., 381 B.R. 455, 469 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting the additional protections that U.S.
bankruptcy laws provide to debtors).
57. In re Avianca, 303 B.R. at 1.
58. Id. at 3-4 (finding that Avianca has 14 locations in Colombia and 12 locations in other
countries, mostly in Central and South America, and that Avianca employed 4,153 employees in
Colombia and 28 in the United States, but allowing Debtor's chapter 11 proceeding to continue in
the United States).
59. Id. at 10-11.
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court. That role may thus be seen as illegitimate and may provoke a justified
refusal to enforce the result.
Another case in which there is reason to question a non-COMI
assumption of jurisdiction would arise where the debtor is not eligible to file
an insolvency proceeding in the COMI country. For example, in the United
States and some other countries, an insurance company cannot file for
bankruptcy; 60 there is a separate procedure for distressed insurers that is
initiated by regulators. Should an English court permit an American insurer
to file an insolvency proceeding in England? It would not be inconsistent
with the Model Law if the English court simply accepted the filing and
maintained the status quo in England, along with protection of English
creditors, in close consultation with the American regulators and with a
proceeding brought in the United States. A plenary proceeding with a claim
to global effects on the U.S. insurance company and its stakeholders would
not be legitimate.
The third ground to support non-COMI management of a case is
consent. 6 1 In the airline case discussed above, it appeared that the great
majority of creditors preferred the United States as a forum.6 2 Yet the
decision arose from precisely the fact that one substantial creditor objected
to United States management. 63 Absent unanimous agreement (which might
suggest an out-of-court solution in the first place), it seems problematic to
rest non-COMI case management on consent. The ultimate practical solution
that balances cost and fairness may require negotiation among courts as well
as the parties unless the circumstances permit a buyout of the dissenting
creditors. This solution should start from the idea that the proceeding should
be centered in the COMI jurisdiction absent strong reasons to the contrary. 64
A situation that may involve consent is the quandary posed by the
"solitary non-COMI proceeding." 65 The airline case was an example here,
too. It is clear that the non-COMI jurisdiction (in that case, the United States)
has the right to deal with the case as to its creditors and the assets it controls,
60. 11 U.S.C. 109(b)(2) (2012).
61. See TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY: COOPERATION AMONG THE NAFTA COUNTRIES,
INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY LAW 76 (AM. LAW INST. 2003)
(stating that the U.S. courts can exercise control over debtors' overseas assets and prohibit creditors
access to these assets only if (1) the U.S. courts have jurisdiction over the creditors, or (2) "[the
creditors] have consented to United States jurisdiction").
62. In re Avianca, 303 B.R. at 8.
63. Id. at 7-8.
64. Any exceptions create the risk of unjustified deviations because of the disincentives
discussed below.
65. I use this name to refer to a proceeding that could have been brought in its COMI




provided no COMI proceeding is filed. But a series of such cases would be a
return to the inefficiencies and inequities of territorialism.
Instead, the non-COMI jurisdiction should maintain the status quo
(possibly including the exercise of an indirect global stay) but order extensive
notice to all creditors, including those in the COMI jurisdiction, along with
notice to the appropriate court and officials responsible for insolvency
matters in the COMI jurisdiction. If no proceeding is filed within a reasonable
time, the non-COMI court could then proceed on a worldwide basis. If a
proceeding is filed in the COMI jurisdiction, the non-COMI court still could
maintain the status quo for the benefit of a worldwide proceeding led by the
COMI court. In this way, a global-market approach could be maintained
while adapting to the realities of a specific case. 66
V. Obstacles to Cooperation in Coordination Through a Central Court
Although a variety of factors challenge that multinational coordination,
the three most important are as follows:
1. The variations in national policies concerning allocation of values
realized in insolvency proceedings;
2. The treatment of corporate groups; and
3. The incentives for professionals to resist centralization.
A. Differing Policies and Priorities
Several factors may result in varying allocations of value in a given case,
but the most important are differences in national policies about social or
commercial priorities. It is important to realize that these differences in
policies comprise not merely traditional liquidation-distribution rules, but
broader issues of preferred results. For example, some countries will be more
concerned with preserving employment while others will emphasize a quick
return to creditors. Given these varying policies and a natural concern for
local stakeholders, courts must be persuaded that the overall benefits of
cooperation in multinational cases exceed the costs of accepting a
compromise in the application of local priorities and social policies.6 7 The
66. On some occasions, the COMI is unclear. This problem can arise where the principal
executive office and the principal assets of the debtor are in different jurisdictions. The awkward
result is best resolved by negotiation as discussed below, with each jurisdiction maintaining the
status quo in the meantime. See infra text accompanying notes 87-90.
67. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of
Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457, 465 nn. 27-28 and accompanying text (1991)
(exploring this issue).
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case for their cooperation must include their agreement that the court seeking
to act as the central court is truly entitled to assume that role.
B. Corporate Groups
A corporate group presents an important, common, and sometimes
difficult case, largely because of legal technicalities. The group should
ordinarily be understood to require the same unified treatment as an
individual company. Generally, when a corporate parent files a bankruptcy
proceeding, its COMI should be considered the COMI for the group.
However, there are sometimes obstacles to this common-sense solution. First,
some laws insist that each subsidiary must file in its own COMI as if it were
an entirely independent entity6 8-a result that elevates form over substance
in the great majority of cases. Second, because subsidiaries are routinely
incorporated in various jurisdictions for tax and other reasons, jurisdictions
that insist on an incorporation-based COMI almost guarantee a scattered and
diffuse set of filings-as in the Pacific Andes case.6 9 The diffuse filings make
liquidation inefficient 70 and reorganization very difficult. Although some
have concerns about ignoring the corporate form, permitting the affiliates to
file with the parent in no way requires some form of consolidation of assets
and liabilities other than for purely administrative purposes. 71
C. Disincentives of Professionals
The third serious obstacle to centralized coordination is the natural
desire of professionals-lawyers, accountants, investment bankers, and
others-to seek substantial opportunities for professional employment in the
jurisdictions where they practice. A number of cases have failed to achieve
coordination in recent years at least in part because of this difficulty. When
the professional fees and costs for a company like Nortel in North America
68. See U.N. Secretariat, Centre of Main Interests in the Context of an Enterprise Group, Note
by the Secretariat, 5, 16, UNCITRAL Working Grp. V (Insolvency Law), U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.114 (Feb. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Centre of Main Interests] (reporting that an
entity-by-entity approach to COMI of members of an enterprise group has been maintained, and the
difficulty of defining COMI for enterprise group demands a focus on facilitating coordination and
cooperation between the various courts); U.N. Secretariat, Treatment of Corporate Groups in
Insolvency, 4, UNCITRAL Working Grp. V (Insolvency Law), U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.76/Add.2 (Mar. 6, 2007) [hereinafter Treatment of Corporate Groups] (noting
that the Model Law does not specifically address the concept of COMI as it might apply to a
corporate group).
69. Treatment of Corporate Groups, supra note 68, 6 (indicating that if the COMI test were
adopted for each individual member in a corporate group, it would likely lead to insolvency
proceedings being commenced in different jurisdictions).
70. See the discussion of Nortel, infra text accompanying notes at 72-82.
71. A second obstacle to a simple group COMI, where the subsidiaries file with the parent, is
that sometimes the parent does not file. All these situations cry out for negotiated solutions, often
requiring substantial judicial encouragement.
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can reach nearly $2 billion,72 it is understandable that local practitioners
would oppose coordination procedures that they believe will leave them
substantially excluded and that local judges would feel social pressure to
prevent that exclusion. On the other hand, the Nortel73 case paradoxically
demonstrates the enormous benefits of coordination.
Nortel was a true multinational group engaged in the development and
marketing of certain kinds of high-tech gear all over the world.7 4 The parent
company was based in Canada, as was the main operating subsidiary, while
much of its business involved a subsidiary in the United States.7 5 It also had
subsidiaries in Europe, notably in the United Kingdom. Insolvency
proceedings were filed in those three jurisdictions, although the United
Kingdom court did not participate in the major international decisions in
Nortel.76 The results in the case represented the high and the low of recent
multinational insolvencies:
High. After reorganization failed, the parties cooperated to sell the
debtor's assets on a global basis, in large pieces that spanned many countries.
In particular, the global sale of intellectual property yielded many billions of
dollars. 77 The cooperative disposition, without regard to jurisdiction or
geography, produced far more value than any isolated, jurisdiction-by-
jurisdiction sales could have achieved. This result represented modified
universalism at its best.
Low. After the great sales success, the parties could not agree on
allocation of the roughly $7 billion in proceeds, rejecting repeated pleas by
the U.S. and Canadian courts that the parties resolve the issue by negotiation
or arbitration. 78 The final resolution took years, resulting in the nearly
72. Jeff Montgomery, Nortel OK'd for $14.2M Payout Amid 'Pandora's Box' Warnings,
LAw360 (June 6, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/803875/nortel-ok-d-for-14-2m-payout
-amid-pandora-s-box-warnings [https://perma.cc/T3C4-GLH9] (reporting that the professional fee
payouts in the case reached more than $1.9 billion in the United States by June 2016).
73. In re Nortel Networks, Inc., 669 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2011). I gave an opinion as an expert
witness in the case on behalf of the UK pension creditors.
74. Id. at 130-31.
75. Id. at 131.
76. Id.
77. Nortel Networks Inc. v. Ernst & Young Inc. (In re Nortel Networks Inc.), Nos. 15-
196(LPS), 15-197(LPS), 2016 WL 2899225, at *1 & n.1 (D. Del. 2016) (introducing the background
of this litigation related to the allocation of the $7.3 billion proceeds of court-supervised sales of
assets, principally an extensive portfolio of patents).
78. See, e.g., In re Nortel Networks, Inc., 669 F.3d at 143. The court observed:
Mediation, or continuation of whatever mediation is ongoing, by the parties in good
faith is needed to resolve the differences. No party will benefit if the parties continue
to clash over every statement and over every step in the process. This will result in
wasteful depletion of the available assets from which each seeks a portion.
Id.
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$2 billion of professional fees and costs. 79 The resolution of the case required
joint management between the Canadian and U.S. courts, including a joint
televised trial and coordinated (although independent) decisions by the two
courts. 80 While the courts involved did a wonderful job in managing the
awkward jumble of litigation, it seems clear that large amounts of money and
time would have been saved had either court been permitted to manage the
case centrally, albeit with mutual consultation at every stage.
In the Nortel case, as in other large cases in recent years, there was a
failure to act quickly at the start of the case to seek recognition and
coordination among the courts involved. The result is two or more
independent insolvency proceedings with limited cooperation. The Lehman
insolvency is a notable example. In the Lehman case, recognition and
coordination were not even sought for many months. 81 In Nortel, the efforts
were less laggard, but still too little and too late to produce the best results.
Early cooperation permits the establishment of protocols and lines of
authority in a cooperative direction from the start. It also has the benefit of
being put in place before tactical considerations have become so apparent as
to make it difficult for parties to agree. 82
I do not suggest for a moment that the professionals in these and other
cases planned, much less conspired, to delay or defeat coordination so they
could feather their own nests. But I do think that the incentives for
professionals are such that they require judicial encouragement to focus on
international cooperation and recognition from the very start of a case-or
indeed, during workout negotiations prior to any insolvency filing.8 3 I think
79. Montgomery, supra note 72.
80. In re Nortel Networks Inc., 2016 WL 2899225, at *1; see also Tom Hals, Nortel Cleared
to End Bankruptcy, Distribute $7 Billion to Creditors, REUTERS (Jan. 24, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nortelnetworks-bankruptcy/nortel-cleared-to-end-bankruptcy
-distribute-7-billion-to-creditors-idUSKBN1582TO [https://perma.cc/CDR8-UZ4S] (reporting that
the two courts were linked by video throughout the proceedings).
81. After the filing of bankruptcy, it took the insolvency administrators of the eighteen
Lehman's affiliates seven months to work out a coordination and cooperation protocol. Lehman
Bros. Holdings Inc., Cross Border Insolvency Protocol for the Lehman Brothers Group of
Companies (May 12, 2009), https://www.insol.org/Fellowship%202010/Session%209/Lehman
%20protocol%20executed.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3KF-L3RE]. For further discussion, see Hon.
Allan L. Gropper, The Model Law After Five Years: The U.S. Experience with COMI, in LESSONS
LEARNED AND PROBLEMS EXPOSED IN CROSS-BORDER CASES: THE JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE (Int'l
Insolvency Inst. ed., 2010), https://www.iiiglobal.org/sites/default/files/AllanGropper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z7L3-JSLL].
82. There is a sort of Rawlsian proposition here that parties will be more cooperative and
focused on common interests-like maximization of value-when the rush of events at the start of
a case provides something of a "veil of ignorance." See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 17 (rev. ed. 1999).
83. If a clear judicial signal is sent that, after filing, professionals will be asked pointed
questions about pre-filing negotiations with regard to these cooperation issues, professionals will
be encouraged to give them attention even before filing.
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that judicial encouragement may also serve to overcome difficulties of
coordination among professionals who are naturally motivated to consider
tactical and strategic advantages for their clients and who lack a broad vision
of the needs of the case as a whole. In short, there is a substantial need for
judicial activism to guide the parties toward the best results. Where such
activism may be found, there will be opportunities for professionals to
advance the interests of their clients by being in the forefront of an
internationalist approach and being seen by the courts as taking cooperative
and efficiency-promoting positions.
VI. Strategies for Coordination
At the heart of the needed process is communication. When we were
working on the UNCITRAL negotiations that produced the Model Law in
the mid-Nineties, our inclusion of provisions concerning communication,
including direct communication among courts, was regarded by many as
radical and dangerous. 84 But we persisted in that effort through the American
Law Institute Transnational Project. Others took up the banner in the Global
Principles effort at the International Insolvency Institute. 85 These
communications have increasingly become routine, although not always
timely. Most recently, the creation of the Judicial Insolvency Network (JIN)
and its Guidelines further extend those initiatives. 86 A special virtue of the
84. See U.N. Secretariat, Cross-Border Insolvency: Possible Issues Relating to Judicial
Cooperation and Access and Recognition in Case of Cross-Border Insolvency, 99-100,
UNCITRAL Working Grp. V (Insolvency Law), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.42 (Sept. 26, 1995)
(recognizing that communications between judges "may raise varying degrees of concern in
particular in legal systems that are not accustomed to such initiatives by judges, and also concerns
about procedural safeguards for the parties"); UNCITRAL, Rep. of the Working Group on
Insolvency Law on the Work of the Eighteenth Session, 82, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/419 (Dec. 1, 1995)
(discussing judicial communication as an aspect of cooperation); AM. LAW INST., TRANSNATIONAL
INSOLVENCY PROJECT: INTERIM REPORT 7-8 (1999) (reporting that some of the proposals being
considered "are necessarily controversial," and special difficulties existed in implementing any
particular approach to cooperation); Memorandum from Jay Lawrence Westbrook to Nat'l Bankr.
Review Comm'n, Am. Law Inst. Transnational Insolvency Project 3 (July 29, 1997) ("The
[UNCITRAL] insolvency project began with countries very reluctant to take substantial steps
toward cooperation with foreign proceedings.").
85. ALI-III GLOBAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 11.
86. See generally GUIDELINES FOR COMMUNICATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN COURTS
IN CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY MATTERS (Judicial Insolvency Network ed. 2016), http://www
.insol.org/emailer/January_2017_downloads/docla.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RRL-QESH] (providing
rules to improve the interests of those involved in cross-border insolvency proceedings by
"enhancing coordination and cooperation amongst courts under whose supervision such
proceedings are being conducted"). Recently, the chief bankruptcy judge for the Southern District
of Florida has ordered the adoption of JIN Guidelines on court-to-court communication and
cooperation. Adoption of Guidelines for Communication and Cooperation Between Courts in Cross-
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JIN initiative comes from the fact that the establishment of personal
relationships among commercial judges from different countries is a key to
success in multinational cases. In that regard, not the least important benefit
of the JIN Guidelines is the likelihood that they will tend to produce early
direct communication by judges (with due notice to all) and will incentivize
professionals to act quickly as well.
It may be useful to offer one example of an approach that can produce
coordinated results. Some years ago, a financial company in North America
called Inverworld collapsed in scandal, revealing that it had defrauded large
numbers of investors in the United States and a number of Latin American
countries of hundreds of millions of dollars.87 The accountants had uncovered
quite substantial assets for distribution, although much less than enough to
pay creditors in full. Insolvency proceedings were brought in the United
States, the Cayman Islands, and England.88
The representatives of various parties in the case agreed to a protocol
that led to dismissal of the English insolvency proceeding, upon certain
conditions protecting the claimants therein, and the allocation of functions
between the two remaining courts. 89 The U.S. court was to resolve the
outstanding legal and factual issues relating to entitlements as among various
classes of investors, while the Cayman Islands court was to oversee the
creation and operation of the mechanism of distribution of proceeds to
claimants. Each court was to take the other court's actions as binding and
thus to prevent parallel litigation. Ultimately, the process agreed to in the
protocol led to a worldwide settlement at a cost far less than would have
attended a three-court struggle.9 0
The key point is that there was substantial communication directed to
the global case and its resolution. The judges involved actively encouraged
the professionals to engage in cross-border negotiations with an emphasis on
non-litigious solutions despite plausible conflicting claims for several groups
of claimants under each of the seven arguably applicable laws. The
professionals from each jurisdiction were importantly involved. Judicial
activism combined with a first-rate performance by the professionals
produced spectacularly fast, fair, and efficient results.
[https://perma.cc/ANB6-WLVP].
87. San Antonio Express-News v. Blackwell (In re Blackwell), 263 B.R. 505, 506 (W.D. Tex.
2000).
88. Id.
89. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, International Judicial Negotiation, 38 TEx. INT'L L.J. 567,
571 (2003) for a detailed discussion of the Inverworld case. I should mention I was appointed
"special counsel" in the case and given a role similar to that of an examiner under 1104(c) of the
Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. 1104(c) (2012).




Globalization continues to accelerate; new supply chains form every
day. It is fueled by the enormous wealth it creates, despite the inevitable
debacles it leaves in its wake. Globalization of the management of financial
distress will be its companion. Some insist the process must await elegant
ruminations about the evolution of the common law or endless debates over
treaties about cross-border insolvency, but they will be disappointed.
Economics will incentivize procedures to make cross-border insolvency
proceedings efficient, and citizens will demand procedures to make it fair.
Those results require cooperation around a coordinating central jurisdiction
and the internationalization of the relevant professions. While legislation is
necessary, the courts will, as always, be confronted with issues that run ahead
of the legislative process. Indeed, court decisions will often drive that
process. Judges and lawyers will continue to build the international
insolvency system even though it's a bit like completing the assembly of an
aircraft while in flight.
It is an exciting time to be an international lawyer or judge and not a
time for the timid.
1494 [Vol. 96:1473
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SCHOOL OF LAW PUBLICATIONS
Providing support for superb legal academic publications
to a worldwide audience of legal practitioners.
The University of Texas School of Law is proud to offer






Texas International Law Journal
http://www.tilj.org/
American Journal of Criminal Law
http://www.ajcl.org
Texas Review of Law & Politics
http://www.trolp.org
The Review of Litigation
http://www.thereviewoflitigation.org
Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal
http://www.tiplj.org
Texas Environmental Law Journal
http://www.telj.org
Texas Journal On Civil Liberties & Civil Rights
http://www.txjclcr.org
Texas Hispanic Journal of Law & Policy
http://thjlp.law.utexas.edu
Texas Review of Entertainment & Sports Law
http://www.utexas.edu/law/journals/tresl/













The Greenbook: Texas Rules of Form, 13th ed. 2015
Manual on Usage & Style, 14th ed. 2017
The Blackbook: An Oil and Gas Citation and Legal Research Guide
To order, please contact:
The University of Texas School of Law Publications
727 E. Dean Keeton St.
Austin, TX 78705 U.S.A.
Publications@law.utexas.edu
(512) 232-1149 fax (512) 471-6988
ORDER ONLINE AT:
http://www.texaslawpublications.com




Jamail Center for Legal Research
The Tarlton Law Library Oral History Series Features interviews with outstanding
alumni and faculty of The University of Texas School of Law.
Oral History Series
No. 1 - Joseph D. Jamail, Jr.
No. 2 - Harry M Reasoner
No. 3 - Robert O. Dawson
No. 4 - J. Leon Lebowitz
No. 5 - Hans W Baade
No. 6 - James DeAnda
No. 7 - Russell J. Weintraub
No. 8 - Oscar H. Mauzy
No. 9 - Roy M Mersky
No. 10 -John F Sutton, Jr
No. 11 - M Michael Sharlot
No. 12 -Ernest E. Smith
No. 13 - Lino A. Graglia
No. 14 - Stanley M Johanson
No. 15 -John J. Sampson
No. 16 - Mark G. Yudof
No. 17 - Custis Wright
No. 18 - William Allison
No. 19 - Cynthia Bryant
No. 20 - Olin Guy Wellborn
No. 21 - Lucas A. Powe, Jr
Forthcoming: No. 22 - Jay Westbrook
$20 each. Order online at http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/archives-and-special-collections/oral-history
or contact the Publications Coordinator,
Tarlton Law Library, The University of Texas School of Law,
727 E. Dean Keeton Street, Austin, Texas 78705






We Complete the Picture.
dl 1932, Joe Christensen founded a company based on Value Quality and
Service. Joe Christensen, Inc. remains the most experienced Law Review
printer in the country.
Our printing services bridge the gap between your editorial skills and the
production of a high-quality publication. We ease the demands of your








Texas Rules of Form
Thirteenth Edition




A pocket reference guide on style for all legal writing
Newly revised and released in Fall 2017
School of Law Publications
University of Texas at Austin
727 East Dean Keeton Street
Austin, Texas USA 78705
Fax: (512) 471-6988 Tel: (512) 232-1149
Order online: http://www.utexas.edu/law/publications
1 , UN D -E D t
